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Abstract 
In this work, I present an interpretation of two thinkers, Foucault and Arendt. I 
place these thinkers within a tradition of critical theory running from Kant to 
Nietzsche. The opposition between modernism and postmodernism, between its 
philosophical sources, Kant and Nietzsche, has been widely overstated, for 
example, in the polemical stance taken by Habermas in The Philosophical 
Discourse ofModenfity (1987). 1 am concerned to show that this way of mapping 
does Foucault and Arendt an injustice. Foucault and Arendt accept Nietzsche's 
critique of reason and Western thought and attack Kant's official philosophy, an 
analytical philosophy of truth. Yet they also appropriate Kant's reflection on the 
Enlightenment and revolution (Foucault) and his aesthetic judgment (Arendt). 
More importantly, Foucault and Arendt embrace postmodern sensibility not as an 
absolute given but as an attitude that must be - at the risk of inviting Nietzschean 
scorn - constantly checked and examined. For them, critique is based as much on 
a serious and sustained interrogation of historical experience as it is on a 
deconstruction of metaphysical philosophy. Recognizing the problems of 
attaching labels to Foucault's work and that of Arendt, I focus on the tensions and 
complexity of their work. There are tensions in Foucault's thought between 
totalizing/detotalizing impulses, discursive/extra-discursive theorization, 
macro/micro perspectives, and domination/resi stance relations as well as between 
ethical-political commitments and archaeological detachment. There are also 
tensions in Arendt's thought between creative rupture and exercise in retrieval, 
between agonism and consensus as well as between existential engagement and 
philosophical withdrawal. Critical thought, which is experiment as well as 
problematization, must constantly live within a field of tension. In this light, I 
argue that these tensions provide the elements for the uniqueness and coherence of 
their work and that viewing these tensions as a source of flagrant contradiction 
fundamentally distorts their intentions. 
ii 
Chapter 1 Introduction: Why Foucault and Arendt? 
1. Reading Foucault and Arendt Together 
This work is about Michel Foucault and Hannah Arendt. Foucault and Arendt, I 
feel, represent the most important contemporary effort to develop a method for the 
study of human beings, and to understand, to diagnose, to criticize the current 
situation of our society. Although some of their works now belong to the classics 
of the Western tradition of political thought and social theory, they have always 
remained outsiders who are difficult to classify. In fact, the originality of their 
ideas is itself not just a source of fascination but also of misunderstanding. 
Foucault and Arendt cannot be simply characterized in terms of the traditional 
categories of conservatism, liberalism, and radicalism. Nor can their thinking be 
placed in terms of a stark opposition between modernism and postmodernism. 
Foucault and Arendt do not want to build a system of political philosophy or of 
social theory, which raises problems for the commentators. Furthermore, they 
have a kind of Nietzschean capacity to distance themselves from the unquestioned 
assumptions of the age. This ability is the source of embarrassment and frustration 
for those theorists, such as Walzer (1987), who believe that the first duty of social 
or political critics is to identify with the basic assumptions or values of their age. 
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But, Foucault and Arendt preserve this ability without abandoning active 
engagement in the concerns of the present. 
In turning to a consideration of their ideas, I was faced with a problem: whether to 
acce-ot the standpoint I saw being worked out in their writings, and to try to work 
within it; or to work from some other, explicitly critical standpoint. I did not want 
to do the former, for refutation in any normal sense seemed somehow impossible 
and pointless. To refute these writers one must presuppose the very canons of 
logic they attack, so that every refutation necessarily begs the question - an 
endless word play. 
I hope that the reader will read this work in something like the same spirit in 
which I wrote it. I see it as a "sympathetic" response to the writings of Foucault 
and Arendt. In this work, I aim to present my reinterpretation of Foucault and 
Arendt, my direct dialogue with them rather than criticism, focusing on what they 
have tried to say rather than on what they should have said. Because it is my 
belief that many of the interpretations and criticisms of Foucault and Arendt 
previously advanced have been based on a general and uncomplicated 
understanding of their thought and have therefore missed the mark. Indeed, those 
interpretations and criticisms - whether sympathetic critiques or not - fail to 
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account for the complexity and the tensions of their writings. 
Foucault and Arendt never have been properly read together probably because 
there is the seeming difference between a Foucauldian politics of everyday life 
and an Arendtian conception of the public sphere. In my view, however, Foucault 
and Arendt represent a strange case of non-penetrating between two similar types 
of thinking by that very similarity. Nothing hides the fact of a problem in common 
better than two similar ways of approaching it. I do not mean in any way that they 
are talking about same things. But when viewed in the light of the way in which 
the problem appears and develops, Foucault's mode of problematization and that 
of Arendt turn out to be more similar than often assumed. 
Foucault and Arendt draw heavily on Nietzsche in order to produce "genealogies" 
of modem spirit. They both perform a new historiography, in their own ways, at 
the crossroad where philosophy and history, ideas and events, intersect. After all, 
one thing haunts Foucault and Arendt is thought. The question, "What does 
thinking mean? ", is the arrow fired by Arendt and then again by Foucault. They 
write a history, but a history of thought as such. This is why they call their work 
"studies of history" not "the work of a historian" (Foucault, 1992; orig. 1984: 9; 
Arendt, 1994: 403). Foucault and Arendt suspect the kind of "universal 
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intellectual" (Foucault, 1980: 126) who claims to speak with privilege for a 
universal historical agent, and they renounce grand ideological visions and a state- 
centcred politics in favor of a more partial and localized "micro-politics". And 
they are inspired by those who exist at the political margins of normal society. 
Arendt's The Human Condition can be read a number of ways, for example, as a 
phenomenology of action, or as a contribution to public realm theory. Yet such 
readings become misreadings if they try to detach what Arendt has to say about 
action or the public sphere from her narrative about the "loss", "destruction", and 
"disappearance" of the public world in modemity. When viewed in terms of the 
critique of modernity, Arendt's The Human Condition, to some extent, prefigures 
Foucault's basic theme in Discipline and Punish. Arendt's critique of modernity 
points us to the peculiarly modern threat to the public sphere - the rise of social. 
With the emergence of this hybrid realm in the modem age, the possibility of 
either a genuine public or private realm is undermined. Moreover, the omnipresent 
functionalization that accompanies the rise of the social imposes its own 
constraints on political action. As Arendt puts it: 
It is decisive that society, on all its levels, excludes the possibility of action, 
which formerly was excluded from the household. Instead, society expects from 
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each of its members a certain kind of behaviour, imposing innumerable and 
various rules, all of which tend to "normalize" its members, to make them 
behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement (Arendt, 
1958: 40, my emphasis). 
It is here that Arendt's concerns most nearly intersect with Foucault's. Once we 
see Arendt's public sphere as a space of spontaneous action denatured by the 
normalizing power of the social, we can make connections to the Foucauldian 
story about the take-off of disciplinary power in the modem age. Arendt hardly 
shares Foucault's desire to develop a politics of everyday life. Nevertheless, they 
are both concerned to tell the story of how the premodern public sphere is 
colonized by a new form of disciplinary or socializing power, a power that 
substitutes an institutionally dispersed and normalizing regime of panoptic 
visibility for a space in which action is seen and heard by all. The logic of this 
transformation, for both Foucault and Arendt, is the better management of the 
state's precious resource, its populace. There is a direct line to be drawn from 
Arendt's conception of the state as "national household" to Foucault's notion of 
biopower (Foucault, 1980: 140-143; 1988e: 47-85. cf. Agamben, 1998: 119-135). 
Second, Foucault and Arendt are linked, moreover, by a concern to preserve forms 
5 
and space of popular, spontaneous action (counter-power) from bureaucratic 
structures. For example, Arendt's emphasis on the spontaneous, popular nature of 
revolutionary action in On Revolution is linked up with Foucault's defense of 
direct form of popular justice in Powerl Knowledge (Arendt, 1963, chap. 6; 
Foucault, 1980: 27-32). Reading in this manner suggests that they present 
complementary narratives about the closure of the space of action in the modern 
age. From this standpoint the Foucauldian concept of "resistance" - of local 
struggle against power/ knowledge regimes - can be seen as a kind of alternative 
concept to Arendt's notion of political action. Where the space of freedom is 
usurped - where action in strict sense is no longer possible - resistance becomes 
the primary vehicle of spontaneous political action. 
Third, Arendt's approach to action and judgment decenters the political actor and 
the judging agent in a fashion parallel to Foucault's decentering of the subject. In 
other words, the meaning of action and judgment conceived by Arendt is 
predicated upon a twofold "death of the author". The disclosive quality of 
political action comes to depend on the audience, conceived as a group of 
deliberating agents exercising their capacity of judgment. Thus the actor does not 
create meaning as the artist does a work, or judging spectators cannot redeem this 
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meaning unless they are able, to some extent, to get free of themselves. This is not 
to say Arendt's conception of political action and judgment extinguishes the self. 
Rather, it is to say that self-coherence is achieved through a decentered process, 
for both actor and judge. Arendt's thought on judgment and Foucault's thought on 
the self culminate in The Use of Pleasure's searing phrase, "to get free of oneself' 
(Foucault, 1992: orig. 1984: 8). Foucault's path of the relation to oneself is 
different from that of Arendt, but Foucault's focus on the constitution of the self 
as an autonomous subject and self-mastery and Arendt's focus on the exercise of 
the capacity of independent, autonomous judgment converge to the point where 
the relation to oneself becomes a principle of internal regulation in relation to 
politics and the moral code. Far from ignoring individuality or subjectivity they 
assume this independent, internal dimension, but only as a derivative or the 
product of one's relation with others. As Foucault and Arendt show, it is not a 
projection of "I", on the contrary, it is an interiorization of the Other. It is not the 
emanation of an "I", but something that places in immanence an "Othef". In a 
wora, it is the other in me. 
Finally, what Foucault shares with Arendt is the effort to link Kant and Nietzsche 
in order to overcome the analytics of truth without abandoning philosophical 
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seriousness. Foucault's turn to Kant in his later work enables him to identify the 
thread that connects Kant with Nietzsche within a trajectory of critical theory. The 
critical ontology of ourselves and of the present, which Foucault sees that Kant 
formulated by reflecting on the Enlightenment and revolution, is Foucault's 
Kantian version of Nietzsche's ontological support of the moment against the flux 
of time (cf Beiner, 1982: 145). On the other hand, Arendt's turn to Kant's 
aesthetic judgment in her later work enables her to identify the thread to connect 
Kant with Nietzsche, the thread running from Kant's objectivity, the "objectivity" 
arises from being able to "think in the place of everybody else" (Arendt, 1968b: 
241), to Nietzsche's perspectival objectivity, the objectivity born of using "more"' 
and "different" eyes to judge and to interpret a thing (Nietzsche, 1989: 12; cf 
Arendt, 1982: 43). The representative thinking made possible by disinterested 
judgment through a free play of imagination is Arendt's Kantian version of 
Nietzsche's perspectival objectivity. Their challenge to Kant and Nietzsche or 
rathcr their Nietzscheanism with a Kantian twist opens the possibility of 
perspectivism towards the reconstruction of critical theory. 
Bearing their complementarity in mind, I wish to read Foucault and Arendt in 
terms of critical thought running from Kant to Nietzsche. In order to do so, in the 
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second part of this chapter, I examine various readings that have been made of 
Foucault and Arendt in terms of modernism and postmodernism, of its 
philosophical sources, Kant and Nietzsche. Then, I explicate their selective 
appropriation of Kant, and their idiosyncratic way of accepting modernity (and 
postmodernity) as an attitude, questioning the adequacy of the mapping of 
modernism/ postmodernism, of Kant/ Nietzsche. In the third part, I present the 
hermeneutic dilemma that I am faced with and the methodological strategy that I 
employ to understand Foucault and Arendt. In the fourth part, I explain briefly the 
contents of this work. 
2. Drawing the Map 
Modernism vs. Postmodernism 
While Foucault never adopted the discourse of the postmodem, his critique of 
modernity and humanism made him a source of postmodern thought. Although 
Den-ida points out that Foucault is trapped within "logocentrism", within the 
general historical guilt bome by Western Language (Derrida, 1978: 35), Foucault 
is generally regarded as an exemplary representative of postmodern position in his 
thoroughgoing efforts to dismantle modem beliefs in unity and foundation, and 
his celebration of difference and multiplicity in theory, politics, and everyday life. 
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According to Habermas, the postmodem critique is inaugurated by Nietzsche who 
carries out a systematic assault on modernity, including the Enlightenment and 
reason. This irrational philosophical ethos was taken over in different ways by 
Heidegger, Bataille and the postmodernists. One tendency extends from Nietzsche 
to Bataille to Foucault, while another branches from Nietzsche to Heidegger to 
Derrida. In sum, Habermas criticizes postmodern theory for deserting reason and 
modernity (Habermas, 1981: 3-14; 1987). Habermas appreciates Foucault's 
critique of subjectivity and institutions of modernity, but believes that Foucault 
has no normative standpoint from which to criticize modern institutions and thus 
has no basis for an ethics and politics (Habermas, 1987: 238-293). Habermas also 
accuses Foucault of rejecting modernity and Enlightenment, at least in his earlier 
work, though Habermas sees that Foucault eventually came around to a qualified 
defence of Enlightenment values in a late essay on Kant (Habermas, 1989: 173- 
179). In this regard, Habermas asks: "How does such a singularly affirmative 
understanding of modern philosophizing, always directed to our own actuality and 
imprinted in the here-and-now, fit with Foucault's unyielding criticism of 
modernity? " (Habermas, 1986: 106). 
Against Habermas' reading of Foucault, there are the efforts that have been made 
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to differentiate Foucault from the poststructuralist theorists who, in the name of 
post-enlightenment and postmodern discourse, question philosophical seriousness 
in general. Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983,253-264; 1986: 109-121) attempt to show 
that Foucault has been at pains to distance himself not only from the heirs of 
German philosophy such as Habermas, but from the French poststructuralist 
theorists such as Derrida in terms of the relation between society, reason and 
modernity 
While Foucault is generally located in the postmodern horizon, Arendt is read in 
various ways. First, the early and standard view of Arendt maintains that Arendt is 
a political philosopher of nostalgia, an anti-modernist for whom the Greek polis 
remained the quintessential political experience. It is easy then to conclude not 
only that Arendt's thought is irrelevant to contemporary concerns but also she is 
an efitist reactionary (Kateb, 1984: 39; O'Sullivan, 1976; Pitkin, 1981; Bakan, 
1979: 59; Wolin, R., 2001; Canovan, 1978; Fuss, 1979). 
A very different reading of Arendt has been performed by Habermas and others 
working within the tradition of Critical Theory. These theorists locate Arendt 
within the Kantian horizon, assimilating her to a broadly modernist or universalist 
position by emphasizing the deliberative and intersubjective elements of action 
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and judgment over the performative and agonistic ones (Habermas, 1983; 
Bernstein, 1984,1986; Benhabib, 1987,1992b). The advantage of this reading is 
clear. One is able not only to avoid the elitist baggage of her Grecophile theory 
raised by Canovan (1978) and Fuss (1979) but also to refute the charge of 
immoralism raised by Kateb (1984). This reading enables one to solve the 
problem of moral foundations. 
However, many contemporary theorists are attracted by the postmodern side of 
Arendt's thought. The break with the paradigm structuring modem thought and 
practice and the sense of discontinuity of the past make it possible to locate 
Arendt within the postmodern horizon. (Bernauer, 1987: 10; Canovan, 1992: 278). 
In the end skeptical, radical democrats attempt to locate Arendt's work within the 
Nietzschean horizon, assimilating Arendt to a broadly agonistic model of politics 
for a radical democratic agenda (Conolly, 1998; Honig, 1993; Wolin, S. 1993; 
Villa, 1992; 1996). Contemporary agonists are attracted by the fact that Arendt 
(1958) gives a central place to action in her conception of the political. This sets at 
odds with the liberal focus on institutions, procedures, interest, and negative 
freedom, the freedom from politics (cf Barber, 1984). Also, they are attracted by 
Arendt's endorsement of the agonal spirit, which she sees as animating all 
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genuine political action. Arendt's political and democratic version of Nietzschean 
heroic individualism dovetails with what she calls "revolutionary spirit" (Arendt, 
1963: 221) and the spirit of resistance (Arendt, 1963, chap. 6,1968b, Preface). 
Her zxamples are not great statesmen, but the spontaneous heroic action manifest 
in the American Revolution, the Paris Commune of 1871, the 1905 Russian 
Revolution, the French Resistance during World War 11, and the Hungarian revolt 
of 1956. On this ground, Honig assimilates Arendt to "an activist, democratic 
politics of contest, resistance, and amendment", emphasizing her passionate 
refusal of docility (Honig, 1933: 77). Radical democrats are also attracted by her 
anti-foundationalism, showing how the will to find a transcendent ground for 
politics can only be anti-political and anti-democratic. Arendt gives Nietzsche's 
anti-foundationalism a political and democratic twist by arguing for a groundless 
politics of "opinions" (Arendt, 1968b: 233). What makes Arendt's conception of 
agonistic public sphere so attractive to radical democrats is that the 
authoritativeness of the basic institutions is determined by the clash of conflicting 
interpretations. Therefore, the public sphere is, above all, an institutionally 
articulated site of perpetual debate and contestation. On this ground, Villa (1992) 
argues that Arendt's public realm theory is less concerned with the question of 
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legitimation and consensus than with the theorization of an agonistic political 
subjectivity In addition, Isaac (1992) explores Arendt's postmodern position not 
in terms of the agonistic side but in terms of an illuminating lessons of human 
agency in an age of ideology (for another postmodem approach, see Hansen, 
1993; Disch, 1994). 
Let's return to Habermas' reading of Arendt, here. The distinction between action 
(praxis) and fabrication (poiesis) posed by Arendt's theory of action enabled 
Habermas to distinguish systematically between communicative and instrumental 
action and to identify their respective logics of rationalization. Moreover, Arendt's 
sketches of the form of intersubjectivity in the practice of speech supplied 
Habermas with a standard of ideal speech situation (Habermas, 1983: 174-175). 
Thanks to Arendt's theory of action, the way to a theory of communicative 
rationality was opened. 
This makes it possible to say that, to some extent, Habermas is an Arendtian. But, 
on the contrary, Arendt has been read as if she were a Habermasian (Bernstein, 
1983,1986; Benhabib, 1987,2003). In fact, the clear opposition between Arendt 
and Habermas on the one hand and postmodernism, including Foucault, on the 
othei- has been overstated thanks, in large part, to the polemical stance taken by 
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Habermas in Yhe Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1987). In that work, 
Habermas creates a stark opposition between communicative and subject-centered 
reason, between the paradigms of mutual understanding or intersubjectivity and 
that of the philosophy of consciousness (Chap. 11: 294-326). In his view, neither 
Hegel nor Marx succeeded in extricating themselves from the "horizon of the self- 
reference of the knowing and acting subject". But then, neither do such critics of 
the philosophy of consciousness and the modem project as Heidegger, Derrida, 
and Foucault. All remain, from the Habermasian perspective, either caught up in 
the metaphysics of subjectivity (Hegel and Marx with their demiurgic conceptions 
of szoolf-externalizing subjects) or endlessly tracing the transcendental/empirical 
bounds of the "humanist" paradigm (Heidegger, Derrida, Foucault). According to 
Habermas, the postmodems, like their predecessors, fail to effect the transition to 
"the paradigm of mutual understanding" and remain locked within an exhausted 
episteme (Habermas, 1987: 295-96,310). This mapping of the world of 
modern/postmodern theory neatly locates Arendt's work on the intersubjective 
side of the divide. 
Critical Thinking in a Modernity-Crisis 
The various readings of Foucault and Arendt described above have been 
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motivated by complex sets of sensibilities and concerns. Their criticisms and 
goals are diverse, but all read Foucault and Arendt seriously in their attempts to 
come to grips with the ills of modem society. Furthermore, whichever path is 
chosen, it is textually demonstrable. I shall not be directly concerned, therefore, 
with the question, who has got Foucault and Arendt right/ or wrong? I shall be 
concerned, however, with Habermas' reading of Foucault and Arendt, and the 
danger around it, though this will certainly not be evident on every page. This 
underlying intention is important because Habermas presents the one-sided (in my 
view) but equally powerful ways of reading Foucault and Arendt, and it would be 
foolish to ignore his influence on the contemporary Foucault scholarship as well 
as that of Arendt. I shall question the adequacy of Habermas' mapping, suggesting 
that the Arendtian project, a story of pathologies of modern Europe, harmonizes in 
unexpected ways with the writings of Foucault. This invites a rereading of 
Foucault and Arendt on their own terms and a rethinking the relation between 
them. 
I think that there is nothing more dangerous than to reduce a philosophy, 
especially one so subtle and complex such as Foucault and Arendt, to a textbook 
formula. All too often such readings have wound up domesticating one's thought 
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or constricting one's thematic concerns. Furthermore, in order to read these 
independent thinkers together, to discover what is between them, what binds them 
together and draws them apart, we need to shake off a kind of mapping or 
labelling around them. As Fine puts it: 
We should ... leave space for reading books which might be productive of 
surprising discoveries. Social theory can never remain content with frozen 
images ... Understanding is itself an activity which resists indoctrination and 
mindless obedience ... and needs no further justification (Fine, 2001: 2,3). 
Habermas' way of framing issue reminds me of what Foucault calls "the 
blackmail of Enlightenment' (1984: 42) - the insistence that one takes a stand 
"for" or "against" bourgeois democracy, enlightenment rationality and so forth, 
before delivering the specifics of one's critique. I am concerned to show that a 
stark opposition between modernism and postmodernism does Foucault and 
Arendt an injustice. 
Habermas has failed to appreciate the fact that Arendt's thought is not a criticism 
articulated from within a traditional framework, including a modernist one, but 
from without that frame. For Arendt, the break with the tradition is more than a 
theoretical background. Her experience of totalitarianism haunts her treatment of 
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the modernist framework as well as her thinking about modernity as a whole. 
Converting trauma into historical understanding, Arendt attempted to link 
totalitarianism to the spirit of modem age. In doing so her theoretical response 
was the same as Water Benjamin's: to break the chain of narrative continuity, to 
shatter chronology as the natural structure of narrative, to stress fragmentariness, 
historical dead ends, failures, and ruptures (Arendt, 1968a: 193-206). 
Even if, as Kateb notes, Arendt sees the story of modem Europe as a story of 
pathologies, with Nazi and Stalinist totalitarianism as "the climactic pathology" 
(Kateb, 1984: 66), she does not see totalitarianism as a single metaphor or the 
ultimate culmination of modern age. For Arendt the potential disaster in the 
various formative modern projects is a recurrent one. In other words, only from a 
falsely transcendental perspective any specific crisis can be seen as the final one, 
the definitive historical turning point. 
Throughout her work, from The Origins of TolalitariallisnI via lhe Hunian 
Con. -fitim to The Life of the Mind and the Kant Lectures, Arendt consistently 
emphasized the dissolution of modem Europe's moral groundwork, the "break in 
our tradition" and "the loss of common sense". The basic conditions of 
possibilities of thinking, action, and judgment have been destroyed by "the moral 
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and spiritual breakdown of occidental society" (Arendt, 1994: 315), on the one 
hand, and the rise of mass culture, on the other. Arendt writes about action, 
thinking, and judgment in a historical situation parallel to the one Socrates 
confronted in Athens (see Arendt, 1982; 1984; 1990). There, too, traditional 
morality had fragmented to yield a morality of success. The way out of this 
situation, for Arendt as well as Socrates, is no return to a shattered tradition, not a 
simple call to action, but a radical questioning of all the "yardsticks" (Arendt, 
1994: 321) for action, thinking and judgment. What is called for in such a 
situation is not activism, but critical thinking and independent judgment, "thinking 
without a banister" (Arendt, 1979; 336). It is important to remember, in this regard, 
that Arendt wrote The Human Condition, her consideration of the vita activa, not 
in order to stimulate activism, but in order to help us "think what we are doing" 
(Arendt, 1958: 5), which is indeed "a matter of thought, and thoughtlessness" 
(Arendt, 1958: 5). 
It is because of the modem crisis in action, thinking and judgment, of the 
staggering growth of stupidity and the inability to judge, that Arendt explicitly 
turns to Socrates as a model in 'Philosophy and Politics' (1990), 'Thinking and 
Moral Consideration' (1984), and in the Lectures Oil Kalil's Political Philosophy 
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(1982). In these texts, she poses Socrates as a model of "critical thinking", 
emphasizing his purifying quality. indeed, Socrates did not teach anything. Rather, 
he exposed unexamined prejudgments to the "wind of thought", dissolving 
prejudices but putting no "truths" in their places (Arendt, 1990: 81; 1984: 23; 
1982: 37-39). Hence "critical thinking7 is an essentially destructive activity. It has 
a "destructive, undermining effect on all established criteria, values, 
measurements for good and evil, in short on those customs and rules of conduct 
we treat of in morals and ethics" (Arendt, 1984: 24). The Socratic dialogue can 
hardly be characterized as deliberation aiming at decision and action. Socratic 
thinking is a public exercise of reason, yet this kind of thinking suspends all 
"fixed habits of thought, ossified rule and standards". As Arendt put it at a 
conference on her work in 1973: 
I think that this "thinking7... - thinking in the Socratic sense - is a maieutic 
function, a midwifery. That is, you bring out all your opinions, prejudices, what 
have you; and you know that never, in any of the [Platonic] dialogues, did 
Socrates ever discover any child [of the mind] who was not a wind-egg. That 
you remain in a way empty after thinking ... And once you are empty, then, in a 
way which is difficult to say, you are prepare to judge (Arendt in Young-Bruehl, 
20 
1982: 452). 
The testing and examination of opinions that is the heart of critical thinking is not 
only practiced by Socrates but also articulated by Kant. As Arendt makes clear in 
the Kant Lectures, "representative thinking" and "enlarged mentality" are not just 
models for public deliberation. They are, rather, the necessary vehicles of critical 
thinking. They proceed imaginatively, drawing on the possible standpoints and 
opinions of others in order to "abstract from the limitations which contingently 
attach to our own judgment" (Kant in Arendt, 1982: 43). As Arendt puts it in the 
Lectures: 
The "enlargement of the mind" plays a crucial role in the Critique ofJudgment. 
It is accomplished by "comparing our judgment with the possible rather than 
the actual judgments of others, and by putting ourselves in the place of any 
other man". The faculty that makes possible is called imagination ... Critical 
thinking is possible only where the standpoints of all others are open to 
inspection. Hence, critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut 
itself off from "all others". To be sure, it still goes on in isolation, but by the 
force of imagination it makes the others present thus moves in a space that is 
potentially public, open to all sides ... To think with an enlarged mentality 
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means that one trains one's imagination to go visiting (Arendt, 1982: 42-43). 
Dialogue in the agora, or the public use of one's reason, are good ways of 
ccenlarging" one's mentality, of "training one's imagination to go visiting". But 
neither "representative" (Arendt, 1968b: 421) nor "enlarged" thought have 
decision or action as their raison Wetre. The "abstraction from contingent 
limitatione' enables the attainment of a "general standpoint", which Arendt 
characterizes as "a view point from which to look upon, to watch, to form 
judgment, or as Kant himself says, to reflect upon human affairs" (Arendt, 1982: 
44). It "does not tell one how to act". Rather, it enables one to think critically, and 
to judge independently. 
What links Socratic dialectic and Kantian enlarged thought for Arendt is the way 
both yield not the truth, but a more impartial, and hence more valid, each 
individual's opinion, doxa, his or her , it appears to me" (Arendt, 1990: 80-81; 
1968b, 241-242; 1982: 37-40). Even if, as Beiner notes, there are two different 
accounts of judgment in Arendt, which correspond to two distinct phase of her 
thought about action and thinking, whose focus "shifts from the representative 
thought and enlarged mentality of political agents to the spectatorship and 
retrospective judgment of historians and storytellers" (Beiner, 1984: 91), when 
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viewed in the light of "thinking (and judgment) for oneself' (Arendt, 1982: 43; 
71), her articulation of political (or representative) and critical (or Socratic) 
thinking turn out to be more closely related than often assumed. If we view 
Areiidt's thought in terms of broader perspectivism, the standpoint of the actor 
and spectator emerge not as two radically different kinds of thinking and judgment 
(engaged and political vs. detached and historical), but rather as two poles of 
"self-thinking [selhstdenken]" (Arendt, 1978: 250; 1982: 71), "autonomous" 
(Arendt, 1982: 55) "independent" (Arendt, 1978; 250) judgment. To be sure, the 
46 general standpoint" of the impartial judge is different from seemingly more 
vigorous standpoint of the citizen's doxa, "it appears to me". Yet, as Kant's great 
enemy Nietzsche reminds us, " the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, 
the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete 
will our "concept" of thing, our "objectivity", be" (Nietzsche, 1989: 12). Impartial 
judgment, as conceived by Arendt, remains perspectival in character. It is opinion 
in its highest fonn. 
Riley's familiar portrait of Kant as a deontological theorist underlines the 
selectivity and idiosyncrasy of Arendt's interpretation of Kant. Against Arendt, 
Riley argues that Kantian politics is not about opinion or judgment: "Kant himself 
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would never have said that moral opinion, however 'general' or 'enlarged', can 
replace moral truth" (Riley, 1987: 384). His point is that we cannot begin to 
understand Kant's political philosophy unless we first acknowledge the 
fundamental place he reserved for a priori moral truth. It is only in light of such 
truth that we can make sense of Kant's universal republicanism and his hope that 
a constitutional legal order would promote the achievement of moral ends. 
Yet, this criticism manages to miss Arendt's thrust. She does not deny that Kant 
begins with the moral law and justifies republican government in terms of it. 
Rather, her point is that this mode of proceeding brackets the realm of opinion, 
plurality, and appearance, therefore denatures the political. Arendt seeks an 
unwritten political philosophy in the third Critique not because Kant sought "a 
new moral and political doctrine in aesthetic judgment", but because the world of 
aesthetic judgment is also the world of publicity, or politics (Arendt, 1968a: 27; 
1968b: 219-220). 
In order to appropriate Kant for politics, Arendt feels she must ignore the 
systematic intent that governs Kant's political writings such as 'Perpetual Peace'. 
As Riley correctly observes, Kant's "official" political philosophy gives pride of 
place to his practical philosophy, to the ideas of moral truth and a pure (rational) 
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will. There can be no doubt. Kant's "official" politics is a politics of truth, a 
politics derived, in deductive fashion, from an absolute. Yet it is for this reason 
that Arendt dismisses it and looks elsewhere. The necessity of this search flows 
from her judgment that Kant's practical philosophy is "inhumaif', intrinsically 
destructive of the realm of human affairs and its essential plurality: 
Kant argued that an absolute exists, the duty of the categorical imperative 
which stands above men, is decisive in all human affairs, and cannot be 
infringed even for the sake of humanity in every sense of that word. Critics of 
the Kantian ethic have frequently denounced this thesis as altogether inhuman 
and unmerciful. Whatever the merits of their arguments, the inhumanity of 
Kant's moral philosophy is undeniable. And this is so because the categorical 
imperative is postulated as absolute and in its absoluteness introduces into the 
interhuman realm - which by its nature consists of relationships - something 
that runs counter to its fundamental relativity. The inhumanity which is bound 
up with the concept of one single truth emerges with particular clarity in Kant's 
work precisely because he attempted to found truth on practical reason; it is as 
though he who had so inexorably pointed out man's cognitive limits could not 
bear to think that in action, too, man cannot behave like a god (Arendt, 1968a: 
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27). 
The Kantian appeal to such an absolute tears apart the web of human relationships, 
degrading opinion and plurality. Such effects, however, are not confined to Kant. 
They follow any attempt to make an absolute the organizing principle of the realm 
of human affairs (see Arendt, 1968b: 91-141). 
Like Arendt, Foucault also belongs to the generation of European intellectuals 
who experienced the traumas of the twentieth century - Nazism and Stalinism, 
and performs the critique of modernity and western thought. As Foucault 
understands it, modernity is not a specific historical event, but a historical 
conjuncture which has happened several times in our history, albeit with different 
form and content: for example, the breakdown of the traditional virtues in Athens 
at the time of Socrates, the decline of the Hellenistic world, the end of 
metaphysics at the time of Kant. This breakdown results in a specific attitude 
toward reality, which to differentiate it from a subjective state, Foucault calls 
"ethos" (Foucault, 1984: 39). In a modernity-crisis, a taken-for-granted 
understanding of reality ceases to function as a shared background in terms of 
which people can orient and justify their activity. Therefore the modemist 
response is uc dly to face up to the collapse of the old order. In Foucault's view, 
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such was the attitude of the Sophists in Greece, and the Stoics in Alexandria and 
Kant, and, in my view, Arendt and Foucault in the post-totalitarian moment. 
While Arendt's critique is developed in the form of fragmentary historiography 
for which Walter Benjamin was her prime example, Foucault's critique is 
developed in the form of archaeology and genealogy for which Nietzsche was his 
prime example. Unlike in modern historiography, discontinuity is seen as a 
positive working concept in Foucault as well as Arendt. While Arendt seeks to 
recover the meaning of the past outside of the framework of any tradition, 
Foucault attempts to rethink the nature of power and self in a non-totalizing, non- 
presentational, and anti-humanist scheme. In this regard, as Habermas shows 
(1987, chapters, 5 and 6), Foucault is not following in the philosophical tradition 
of using language to represent reality, nor is he using language as a vehicle for 
undi3torted communication. But, pace Habermas, neither is he abandoning 
himself to the free play of self-referential signifiers. Foucault is not trying to 
construct a general theory, nor deconstruct, the possibility of any metanarrative. 
What Foucault is trying to do is to suggest an "Introduction to the Non-Fascist 
Life" in theory as well as in practice, that contains essential deindividualizing 
principles against totalization as well as individualization. Here what Foucault 
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means by fascism is "not only historical fascism of Hitler and Mussolini", but also 
"the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behaviour", in "our speech 
and our acts, our hearts and our pleasures", buried deep "in body", its trace 
brutally to expunge, "the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very 
thing that dominates and exploits us" (Foucault, 1977b: xiii, in Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1977). This task to confront the question of totalitarianism leads 
Foucault to the problem between reason and power once again, the reciprocal and 
the inverse of the problem of Enlightenment: how is that rationalization leads to 
the disease of power such as Nazism and Stalinism? In Foucault's words, "how is 
that the great movement of rationalization led us so much noise, so much rage, so 
much silence and dismal mechanism? " (Foucault, 1996: 390). 
In several essays and interviews (Foucault, 1983a: 208-226; 1984: 32-50; 1993: 
10-18; 1996: 382-398; 2000: 443-448), while still critical of Enlightenment reason, 
Foucault attempts to positively appropriate key aspects of the Enlightenment 
heritage - its acute historical sense of the present, its emphasis on rational 
autonomy over conformity and dogma, and its critical outlook. He now sees the 
uncritical acceptance of modern rationality and its complete rejection as equally 
hazardous: "if it is extremely dangerous to say that Reason is the enemy that 
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should be eliminated, it is just as dangerous to say that any critical questioning of 
this rationality risks sending us into irrationality (Foucault, 1984: 239). Beyond 
"being for or against the Enlightenment" (Foucault, 1984: 45), he argues, critical 
thought must constantly live within a field of tension: "If philosophy has a 
function within critical thought, it is ... to accept this sort of revolving door of 
rationality that refers us to its necessity, to its indispensability, and at the same 
time, to its intrinsic dangere' (Foucault, 1984: 249). 
Foucault holds that our modernity begins with Kant's attempt to make reason 
critical, i. e., to establish limits and legitimate use of reason. But Kant's attempt to 
show that this critical use of reason is its true universal nature is not what is 
original and important for Foucault. Foucault does not deny that Kant is 
attempting to preserve the normative role of reason in the face of the collapse of 
metaphysics. But rather than seeing Kant as announcing a universal solution, 
Foucault uses Kant's essay as a diagnostic of a particular conjuncture. What 
Foucault finds most distinctive and insightful in Kant's essay is a philosopher qua 
philosopher realizing for the first time that his thinking arises out of and is an 
attempt to respond to his historical situation: "How and in what respect someone 
who speaks as a thinker, as a savant, as a philosopher forms a part of 
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this ... process, and 
furthermore, how he has a certain role to play in this process, 
figuring in it to say at once as an element and as an actor" (Foucault, 1993: 11). 
Foucault interprets Kant's linking of the historical moment, critical reason and 
society as a challenge to develop a radically new version of what it means to lead 
a philosophical life: 
The critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, certainly, as a 
theory, a doctrine, not even as a permanent body of knowledge that is 
accumulating; it has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical 
life in which the critique of what we are is at once and the same time the 
historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with 
the possibility of going beyond them (Foucault, 1984: 50). 
This critical ontology has two separate but related components, that is, work on 
oneself and responding to one's time: "Modernity... is not simply a form of 
relationship to the present; it is also a mode of relationship that has to be 
established with oneself' (Foucault, 1984: 41). 
Furthermore, Foucault suggests approaching the problem of Enlightenment "in a 
meaningful enough proximity with the work of the Frankfurt School" (Foucault, 
1996: 389). He understands the problem of Enlightenment as a still existing 
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historico-critical. outlook on the present and on ourselves, which makes Foucault 
"brothers with the Frankfurt School" (Foucault, 1996: 391). Foucault sees in 
Kam's answer to the question 'What is Enlightenment? ' (Kant, 1970; orig. 1784) 
and 'What is Revolution? ' (Kant, 'The Contest of Faculties', 1970; orig. 1789) the 
origin of a critical ontology leading through Hegel, Nietzsche, and Weber to 
Horkheimer and Adorno. Foucault adds himself to this tradition: 
Kant seems ... to have founded the two great critical traditions between which 
modern philosophy has been divided .... One can opt for a critical philosophy 
which is framed as an analytical philosophy of truth in general, or one can opt 
for a critical thought which has the form of an ontology of ourselves, an 
ontology of the present; it is this latter form of philosophy which, from Hegel to 
the Frankfurt School by way of Nietzsche and Max Weber, has founded a form 
of reflection within which I have tried to work (Foucault, 1993: 17-18). 
Foucault and Arendt evade easy classification. They seem to occupy the 
anonymous place, which classical treaties in philosophy reserved for substance, 
without location, or boundaries, they are everywhere and nowhere at the same 
time. There is no doubt, however, that Foucault and Arendt, in their respective 
ways, embrace postmodern sensibility like never-ending pulsations. I believe that 
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postmodem sensibility, what Lyotard calls "incredulity" (1984: xxiii), is necessary 
to keep us honest as thinkers. But it is true that, for many contemporary 
postmodern theorists, this sensibility is not simply an inescapable element of our 
historical experience but a terminus of critical inquiry. In this regard, I value 
Foucault and Arendt because they accept postmodern sensibility not as an 
absolute given but as an "attitude" (see Foucault, 1984: 39; 1996: 383) that must 
be - at the risk of inviting Nietzschean scorn - constantly checked and examined. 
They offer us a critical theory without comfort, without the guarantee that modem 
ideologies have typfcally purported to provide. Like postmodernist, both thinkers 
criti, 7. ize the Enlightenment faith that the transcendental power of science and 
reason could be saved and preserved. Yet, for Arendt and Foucault, this critique is 
based on a serious and sustained interrogation of historical experience as much as 
it is on a deconstruction of metaphysical philosophy. This is why Foucault and 
Arendt cannot be wholly understood by a stark opposition between modernism 
and postmodernism. 
I Methodological Observations 
Foucault and Arendt are fascinated by history and the relationship between 
personal experience and those events of which they are a part. I believe this is the 
32 
nucleus of their theoretical desires. Particularly, the experience of totalitarianism 
and Stalinism, which they see as a disease of modem power, haunts their critique 
of modernity as a whole. This is not to say their writings on history are only 
concerned with actual experiences, whether contemporary or historical. Because 
their writings on history are intertwined with "an exercise of oneself in the 
activity of thought" (Foucault, 1992; orig., 1984: 9), which opens up the space of 
possible transformation. Indeed, for them, thinking itself, as Arendt argues in The 
Life of the Mind, is like "Penelope's web" (Arendt, 1971: 88), constantly undoing 
its own construction. Furthermore, a tension between their profound commitment 
to political reality and the sense of detachment from the subject matter. continually 
complicates their work. However, these tensions in theory as well as in practice, in 
the technique of life as well as in the political choices provide the elements for the 
unique work. 
As we shall see, the historical-philosophical approach performed by Foucault and 
Arendt is neither subjective nor objective. Rather, it is an unusual combination of 
imagination, analysis and commitment. But equally, Foucault was very wary of 
the analytic link between a "philosophical conception7' and the "concrete political 
attitude', between "what one is thinking and saying7 and "what one is doing7 
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(Foucault, 1984: 374). Like Foucault, Arendt remained intensely skeptical of the 
ideal of a unity of thought and action, or theory and practice. In Arendt's view, 
this ideal is a chimera and a dangerous one, because it grows out of and enforces 
an instrumental configuration of theory and practice. As she once said, "I think 
that commitment can easily carry you to a point where you no longer think7' 
(Arendt, 1979: 308). Bearing these questions in mind, we should read Foucault 
and Arendt not only through their ideas, but also through Foucault's ethos and 
Arendt's moral taste. We should perform the two readings, which are, on the one 
hand, a scientific analysis of their work, the ability to decipher Foucault's "ethos" 
and Arendt's "judgment", on the other. This is in my view, the only spirit that can 
take us along their paths in such a way that we can understand them, then can 
indeed go beyond them. 
Foucault did not think of writing as an aim or an end itself. He regarded his work 
as "tool boxes" (in Eribon, 1991: 237) and challenged the notion of author, as he 
was fond of quoting Beckett, "what matter who's speaking? " (Foucault, 1977: 
138). Nevertheless, he was inclined to see his own work as, to some extent, "a 
fragmentary of autobiography" (Foucault, 2000: 458). Regarding the 
autobiographical elements of his work, it is important to acknowledge that he is 
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talking about not just his phenomenology in the vulgar sense of the terms, but his 
attempt to link "the historical and theoretical analysis of power relations, 
institutions, and knowledge, to the movements, critiques, and experiences that call 
them into questions in reality" (Foucault, 1984: 374). His primary concern is 
always a historical problem that he formulates as always by using historical 
records. And yet, it is a problem that he feels very closely linked to what he is 
experiencing. If Foucault's interviews form an integral part of his work, 
furthermore, if Foucault's life, in itself, composes an intertextual space of his 
work, it is because Foucault extends the problernatization of each of his books 
into the construction of the present problem, i. e., madness, punishment or 
sexuality After all, it is the question of the present and of ourselves: what do we 
know? what can we do, "what are we? " (Foucault, 1983a: 216), which obviously 
stem from three dimensions of his thought: "knowledge, power and self' (Deleuze, 
1988: 114). At the very heart of his analysis, it is critique, whose focus is "the 
relationship between truth, power, and the self' (Foucault, 1988b: 15). 
For Foucault, in a deeper sense, "writing" involves a double meaning. On the one 
hand, in "What is an author? ", he defines the writing subject, i. e., the author, as a 
derivative, a function derived from the discourse. To awaken thought from its 
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humanist sleep, Foucault argues, "the subject must be ... analyzed as a complex 
and variable function of discourse" (Foucault, 1977: 138). On the other hand, in 
Ae Care of the Setr (Foucault, 1990b; orig. 1984), Foucault sees writing as the 
relation with oneself, i. e. "subjectivation" (Deleuze, 1988: 101). In Foucault's 
reading of Roman culture, writing connects up with ethics and the self because 
writing is the technique or professional skill which can be acquired only through 
exercise just as one cannot learn the art of living without a training oneself by 
oneself Writing is "not an exercise in solitude, but a true social practice" 
(Foucault, 1990b; orig. 1984: 5 1), which means that it is not a psychological form 
but an ontological form of the constitution of the self as well as communication 
with others. Also, writing is political practice because the question of writing and 
the self converge into the goal of "the perfect government of the self -a sort of 
political relationship between self and self' (Foucault, 1983b: 246). As Deleuze 
understands it, I do not encounter myself on the outside, I find the other in me" 
(Del--Uze, 1988: 98). The process of subjectivation is accompanied by writing, or 
rather, writing is the real name of the relation with oneself, i. e., subjectivation. Far 
from ignoring individuality or subjectivity, Foucault revisits the subject, but only 
as "a derivative or the product of a subjectivatiorf' (Deleuze, 1989: 101). The 
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return of the "subject" (Foucault, 1983a: 209) in Foucault, therefore, is not a 
return to a humanist or phenomenological concept of the subject endowed with an 
inner essence or original will that proceeds and stands from the social. The subject 
is still discursively and socially conditioned for Foucault, and still theorized as 
situated within power relations. As Foucault says: 
If I am interested... in the way in which the subject constitutes himself in an 
active fashion, by the practice of self, these practices are nevertheless not 
something that the individual invents by himself They are patterns that he finds 
in his culture and which are proposed, suggested, and imposed on him by his 
culture, his society and his social group (Foucault, 1988a: 11). 
For Arendt, writing about totalitarianism and about something with the 
breakdown of tradition presented profound historical dilemmas. Historiography 
originates with the human desire to overcome oblivion and nothingness. It is the 
attempt to save, in the face of the frailty of human affairs, something "which is 
even more than remembrance" (Arendt, 1994: 402). Although the structure of 
traditional historiography described as it is in chronological sequence, serves to 
46 preserve" what has happened by making it seem inevitable, necessary and 
justifiable, for Arendt, the first dilemma posed by the historiography of 
37 
totalitarianism was the impulse to destroy rather than to preserve: "Thus my first 
problem was how to write historically about something - totalitarianism - which I 
did not want to conserve but on the contrary felt engaged to destroy" (Arendt, 
1994: 402). 
Her response to this dilemma was the fragmentary historiography embodying a 
discontinuity between past and present, which Arendt is indebted to Benjamin's 
notion of "profane illumination". This historiography is compared by Arendt to 
the activity of the pearl driver who brings to the surface the pearls and corals 
hidden in the depths of the sea. Just as the pearl driver recovers these treasures by 
extracting them forcibly from their surroundings, so this new historian delves into 
the depths of the past, not to resuscitate it the way it was or to glorify past ages, 
but to recover from forgetfulness those thought fragments that are still able to 
illuminate our present (Arendt, 1968a: 205-206). This method of fragmentary 
historiography is the way of discovering the past without being enslaved by it, in 
particular without having one's historical imagination suffocated by argument of 
historical necessity 
Arendt maintained that there was a special relationship between historical 
understanding and what Kant had called imagination (Arendt, 1994: 404). Both 
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were exercise in reproductive imagination. In each case, one had to re-create from 
the evidence a new concept, a new narrative, a new perspective. For historical 
understanding could never be the mere reproduction of past historical actors. To 
pretend that historical understanding was complete empathy was an act of bad 
faith that served to disguise the standpoint of the narrator or the historian. Arendt 
painstakingly distinguished "judgement" from empathy (Arendt, 1968b: 220-221). 
The historical narrator was no less than the moral actor and had to engage in acts 
of judgment, for understanding is a form of judging - certainly not in the juridical 
or moralistic sense of the delivery of a value perspective but in the sense of re- 
creating a reality from the standpoint of all involved and concerned. Historical 
judgment revealed the perspectival nature of the world by representing its 
plurality in narrative form. It is the ability "to take the standpoint of the other" 
(Arendt, 1968b: 241), which does not mean emphasizing or even sympathizing 
with the other but re-creating the world as it appears through the eyes of others in 
me. 
In re-creating this plural and perspectival quality of the world, the historian could 
accomplish his or her task only so far as his or her faculty of imagination was not 
limited to one of these viewpoints. Arendt draws a fine line between the practice 
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of judgment by the historian on the one hand and the moral dilemmas of 
objectivism and relativism on the other. The commitment to represent in narrative 
form every perspective may appear as the equivalent of God's eye view of the 
universe. It may feed the illusion of total objectivity. Equally, the more pluralized 
and fragmentary social and historical reality appears, the more one can gain the 
conviction that there is no shared right or wrong at all but that all our moral 
concepts are smoke screens for our perspectives and preferences. It is a 
consequence of Nietzsche, whose perspectivalist epistemology certainly inspired 
Arendt. 
Arendt's critic had praised her work as passionate and denounced it as sentimental 
(Arendt, 1994: 403). Arendt's response to this was that she had parted quite 
consciously "with the tradition of sine ira et studio" (without passion and study) 
in her analysis of totalitarianism, for not to express moral indignation when 
writing about totalitarianism would have been equivalent to moral complicity: 
To describe the concentration camps sine ira is not to be "objective", but to 
condone them: and such condoning cannot be changed by a condemnation 
which the author may feel duty bound to add but which remains unrelated to the 
description itself 
.. I think that a description of the camps as Hell on earth is 
40 
more "objective", that is, more adequate to their essence than statements of a 
purely sociological or psychological nature (Arendt, 1994: 404). 
Arendt faced this historiographical dilemma when reflecting upon totalitarianism, 
but there is little question that this method of writing history in defiance of the 
traditional canons of historical narrative is also what guided her controversial 
account in the Eichmarm book, her account of the French and American 
Revolutions in On Revolution, and an archaeology of modernity in The Human 
Condition. 
4. Contents 
Recognizing the problems of attaching labels to Foucault's work and that of 
Arendt, firstly, I wish to examine how and to what extent they develop their 
critique of modernity and humanism. Secondly, I wish to examine their response 
to the dangers incurred by modernity, namely, the development of new forms of 
subjectivity (Foucault) and the exercise of independent judgment (Arendt). 
I do not read Foucault as a postmodernist tout court, but rather as a theorist who 
combines premodern, modern, and postmodern perspectives. I see Foucault as a 
profoundly subtle, sophisticated but not well-conceptualized thinker whose 
thought is in tensions between totalizing/detotalizing impulses, discursive/extra- 
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discursive theorization, macro/micro perspectives, and domination/resi stance 
relations as well as in tensions between ethical-political commitments and 
archaeological detachment. Yet, I do not think that there is a flagrant contradiction 
in Foucault's thought. Of course, as Habermas ironically points out, "only a 
complex thinking produces instructive contradictions (1986: 107), but "the force 
of this contradictioW' (1986: 108), as Habermas calls it, provides the elements for 
a coherent work. When viewed in terms of a three-fold circular (i. e., non- 
totalizing) reciprocity between knowledge, power and self, his thinking about 
power and his thinking about self, i. e., subjectivation, turn out to be more closely 
related than often assumed. In the course of this work, I step back and examine 
Foucault's work in context, and relate the earlier work (in the 1960s and 1970s) to 
the later (in the 1980s), and show the underlying continuity in his thought on 
knowledge, power and self 
Like Foucault, Arendt was an 'antifoundationalist' long before the term came into 
use, doing her thinking "without a bannister" (Arendt, 1979: 336). However, 
Arendt is neither a 'deconstructionist' per se, intent upon demolishing conceptual 
thought, nor a political 'rationalist' with a system of notions. I read Arendt as a 
postmodernist avant a lettre but also as a theorist who combines premodern, 
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modern, and postmodern perspectives. I see Arendt as appropriating classical 
philosophers, Aristotle, Kant, Nietzsche and Heidegger, in particular, in a highly 
agonistic manner, as twisting, displacing, and reinterpreting their thought. Indeed, 
Arendt's originality resides in her ability to see the political implications of a 
body of work in a way that goes against the grain of authorial intent. I see Arendt 
as a complicated thinker whose thought is in tension between creative rupture and 
exercise in retrieval, between agonism and consensus as well as in tension 
between existential engagement and philosophical withdrawal. But again, when 
viewed in terms of a three-fold circular (i. e., non-totalizing) reciprocity between 
action, thinking and judgment, her consideration of the vita activa and the vita 
contemplativa, her articulations of political thinking in her earlier work (in the 
1950s and 1960s) and critical (or Socratic) thinking in her later work (in the 
1970s) turn out to be more closely related than often assumed. Indeed, 
interpretations of political (or representative) thinking as a method of public 
deliberation and decision-making (Habermas, 1983; Bernstein, 1984,1986; 
Benhabib, 1987,1992b) fundamentally distort Arendt's intention. In the course of 
this work, I step back and examine Arendt's work in context, and relate the earlier 
work to the later and show the underlying continuity in her thought on action, 
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thinking and judgment. 
In this work, the tensions of their work I describe above are not the target of 
criticism but the positive working concept. What Foucault and Arendt teach us is 
that critical thinking must live in a field of tension. Viewing these tensions as the 
source of flagrant contradiction distorts their intentions. In this horizon, far from 
vindicating one against the other, this work is also situated in the force field 
created by these interpretive tensions which run deep in my work. 
This work is composed of two parts, three chapters on Foucault, two chapters on 
Arendt. Two parts are irreducible, yet constantly imply one another. It is my 
intention that someone interested in either Foucault or Arendt should be able to go 
to the relevant part and read it, with considerable understanding. Yet, the two parts 
do reinforce one another. Consequently, important aspects of the treatment of each 
will only be fully understood if the reader has read the work as a whole. 
In Chapter 2,1 begin with a discussion of Foucault's critique of modernity His 
critique is developed in the form of new historical approaches which he terms 
'archaeology' and 'genealogy'. I then explicate Foucault's postmodern 
perspectives on the nature of modem power and his argument that the modem 
subject is a construct of domination. After analyzing the political implications of 
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Foucault's genealogical method and his later studies of ethics and techniques of 
the self, I conclude with some remarks on the tensions in his work as a whole. In 
Chapter 3,1 begin with some critical remarks on criticisms that have been made of 
Foucault's work. Against those critiques that fail to account for the complexity of 
Foucault's work (not only the tensions but also the continuity behind them), I step 
back, and relate his earlier studies of knowledge and power to the later studies of 
the self, and show the underlying continuity in his work. In Chapter 4,1 examine 
the conception of critique in Foucault' work. Then I relate Foucault's work with 
his life to show how his entire work as a form of critique is intertwined with his 
ethics as an intellectual. In Chapter 5,1 examine Arendt's conception of 
modernity and her critique of modern forms of social and political life. I begin 
with the hermeneutic strategy that Arendt employs to understand the past. This 
includes the method of fragmentary historiography and that of deconstructive 
reading of the Western philosophical tradition. Then I examine the key features of 
Arendt's conception of modernity: world alienation, earth alienation, the rise of 
the social, and the victory of aninial laborans. I conclude with some remarks on 
the tensions in her critique of modernity and on criticisms that have been made of 
her critique. In Chapter 6,1 reconstruct Arendt's unfinished work on judgement. I 
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begin with an examination of the attempt made by Arendt to connect the activity 
of thinking to that of judging. Then I provide an account of Arendt's appropriation 
of Kant's theory of aesthetic judgment. After examining two different accounts of 
judgment, one from the standpoint of the vita acliva, the other from the standpoint 
of the vita contemplativa, I step back and relate the earlier theory to the later, and 
show the underlying continuity in her thought on judgment. I conclude by briefly 
considering her historical understanding of totalitarianism, of the Eichmann trial, 
in particular, as an example of independent judgment. In Chapter 7,1 conclude 
with a reflection on the relation between their life and work, between their 
political commitments and theoretical detachment, reviewing the overall 
theoretical tensions in the point of the pariah they distinctively hold. 
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Chapter 2 
Foucault: Archaeology, Genealogy, and the Critique of Modernity 
Foucault's critique of modernity and humanism, along with his proclamation of 
the 'death of man' and development of new perspective on society, knowledge, 
discourse, and power, has made him a major source of postmodern thought. 
Foucault draws upon an anti-Enlightenment tradition that rejects the equation of 
reason, emancipation, and progress, arguing that an interface between modern 
forms of power and knowledge has served to create new forms of domination. In a 
series of historico-philosophical studies, he has attempted to develop and 
substantiate this theme from various perspectives: psychiatry, medicine, 
punishment and criminology, the emergence of the human science, the formation 
of various disciplinary apparatus, and the constitution of the subject. Foucault's 
projý-ct has been to write a "critique of our historical era" (Foucault, 1984: 42) 
which problematizes modem forms of knowledge, rationality, social institutions, 
and subjectivity that seem given and natural but in fact are contingent 
sociohistorical constructs of power and domination. 
While Foucault has decisively influenced postmodem theory, he cannot be wholly 
assimilated to that rubric. He is a complex thinker who draws multiple sources 
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and problematics while aligning himself with no single one. If there are privileged 
figures in his work, they are critics of reason and Western thought such as 
Nietzsche. Nietzsche provided Foucault with the impetus and ideas to attack 
Hegelian and Marxist philosophies. In addition to initiating a postmetaphysical, 
posthumanist mode of thought, Nietzsche taught Foucault that one could write a 
Ggenealogical' history of unconventional topics such as reason, madness, and the 
subject which locate their emergence within sites of domination. Nietzsche 
demonstrated that the will to truth and knowledge is indissociable from the will to 
power, and Foucault developed these claims in his critique of liberal humanism, 
the human sciences, and in his later work on ethics. While Foucault gave 
Nietzsche a political democratic twist, he did accept Nietzsche's claim that 
systematizing methods produce reductive social and historical analyses, and that 
knowledge is perspectival in nature, requiring multiple viewpoints to interpret a 
heterogeneous reality. 
Recognizing the problems of attaching labels to Foucault's work, I should like to 
examine the extent to which he develops certain postmodern positions. I do not 
read Foucault as a postmodernist foul court, but rather as a theorist who combines 
premodern, modem, and postmodem perspectives. I see Foucault as a profoundly 
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subtle and complex thinker whose thought is in tensions between discursive/ 
extra-discursive theorization, macro/ micro perspectives, and domination/ 
resistance relations as well as in tensions between ethical-political commitments 
and archaeological detachment. I begin with a discussion of his critique of 
modernity This critique is developed in the form of new historiographical 
approaches which he terms 'archaeology' and 'genealogy'. I shall then explicate 
Foucault's postmodern perspectives on the nature of modem power and his 
argument that the modern subject is a construct of domination. After analyzing the 
political implications of ethics and techniques of the self, I shall conclude some 
remarks on the tensions in his work as a whole. 
1. Archaeology and Genealogy 
Archaeology and Discontinuity 
In his initial books, Foucault characterizes his position as an archaeology of 
knowledge. In Madness and Civilization (1989; ofig. 1961), his first major work, 
Foucault attempts to write the 'archaeology of that silence' whereby madness is 
historically constituted as the other reason. He shows classical and modern 
discourses construct oppositions between sane and insane, normal and abnormal 
that work to enforce norms of reason and truth. In his next book, The Birth of lhe 
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Clinic (1975; orig. 1963), subtitled 'An Archaeology of Medical Perception', 
Foucault analyzes the shift from a premodern speculatively-based medicine to a 
mod-. rn empirically-based medicine rooted in the rationality of the scientific gaze. 
Then, in 7"he Order of 7hings (1994; orig. 1966), subtitled 'An Archaeology of the 
Human Sciences', Foucault describes the emergence of the human sciences. In his 
analysis, Foucault uncovers the birth of 'man' as a discursive construct. 'Man', 
the object of philosophy as the human sciences (psychology, sociology and 
literature), emerges when the classical field of representation dissolves and the 
human being for the first time becomes not only an aloof representing subject, but 
also the object of modem scientific investigation, a finite and historically 
determined being to be studied in its living, labouring, and speaking capacities. 
Having analyzed the birth of 'man', Ae Order of Aings concludes by 
anticipating the 'death of man' as an epistemological subject in the emerging 
posthumanist, postmodem epistemic space. 
In this book, Foucault provides a grid for the varieties of modern humanism by 
identifying three forms of Man doublet (1994; orig. 1966: 318-335). First, there is 
the transcendental/ empirical double, in which Man both constitutes the world of 
empirical objects and is constituted himself, an empirical object like any other in 
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the world. Second, there is the cogito/ unthought double, in which Man is both 
determined by forces unknown to him and aware that he is so determined; he is 
thus charged with the task of thinking his own unthought and thereby freeing 
himself Finally, there is the return-and-retreat-of the-origin double, in which Man 
is both the originary opening from which history unfolds and an object with a 
history that antedates him. 
Each of these three doubles contains a subject pole that suggests the autonomy, 
rationality, and infinite value of Man. As the one who transcendentally constitutes 
the world, Man is a meaning giver and lawmaker. As thinker of his own unthought, 
he becomes self-transparent, unalienated, and free. And as enabling horizon of 
history, he is its measure and destiny But no sooner does this subject pole endow 
Man with this privilege and value than it defines the opposing object pole that 
denies them. As empirical object, Man is subject to prediction and control. 
Unknown to himself, he is determined by alien forces. And as a being with a 
history that antedates him, he is encumbered with a destiny not properly his own. 
Foucault's initial critique of the human sciences is that they are premised on an 
impossible attempt to reconcile irreconcilable poles of thought and posit a 
constituting subject. However, it is only in his genealogical works, as we shall see, 
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that this critique assumes its full importance as Foucault becomes clear on the 
political implications of humanism as epistemological basis of a disciplinary 
society 
Finally, in The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972a; orig. 1969), Foucault gives us 
on account of the methodology underlying his various researches. Drawing from 
the work of French historians of science, Foucault announces that "this new form 
of history is trying to develop its own theory" (1972a: 5). From within this new 
conceptual space the modern themes of continuity, teleology, genesis, totality, and 
subject are no longer self-evident and are reconstructed or abandoned. 
Unlike modem historiography, Foucault adopts discontinuity as a positive 
working concept. He opposes his concept of general history to the concept of a 
total history that he attributes to figures such as Hegel and Marx. He summarizes 
the difference in this way: "A total description draws all phenomena around a 
single center -a principle, a meaning, a spirit, a world-view, an overall shape; a 
general history, on the contrary, would deploy the space of a dispersion7' (1972a: 
19). 
The task of archaeology is not just "to attain a plurality of histories juxtaposed and 
independent of one another", but also "to determine what form of relation may be 
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legitimately described between ... 
different series [of things]" (1972a: 10) In 
addition, he rejects the interpretation of his work as simply a "philosophy of 
discontinuity" (Foucault, 1988e: 99-100), instead, he claims that he sometimes 
exaggerated the degree of historical breaks "for pedagogical purpos&', that is, to 
counter the hegemony of the traditional theories of historical progress and 
continuity (see also Foucault 1980: 111-112) Historical breaks always include 
some "overlapping, interaction, and echoes" (1990a; orig. 1976: 149), hence, what 
Foucault employ is not a philosophy of discontinuity but a spiral process of 
continuity and discontinuity. 
The Archaeology of Knowledge was the last work Foucault explicitly identified 
as an archaeology and it marks the end of his focus on the unconscious rules of 
discourse and the historical shifts within each discursive field. 
Nietzsche and Genealogy 
In 1970 Foucault began to make the transition from archaeology to genealogy and 
thereby to a more adequate theorization of material institutions and forms of 
power. In his essay, 'The Discourse of Language', he speaks of employing a new 
genealogical analysis of "the effective formation of discourse, whether within the 
limits of control, or outside them7' (1972b; orig. 1971: 233) In a summary of a 
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discourse he gave in the Coll6ge de France (1970-1), he stated that his earlier 
archaeological studies should now be conducted "in relation to the will to 
knowledge" (1977: 201) and the power effects this creates. In his essay 'Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, and History', he analyzes the central Nietzscean themes that will 
inform his new historical method, which appears in mature form in his next major 
book, Discipline andPunish (1991; orig. 1975). In this book, he characterized this 
study as "a correlative history of the modem soul and of a new power to judge; a 
gencalogy of the present scientifico-legal complex from which the power to 
punish derives its bases, judifications and rules, from which it extends its effects 
and by which it masks its exorbitant singularity" (1991: 23) 
Foucault articulates, in 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, and History', the notion of an 
histography that "disturbs what was previously considered immobile; ... fragments 
what was thought unified; ... shows the 
heterogeneity of what was imagined 
consistent with itself, (1977: 147). In so doing, it affirms knowledge "as 
perspective", aiming not at "objective" truth but rather at a particular impact on its 
readers. It thus functions as "effective history", breaking up a present order that 
has enjoyed the advantage of a historical legitimacy. As Foucault puts it, history 
becomes "effective" when it "introduces discontinuity into our very being", when 
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it "deprives the self of the reassuring stability of life and nature' (1977: 154). 
Such a history is in all respects opposed to the extant order; it is "parodic, directed 
against reality, dissociative, directed against identity,... sacrificial, directed against 
trutW' (1977: 160) 
With regard to this final, sacrificial function, Foucault insists particularly on the 
notion of a "will to knowledge" that arbitrarily establishes its own "truth". Such a 
"trut. Y' is violent and coercive in character. In Foucault's words, "knowledge does 
not slowly detach itself from its empirical roots, the initial needs from which it 
arose, to become pure speculation subject only to the demands of reason; ... rather, 
it creates a progressive enslavement to its instinctive violence" (1977,162-4) 
While genealogy signals a new shift in focus, it is not a break in his work, but 
rather a widening of the scope of analysis. Foucault characterizes genealogy as a 
new mode of historical writing, calling the genealogist "the new historian" (1977: 
160) Both methodologies attempt to re-examine the social field from a 
micrological standpoint that enables one to identify discursive discontinuity and 
dispersion instead of continuity and identity, and to grasp historical events in their 
real complexity 
In the transition to his genealogical stage, however, Foucault places more 
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emphasis on the material conditions of discourse, which he defines in terms of 
"institutions, political events, economic practices and processes" (1972a: 49), and 
on analyzing the relations between discursive and non-discursive domains. 
Consequently, he thematizes the operations of power, particularly as they target 
the body to produce knowledge and subjectivity. This transition is not then a break 
between the idealist archaeological Foucault and the materialist genealogical 
Foucault, but rather marks a more adequate thematization of social practices and 
power relations. 
Archaeology and genealogy now combine in the form of theory/ practice where 
theory is immediately practical in character. As Foucault states (1980: 85), 
" "archaeology" would be the appropriate methodology of the analysis of local 
discursivities, and "genealogy" would be the tactics whereby on the basis of the 
descriptions of these local discursivities, the subjected knowledges which were 
thus released would be brought into play". Theoretical activity, then, is seen as 
having an entirely practical significance. In other words, theory does not simply 
tanalyze' or 'describe' reality, more importantly, it seems to articulate strategies 
by which what is extant may perpetually be overcome. This shift toward a notion 
of discourse as praxis can be linked to the events of 1968 in France, and to the 
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reaction that those events occasioned intellectual community. But at the same time, 
the shift was, in view of positions that Foucault had taken up in Madness and 
civilization, that is, his claims to be resurrecting the silent language of an 
oppressed madness, a logical one. 
In order to theorize the birth of modern disciplinary and normalizing practices, 
genealogy politicizes all facets of culture and everyday life. Following Nietzsche, 
Foucault tnes to wnte the history of unknown, forgotten, excluded, and marginal 
discourses. He sees the discourses of madness, medicine, punishment and 
sexuality to have independent histories and institutional bases, irreducible to 
macrophenomena such as the modem state and economy Hence, against "the 
tyranny of globalizing discourses" (Foucault, 1980: 83), he calls for "an 
insurrection of subjugated knowledges" (1980: 81), of those "disqualified" 
discourses that positivistic science and Marxism delegitimate because they are 
deemed marginal or non-formalizable. Genealogies are therefore 'anti-sciences', 
not because they seek to "vindicate a lyrical right to ignorance or non-knowledge" 
and attack the concepts and methods of science per se, but rather because they 
contest "the [coercive] effects of the centralizing powers which are linked to the 
institutions and functioning of an organized scientific discourse" (1980: 84). 
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In relation to Foucault's historiographical project, it can be said that Foucault has 
always written with the aim of changing the present: as early as History of 
Madness, he had this obvious present end in view. But there was a tendency, in his 
earlier archaeological work, for much of this to be obscured. This is because, as 
Best and Kellner point out, "Foucault's archaeologies privileged analysis of 
theory and knowledge over practices and institutions". (1991: 45) With the 
genealogical turn, however, Foucault is concerned not with the portrayal of a dead 
past but rather with the active play of forces in the present. Thereafter, he 
emphasizes the total insertion of his works into the context of a present struggle: 
" Writing interests me only insofar as it enlists itself into the reality of a contest, 
as an instrument of tactics, of illumination. I would like my books to be, as it were, 
lancets, or Molotov cocktails, or minefields; I would like them to self-destruct 
after use, like fireworks. " It is necessary, Foucault asserts, for historical analysis 
to be a part'of "political struggle" - not that it attempts to give such struggles a 
"guiding thread" or a "theoretical apparatus, " but rather that it "constitutes" their 
"possible strategies. " (Foucault in Megill, 1985: 243) It is in Discipline and 
Punish that this concern first comes fully into play. He tells us in this work that "I 
have learnt not so much from history as from the present' that "punishment in 
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general and the prison in particular belong to a political technology of the body. " 
He goes on to say that it is of the prison in its actuality "that I would like to write 
the history, " an enterprise that he characterizes not as "writing a history of the past 
in terms of the present, " but "writing the history of the present" (1991; orig. 1975: 
30-3 1). At this point, we arrive at the essential core of Foucault's 
historiographical project, that is, he is more interested in changing the way things 
are rather than in logical or historical correctness. We can say that the object of 
Foucault's genealogical critique is the status of the present. It is in this sense that 
Foucault characterizes his enterprise as the "history of the presenf'. In this regard, 
it must said that Foucault's genealogy is certainly not a masterscheme purporting 
to govern. all possible forms of historical explanation though it may offer them a 
supplementary dimension of reflection. As Gordon has noted, "What it may 
possibly provide is a principle of intelligibility for some ... of the 
historical 
relations covered by the category of power/ knowledge insofar as these are 
constituents of an effect of progressivity/ modernitý'. (Gordon, 1980: 242) 
Not only in his historical writings, Foucault's theoretical tendency toward the 
present also appears in his interest in journalism, or rather precisely, in the 
relationship of philosophy to journalism. Indeed, journalism was nothing new for 
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Foucault. He had been closely involved in launching LiNration, and he had long 
been a regular contributor to Le Nouvel Observateur. And he had conducted many 
'investigations' during his leftist period, particularly in working with the Group 
d'Information sur les Prisons (GIP) (Eribon, 1991: 281). He describes his notion 
of reporting: 
There are more ideas on earth than intellectuals imagine. And these ideas are 
more active, stronger, more resistant, more passionate than "politicians" think. 
We have to be there at the birth of ideas, the bursting outward of their force: not 
in books expressing them, but in events manifesting this force, in struggles 
carried on around ideas, for or against them ... This is the 
direction we want 
these "journalistic report" to take. An analysis of thought will be linked to an 
analysis of what is happening. Intellectuals will work together with journalists 
at the point where ideas and events intersect (Ibid., 282). 
Similarly, he sees Kant's 1784 text on the question 'What is Enlightenment? ' from 
this perspective. As he emphasizes it, "We must not forget that this is a newspaper 
article. A study is yet to be done of the relationship of philosophy to journalism 
beginning with the end of the eighteenth century" (Foucault, 1996: 386). He 
considers this text as "the question of the present as a philosophical event 
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incorporating within it the philosopher who speaks of it" (1993: 11), and links his 
concern for the historicization of the event in the present to the journalistic 
approach: 
I believe this question is also the basis of the journalist's occupation. The 
concern to say what is happening ... 
is not so much prompted by the desire to 
know always and everywhere what makes this happening possible but, rather, 
by the desire to make out what is concealed under that precise, floating, 
mysterious, utterly simple word "today" (Foucault: 2000: 443). 
2. Foucault's Postmodern Analytics: Power/ Knowledge/ Subjectivity 
Power/Knowledge 
Beginning in the early 1970s, Foucault attempts to think the nature of modern 
power in a non-totalizing, non-representational, and anti-humanist scheme. While 
the bourgeois revolution decapitated the king in the sociopolitical realm, Foucault 
argues that many concepts and assumptions of the sovereign-juridical model 
continue to inform modem thought (for example, in liberal theory and repression 
theories of power in general). He therefore attempts 'to cut off the head of the 
king' in the realm of theory with a genealogical guillotine. 
Against modem theories that see knowledge as neutral and objective (positivism) 
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or emancipatory (Marxism), Foucault emphasizes that knowledge is indissociable 
from regimes of power. His concept of 'power/ knowledge' is symptomatic of the 
postinodern suspicion of reason and the emancipatory schemes advanced in its 
name. The circular relationship between power and knowledge is established in 
Foucault's genealogical critiques of the human sciences. Having emerged within 
the context of relations of power, through practices and technologies of exclusion, 
confinement, surveillance, and objectification, disciplines such as psychiatry, 
sociology, and criminology in turn contributed to the development, refinement, 
and proliferation of new techniques of power. Institutions such as asylum, hospital, 
or prison functioned as laboratories for observation of individuals, 
experimentation with correctional techniques, and acquisition of knowledge for 
social control. 
Foucault views all claims to knowledge as irremediably tied up with the exercise 
of power. There is no such thing as an "objective" knowledge, no possibility of 
retreating into the Cartesian pallium. Any claims to objective knowledge, to valid 
theory, are merely attempts to exercise power of one sort or another. The corollary 
of this is that theory has no status as theory; on the contrary, it is nothing other 
than practice. In a conversation with Deleuze, Foucault argues that after May 
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1968 [popularly known as the "events of May), the intellectual discovered that the 
masses no longer need him to gain knowledge, and that intellectuals are 
themselves agents of this system of power, and that the idea of their responsibility 
for "consciousness" and discourse forms part of the system. Foucault redefines the 
"general intellectual" as a "specific intellectual" (see Foucault, 1980: 109-133) in 
this way: 
The intellectual's role is no longer to place himself "somewhat ahead and to the 
side" in order to express the stifled truth of the collectivity; rather, it is to 
struggle against the forms of power that transform him into its object and 
instrument in the sphere of "knowledge", 11trutlf', "consciousness", and 
"discourse" In this sense theory does not express, translate, or serve to apply 
practice: it is practice. But it is local and regional ... and not totalizing. 
This is a 
struggle against power, a struggle aimed at revealing and undermining power 
where it is most invisible and insidious. It is not to "awaken consciousness" that 
we struggle ... but to sap power, to take power ... A "theorý' 
is the regional 
system of this struggle (Foucault, 1977: 207-208). 
On this ground, one might expect Foucault to engage in a "theoretical practice" 
designed to advance the interests of some particular class or group within society. 
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But he does not do so. His failure to adopt, generally, Marxist strategy derives 
ultimately from his rejection of theory itself In an interview with a group of 
radical lyc6ens, he advises: "Reject all theory and all forms of general discourse. 
This need for theory is still part of the system we reject" (Ibid.: 23 1). 
He perhaps best defines this radically critical position in 'A Preface to 
Transgression'. Evoking Bataille, he here speaks of a "philosophy of nonpositive 
affirmatioW' whose sole aim is to "contest" the existing order. "Contestation", 
according to Foucault, "does not imply a generalized negation, but an affirmation 
that affirms nothing, a radical break of transitivity; ... to contest 
is to proceed until 
one reaches the empty core where being achieved its limit and where the limit 
defines being7 (Ibid.: 35-6). 
Foucault opposes the existing order of things, strategically attacking it at what he 
believes to be its weakest points. But he does so in the name of no other order that 
he intends or hopes will replace what exists, Order itself is brought before the bar. 
As Foucault says, "to imagine another system is to extend our participation in the 
present system" (Ibid.: 230). Or as he puts in the more authoritative The Order of 




According to Foucault, the modem individual became both an object and subject 
of knowledge, not "repressed", but positively shaped and formed within the 
matrices of "scientifico-disciplinary mechanisms", a moral/ legal/ psychological/ 
medical/ sexual being 'carefully fabricated ... according to a whole technique of 
force and bodies' (Foucault, 1991; orig. 1975: 217). As Foucault understands it, 
the term 'subject' has a double meaning: one is both 'subject to someone else by 
control and dependence, and tied to ... (their) own identity by a conscience or self- 
knowledge' (1982a: 212). 
Against modem theories that posit a pregiven, unified subject or an unchanging 
human essence that precedes all social operations, Foucault calls for the 
destruction of the subject and sees this as a key political tactic. "One has to 
dispense with the constant subject, and to get rid of the subject itself, that's to say, 
to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject within 
a historical frameworle' (Foucault, 1980: 117). The notion of a constituent subject 
is a humanist mystification that occludes a critical examination of the various 
institutional sites where subjects are produced within power relations. Taking his 
cue from Nietzsche, Foucault's task is to awaken thought from its humanist 
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slumbers and to destroy "all concrete forms of the anthropological prejudice", a 
task which would allow us "to renew contact ... with the project of a general 
critique of reason" (Foucault, 1994; orig. 1966: 342). To accomplish this, the 
subject must be "stripped of its creative role and analyzed as a complex and 
variable function of discourse" (Foucault, 1977: 138). Hence, Foucault rejects the 
active subject and welcomes the emerging postmodern era as a positive event 
where the denuding of agency occurs and new forms of thought can emerge 
(Foucault 1989; orig. 1961: 386). 
As Dews (1987) notes, Foucault rejects the Enlightenment model which links 
consciousness, self-reflection, and freedom, and instead follows Nietzsche's claim 
in Yhe Genealogy ofMorals that self-knowledge, particularly in the form of moral 
consciousness, is a strategy and effect of power whereby one internalizes social 
control. While his early critique of modernity are sharply negative, in his later 
work he sometimes adopts a more positive attitude, seeing a critical impulse in the 
modern will-to-knowledge which should be preserved. This leads him, as I shall 
show later, to modify his position that subjectivity is nothing but a construct of 
domination. 
3. Foucault's Political Fragments: Domination and Resistance 
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Resistance 
In Foucault's description, power is diffused throughout the social world, 
constituting individual subjectivities and their knowledges and pleasures, 
colonizing the body itself, utilizing its forces while inducing obedience and 
conformity Since the seventeenth century, individuals have been caught within a 
complex grid of disciplinary, normalizing, panoptic powers that survey, judge, 
measure, and correct their every move. Power is everywhere. "What I am 
attentive to is the fact that every human relation is to some degree a power 
relation. We move in a world of perpetual strategic relations. " (Foucault 1988e: 
168) 
Considering this intense vision Of oppression, I am not unsympathetic to the view 
that Foucault overly preoccupies with the question of power to the detriment of 
the question of resistance. However, the criticism outlined by Poulantzas (1978), 
namely that in Foucault's work there is no escape from domination since 
resistance is always inscribed within power, is predicted upon a clear 
misunderstanding. Ironically, Foucault addresses this very misunderstanding in 
the following rhetorical manner: 
Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this 
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resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power. Should it be 
said that one is always 'inside' power, there is no 'escaping' it, there is no 
absolute outside where it is concerned, because one is subject to the law in any 
case? Or that, history being the ruse of reason, power is the ruse of history, 
always emerging the winner? (Foucault, 1990a; orig., 1976: 95). 
The answer given is that to do so is to misunderstand the relational character of 
power, the power relationship being dependent upon the existence of a 
multiplicity of points of resistance. Thus Foucault argues that relations of force 
require opposition or resistance and that these are present throughout the network 
of power relations. In other words, there is no single necessary locus or source of 
opposition; rather there are plurality of resistances which can only exist in the 
strategic field of power relations: 
Their existence [power relationships] depends on a multiplicitY of points of 
resistance ... These points of resistance are present everywhere 
in the power 
network. Hence there is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, 
source of all rebellions, or pure law of revolutionary. Instead there is a plurality 
of resistances, each of them a special case (Foucault, 1990a; orig. 1976: 95-96). 
Another misinterpretation of Foucault turns on a conflation between power as 
68 
omnipresent and as omnipotent. Fine (1984), for example, adds his critique in 
terms of omnipotence of power, that is, "power without people": 
Foucault was not wrong to take off from themes which represented a revival of 
left criticism about power and the state. However, around the kernel of truth 
contained in these observations he built an elaborate mystical shell ... Power 
appeared as a self-sufficient entity, whose only purpose is the maintenance of 
its own mastery. This thesis was clearly apparent in his critique of prisons, 
where he described the prison as an 'extreme form' of disciplinary power ... For 
Foucault, since the form of power is everything and power produces its own 
reality, there can be no obstacles to its apparent efficacy: the prison becomes 
the symbol of omnipotence ( Fine, 1984: 191,196). 
agree, to some extent, that Foucault has neglected analysis of forms of resistance 
and oppression, but it is a mistake to see Foucault as a fatalist with respect to 
social and political change for his work can be read another way As the inevitable 
fate of class struggle and conflict is not institutionalization and neutralization, 
there is no warrant for attributing a fatalistic position to Foucault. 
While power is everywhere, it is indissociable from contestation and struggle: I 
am just saying: as soon as there is power relation, there is a possibility of 
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resistance. We can never be ensnared by power: we can always modify its grip in 
determinate conditions and according to a precise strategy" (Foucault 1988e: 123). 
The common argument that Foucault presents subjects as helpless and passive 
victims of power fails to observe his emphasis on the contingency and 
vulnerability of power and the places in his work where he describes actual 
resistances to it. (see Foucault, 1991; orig. 1975: 273ff.; 1990a; orig. 1976: 101). 
Admittedly, such passages are rare and the overriding emphasis of Foucault's 
work is on the ways in which individuals are classified, excluded, objectified, 
individualized, disciplined, and normalized. Foucault himself became aware of 
this problem and shifted his emphasis from "technologies of domination" to 
"technologies of the self', from the ways in which individuals are transformed by 
others to the ways in which they transform themselves. 
In sum, the emphasis in Foucault's work is on an unprejudiced examination of the 
complex mechanisms through which power has functioned. The exercise of power 
and the mechanisms through which it functions are conceptualized neither as 
autonomous of nor as subordinate to economic processes and relations of 
production. Foucault does not deny that local struggles against power may be 
related to struggles against economic exploitation (1977: 216), but argues that the 
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exercise of power and the mechanisms through which it is effective may not be 
theorized: or accounted for in terms of capitalist exploitation and relations of 
production. An analysis of the mechanisms through which power is exercised, and 
of the relationships between struggle against power and against struggle against 
exploitation, may not simply be derived from an existing totalizing theoretical 
system. Such mechanisms and relationships need to be analyzed in their own fight 
as "eventsP, rather than subordinated to existing conceptions of global historical 
processes which proves to be far from infallible. 
Furthermore, Foucault's own interventions into political struggles and debates 
would make little sense if he felt that the deadlock of power was unbreakable. 
One might even speak of Foucault's optimism that issues from his belief in the 
contingency and vulnerability of power: "There's an optimism that consists rather 
in saying that thing's couldn't be better. My optimism would consist rather in 
saying that so many things can be changed, fragile as they are, bound up more 
with circumstances than necessities, more arbitrary than self-evident, more a 
matter of complex, but temporary, historical circumstances than with inevitable 
anthropological constrainte' (Foucault 1988e: 156). Ultimately, this attitude 
proceeds on the belief that "Knowledge can transform us" (Foucault, 1988e: 14) - 
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hence the importance of archaeology and genealogy as historical methods that 
expose the beginnings and development of current subjectifying discourses and 
practices. 
The political task of genealogy, then, is to recover the autonomous discourses, 
knowledges, and voices suppressed through totalizing narratives. As Marx 
attempted to break the spell of commodity fetishism in capitalist society, 
Foucault's genealogy problematizes the present as eternal and self-evident, 
exposing the operations of power and domination working behind neutral or 
beneficent facades. In Foucault's words (1974: 171): "It seems to me that the real 
political task in a society such as ours is to criticize the working of institutions 
which appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticize them in such a 
manner that the political violence which has always exercised itself obscurely 
through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight them". 
Therefore, we have to attempt to formulate some of these reservations as they 
arise from Foucault's discussion of power, strategy and resistance. As Gordon 
suggests it: 
The contribution of the intellectual as historical analyst ends and gives way to 
the reflection and decisions, not of the managers and theoreticians of resistance 
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but of those who themselves choose to resist. For the recent eruptions of 
'popular knowledge' and 'insurrections of subjugated knowledges' which he 
celebrates, what Foucault may have to offer is a set of possible tools, tools for 
the identification of the conditions of possibility which operate through the 
obviousnesses and enigmas of our present, tools perhaps also for the eventual 
modification of those conditions (Gordon, 1980: 258). 
Power, Discourse and the Intellectual 
In my reading, a Foucauldian micropolitics includes two key components: a 
discourse politics and a bio-politics. Here, I should like to limit my discussion to 
discourse politics. In discourse politics, marginal groups attempt to contest the 
hegemonic discourses. In any society, discourse is power because the rules 
determining discourse enforce norms of what is rational, sane, or true, and to 
speak from outside these rules is to risk marginalization and exclusion. All 
discourses are produced by power, but they are not wholly subservient to it and 
can be used as "a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategý' 
(Foucault, 1990a; ofig. 1976: 101). Counter-discourses provide a lever of political 
resistance by encapsulating a popular memory of previous forms of oppression 
and struggle and a means of articulating needs and demands. 
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At this point, let's relate Foucault's emphasis on discourse politics to the question 
of the political role of intellectual. There must be something obviously self- 
interested in raising the question of discourse over and over again. Let us consider 
Foucault's intellectual milieu - which is, in fact, the milieu of intellectuals, 
intellectuals who take it as self-evident that they have a crucially important 
political role to play. Descombes notes that the staking out of a political position 
has been so important to philosophers in France that the "definitive meaning7 of 
even the most abstruse epistemological or metaphysical problems is not 
considered settled until its implications for the next elections, or for the attitude of 
the Communist Party, have been disclosed (Descombes, 1979: 7). In short, it is 
assumed that the intellectual has a political role to play as an intellectual, distinct 
from his status as person and citizen. And it is assumed, too, that all his 
intellectual work will have some sort of political significance. In Foucault's 
words: 
The role of intellectual is not to tell others what to do. By what right could he 
do so? Remember all the prophecies, promises, injunctions and programmes 
that intellectuals have formulated in the course of the last two centuries, the 
effects of which we can now see. The intellectual's task is not to shape the 
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political will of others: it is rather, by means of analyses in his own fields, to 
reinterrogate the obvious and the assumed; to unsettle habits and ways of 
thinking and doing; to dissipate accepted familiarities to re-evaluate rules and 
institutions, and, on the basis of this re-problematisation (in which he exercises 
his specific function as an intellectual), to participate in the formation of a 
political will (in which he has his role to play as a citizen) (Foucault, 1988e: 
265). 
Given these assumptions, the question of the political role of the intellectual 
becomes a standing problem. Not surprisingly, it is a problem that Foucault has 
addressed on a number of occasions; one notes especially the long discussion of 
the issue in his 1977 interview with Fontana and Pasquino, and his 1972 
conversation with Deleuze on the same subject (Foucault, 1980: 126-133; 1977: 
205-217). Many French intellectuals of the generation prior to Foucault's 
cons; dered the political role of the intellectual to be unambiguous: the intellectual 
was "the clear, individual figure of a universality whose obscure, collective form 
is embodied in the proletariat" (Foucault, 1980: 126). But for Foucault this 
peculiar form of Kantian theoretical universalism obviously will not do. We all 
know that intellectuals have a political role to play - but what is it? The advantage, 
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here, of a discursive redefinition of reality is clear. For discourse is a matter, 
finally, of words, and words are the peculiar concern of intellectuals. Hence, the 
political importance that Foucault attributes to Nietzsche (Foucault, 1980: 133). 
Although politics is not all about a matter of discourse, discourse is a form of 
power, then intellectuals become important political agents: 
The political involvement of the intellectual was traditionally the product of 
two different aspects of his activity: his position as an intellectual in bourgeois 
society, in the system of capitalist production and within the ideology it 
produces or imposes ... ; and his proper 
discourse to the extent that it revealed a 
particular truth, that it disclosed political relationships where they were 
unsuspected. These two forms of politicization did not exclude each other, but, 
being of a different order, neither did they coincide (Foucault, 1977: 207). 
According to Foucault, as individuals, intellectuals may be specified in a variety 
of ways; for example, in relation to their class position - "whether as petty- 
bourgeois in the service of capitalism or 'organic' intellectual of the proletariat" 
(Foucault, 1980: 132) - or to the economic or scientific sector in which they work. 
Moreover, as individuals they may oppose relations of power, class and sex 
domination in all of these dimensions. However, Foucault argues since it is 
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through the regime of truth that their specific function as intellectuals connects 
with the global system of power, it is this which must constitute their primary 
political objective. It is at this point that they can practice an intellectual 
subversion with the potential to disrupt one essential level of the general structure 
and functioning of society: 
There is a battle 'for truth', or at least 'around truth' - it being understood once 
again that by truth I do not mean 'the ensemble of truths which are to be 
discovered and accepted', but rather 'the ensemble of rules according to which 
the true and the false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the 
true', it being understood also that it's not a matter of a battle 'on behalf' of the 
truth, but of a battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role 
it plays. It is necessary to think of the political problems of intellectuals not in 
terms of 'science' and 'ideology' but in terms of 'truth' and 'power' (Foucault, 
1980: 132). 
Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) note that whereas in his writings of 1963-69 
Foucault dwelt almost exclusively on linguistic practices, in his post - 1969 
writings he dealt with the social practices that fonned both institutions and 
discourse. It is true, in particular, much of Discipline andplillisil suggests a focus 
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on actual social practices. Therefore, for Foucault in the 1970s, the essential 
political problem for the intellectual is "not changing people's consciousnesses - 
or what's in their heads - but the political, economic, institutional regime of the 
production of trutW' (Foucault, 1980: 133). The shift to the focus on technologies 
of the self, ethics, and freedom in the 1980s leads Foucault to restate the position 
in an interview published shortly before his death: 
My role ... 
is to show people that they are much freer than they feel, that people 
accept as truth, as evidence, some themes which have been built up at a certain 
moment during historyý and that this so-called evidence can be criticized and 
destroyed. To change something in the minds of people - that's the role of an 
intellectual (Foucault, 1988b: 10). 
4. Ethics and Technologies of the Self 
Foucault never provided any conception of human agency, and yet he did gesture 
towards a positive reconstruction of subjectivity in a posthumanist problematic. 
This move occurs in his later works - the second and third volumes of his history 
of sexuality and various essays and interviews from the 1980s - and it moves into 
the forefront of Foucault's thought a concern with ethics and technologies of the 
self. 
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Explaining his motivations in an 'auto-critique, Foucault says: "If one wants to 
analyze the genealogy of the subject in Western Civilization, one has to take into 
account not only techniques of domination, but also techniques of the self One 
has TOshow the interaction between these two types of self When I was studying 
asylums, prison, and so on, I perhaps insisted too much on techniques of 
domination ... I would 
like, in the years to come, to study power relations starting 
from techniques of the self' (Foucault and Sennet, 1982c: 10). Furthermore, 
Foucault situates his work as a whole in the context of "not power but the 
subject": "It has not been to analyze the phenomena of power, nor to elaborate the 
foundations of such an analysis. My object ... has been to create a 
history of the 
different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects ... Thus 
it is not power, but the subject, which is the general theme of my researcif'. 
(1982a: 208-9) 
Foucault defines technologies of the self as practices "which permit individuals to 
effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of 
operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so 
as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, 
wisdom, perfection, or immortality" (1988c: 18) Given this new emphasis, 
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subjectivity is no longer described as a reiried construct of power; the 
deterministic view of the subject is declined, impersonal explanations give way to 
a study of how individuals can transform their own subjectivities through 
techniques of the self. Discipline, in the form of these techniques, is no longer 
viewed as an instrument of domination. Furthermore, issues concerning the 
freedom and autonomy of individuals emerge as central concerns. 
These changes in Foucault's work were influenced by his study of Greek and 
RomanCUltUTes where techniques of the self, as practiced by ftee males (slaves 
and women were excluded from the ethical field) provided models of the practice 
of freedom. In 7he Use of Pleasure (Foucault, 1992; orig. 1984) and Ae Care of 
the Seff (Foucault, 1990b; orig. 1984), Foucault analyzes how Greek and Roman 
citizens problematized desire as an area of intense moral concern and defined key 
domains of experience (diet, family relations, and sexuality) as areas requiring 
moderation and self-control. For the Greeks, especially, ethics was immediately 
bound up with "an aesthetics of existence". 
Unlike Christian morality, Greek and Roman morality aimed not at abstinence per 
se, but at moderation and self-control; it was not a question of banishing or 
stigniatizing desire and pleasure, but of their proper use. Moreover, where in 
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Greek and Roman culture moral problematizations were ultimately the 
responsibility of each individual who wished to give style, beauty, and grace to his 
existence. 
In Foucault's reading of Greco-Roman culture, ethics is the relation an individual 
has with itself This is not to say that there is no social component to ethics, for 
mastery of and caring for the self is inscribed in a nexus of social and pedagogical 
relations and aims at developing oneself as a better ruler over oneself and other 
people. Whereas other forms of ethics such as Kantianism focus on the duties and 
obligations a self has to others, the Greco-Roman model holds that the freedom of 
individuals (defined not as free will or in opposition to determinism, but in 
relation to mastery of one's desires) was essential for overall good of the city and 
state, and that the person who could best rule himself could best rule other people. 
On this model, ethics is "the liberate form assumed by liberty" (I 988a: 4), and the 
basis for a prolonged practice of the self whereby one seeks for a "constitution of 
ourselves as autonomous subjecte' (Foucault, 1984: 43). 
However, Foucault is adamant that the Greeks do not offer an c-Lalternative7' 
(1983b: 231) for contemporary society, only an example of a non-normalizing 
morality which modem cultures will have to develop themselves: 
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In this regularly repeated return to the Greeks there is a sort of nostalgia, an 
atiempt to retrieve an original form of thought and an effort to conceive the 
Greek world outside of Christian phenomena ... Trying to rethink the Greeks 
today does not consist of setting off Greek morality as the domain of morality 
par excellence which one would need for self-reflection. The point rather is to 
see to it that European thinking can take up Greek thinking again as an 
experience which took place once and with regard to which one can be 
completely free (Foucault 1988e: 249). 
Hence, the genealogical importance of Foucault's historical inquires into ethics 
would seem to involve the valorization of a form of ethical practice that is non- 
universalizing and non-normalizing, attentive to individual differences, while 
emphasizing individual liberty and the larger social context of the freedom of the 
self. This is not to say that ethics is separated from politics for, the struggle 
against disciplinary institutions within each one of us is an important political act 
and on this account ethics can be seen as an extension of Foucault's earlier 
micropolitical concems. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
There is the third shift in Foucault's work, from the archaeological focus on 
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systems of knowledge in the 1960s, to the genealogical focus on modalities of 
power in the 1970s, to the focus on technologies of the self, ethics, and freedom in 
the 1980s. Where earlier it could be said that Foucault privileged political issues 
relating to the theme of power, in his later work (in the 1980s) he states that "what 
interests me is much more morals than politics or, in any case, politics as an 
ethice'(1984: 375). 
One important shift in Foucault's later work involves a revaluation of the 
Enlightenment in terms of its positive contributions to a critique of the present era 
and his identification of his own work with a trajectory of critical theory running 
from Kant to Nietzsche to the Frankfurt School. The second major difference 
involves a qualified turn to a problematic of the creative subject, which was 
previously rejected as a humanist fiction along with the use of the vocabulary of 
freedom, liberty, and autonomy, previously eschewed by the theorists of the death 
of man. Foucault's concern is still a history of the organization of knowledge and 
subjectivity, but now the emphasis is on the knowledge relation a self has with 
itself 
Foucault begins to take up Kant's task, the problem of Enlightenment "in a 
meaningful enough proximity with ... the work of the Frankfurt School" (1996: 
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389) in the late 1970s, afler Discipline and Punisk In several essays and 
interviews (Foucault, 1983a, 'The Subject and Power'; 1993, 'Kant on 
Enlightenment and revolution; 1996, 'What is Critique? '; 2000, 'For an Ethic of 
Discomfort'; 1984, 'What is Enlightenment? ), far from positing a radical rupture 
in history, he draws key continuities between our current era and the 
Enlightenment. While still critical of Enlightenment reason, Foucault attempts to 
positively appropriate key aspects of the Enlightenment heritage - its acute 
historical sense of the present, its emphasis on rational autonomy over conformity 
and dogma, and its critical outlook. He now sees the uncritical acceptance of 
modem rationality and its complete rejection as equally hazardous: "if it is 
extremely dangerous to say that its Reason is the enemy that should be eliminated, 
it is just as dangerous to say that any critical questioning risks sending us into 
irrationality" (1984: 249). Beyond "being for or against the Enlightenment" (Ibid.: 
45), he argues, critical thought must constantly live within a field of tension: "if 
philosophy has a function within critical thought, it is ... to accept this sort of 
revoiving door of rationality that refers us to its necessity, to its indispensability, 
and at the same time, to its intrinsic dangers" (Ibid.: 249) 
More importantly, Foucault uses Kant's essay as a diagnostic of a particular 
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historical conjuncture. What Foucault finds distinctive and insightful in Kant's 
essay is a philosopher qua philosopher realizing for the first time that his thinking 
arises out of and is an attempt to respond to his historical situation. In other words, 
Foucault reinterprets Kant's linking of the historical moment, critical reason and 
society as a challenge to develop a radically new version of what it means to lead 
a philosophical life. 
Is there a flagrant contradiction in Foucault's work? I think not. While each stage 
signals a new shift in focus, it is not a rupture in his work but rather an 
overlapping and a widening of the scope of analysis. Thematically, his work has 
three axes whose specificity and whose interconnections have to be analyzed, "the 
axis of knowledge, the axis of power, the axis of ethice'. (Foucault, 1984: 48) 
Methodologically, his new mode of historical writing is a unique combination of 
archaeology and genealogy. "An archaeology of problematizatione' and "a 
genealogy of practicee' (Foucault, 1992; orig. 1984: 13), he argues, are not the 
Itsuccessive levels" that develop on the basis of one another, but the "necessarily 
simultaneous dimensions of the same analysis" (Foucault, 1996: 397). 
In this sense, the shift to ethics does not mean that Foucault abandons his past 
concepts and methods, for all three 'axes' of his studies overlap in his later works 
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on techniques of self- the archaeology of problernatizations intersects with a 
genealogy of the ethical practices of the self Nor is it to say that the turn to 
analysis of techniques of the self represents a rejection of his earlier political 
positions, since ethics for Foucault suggests the struggle of individuals against the 
forces that dominate, subjugate, and subjectify them. 
Foucault still rejects essentialist liberation models that assume the self is an inner 
essence waiting to be liberated from its repression or alienation. He contrasts 
liberation with liberty, and defines the later as an ongoing ethical practice of self- 
mastery and care of the self. He sees liberty as "the ontological condition of 
ethice' and ethics as "the liberate form assumed by liberty" (1988a: 4). Similarly, 
for Foucault, 'subject' means both 'subject to someone else by control and 
dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge' 
(1983 a: 212). In this sense, the return of the 'subject' in Foucault is not a return to 
a pre-archaeological - i. e., humanist or phenomenological - concept of the subject 
endowed with an inner essence or originary will that precedes and stands apart 
from the social. The subject is still discursively and socially conditioned for 
Foucault, and still theorized as situated within power relations; the difference is 
that he now sees that individuals also have the power to define their own identity, 
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to master their body and desires, and to forge a practice of freedom through 
techniques of the self. What now Foucault suggests, therefore, is a tensional 
relation between an active and creative agent and a constraining social field where 
freedom is achieved to the extent that one can overcome socially imposed 
limitations and attain self-mastery and a stylized existence. As Foucault says: "if I 
am interested-in the way in which the subject constitutes himself in an active 
fashion, by the practices of the self, these practices are nevertheless not something 
that the individual invents by himself They are patterns that he finds in his culture, 
his society and his social group" (I 990b; orig. 1984: 11). 
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Chapter 3 
The Tensions and Continuity of Foucault's Thought: Knowledge, 
Power, and the Self 
1. Accusation? or Understanding? 
Foucault was a committed philosopher who fought against racism, sexism and all 
the varieties of injustice, not only through his books and public manifestoes, but 
with his own physical person. In this regard, some readers complain that the work 
of this intensely political intellectual does not carry the equivalent signs of 
commitment. On the contrary, some are astonished because Foucault, who had 
spoken of the death of man, took part in political struggle. Then again, concerning 
Foucault's final works on the history of sexuality, particularly on the care of the 
self, some raise a question like "how is it possible that the thinker who worked so 
hard to convince us of the death of Man, of antihumanism throughout his career, 
would in the end champion these central tenets of the humanist tradition? " These 
general or even confused reactions arise from Foucault's deliberate refusal to 
adopt the discursive forms of adherence to a particular revolutionary tradition or 
political position. These also lie behind the criticism that Foucault was always 
shifting his interests and positions. 
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In this context, the heirs of German philosophy such as Habermas (1986; 1987; 
1996) attack Foucault for being arbitrary and ungrounded, on the contrary, the 
French post-philosophers such as Derrida (1978), attack Foucault for not being 
arbitrary enough. Besides, the most often made criticism of his work is that he 
fails to define and defend the implicit normative assumptions of his analyses and 
poliC, cs and hence provides no theoretical basis for his vigorous critique of 
domination. (see Fraser, 1994; Rachjman, 1985; Taylor, 1986; Walzer, 1986; 
Dcws, 1987; Habcrmas, 1986,1987,1996) 
In his critique of History of Madness, Derrida, points out that Foucault is trapped 
within "logocentrism, " within the general historical guilt bome by Western 
language. For whatever his claims to be resurrecting the silent language of an 
oppressed madness, Derrida argues, Foucault continues to speak- the language of 
the very reason that carried out the oppression in the first place. In short, Foucault 
is still caught within the all-powerfiil order that he is seeking to evade. Thus, the 
radicalism of Foucault's critique of psychiatry is called into question. (see Derrida, 
1978: 35) 
Habermas, on the other side, highlights Foucault's seemingly arbitrary position. 
He points out what he takes to be an unresolved tension, "which resists easy 
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categorization, between the almost serene scientific reserve of the scholar striving 
for objectivity on the one hand, and, on the other, the political vitality of the 
vulnerable, subjectively excitable, morally sensitive intellectual" (Habermas, 
1986: 103). Foucault's subtle, sophisticated ironic stance towards the present is 
bound to look paradoxical to Habermas who agrees with Kant in identifying 
maturity with acceptance of limits on reason in order to preserve traditional 
philosophical seriousness. Habermas seizes on Foucault's refusal to specify or 
justify the normative values that implicitly inform his critique of modem practices 
of domination. For Habermas, this is a problem which spoils Foucault's political 
criticism. Habermas believes that Foucault has no standpoint from which to 
criticize modem institutions and thus has no basis for an ethics and politics. 
Furthermore, Habermas also accused Foucault of rejecting modernity and 
Enlightenment, at least in his earlier work, though Habermas sees that Foucault 
eventually came around to a qualified defence of Enlightenment values in a late 
essay on Kant. In relation to Foucault's analysis on Enlightenment, Habermas 
asks: "how does such a singularly affirmative understanding of modem 
philosophizing, always directed to our own actuality and imprinted in the hear- 
and-now, fit with Foucault's unyielding criticism of modernity? " (1986: 106). 
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In similar context, Fraser (1994) argues that without the introduction of normative 
notions Foucault cannot tell us why struggle is preferable to submission and why 
domination ought to be resisted and what is wrong with the modem power/ 
knowledge regime and why we ought to oppose it: "Without a nonhumanist 
ethical paradigm, Foucault cannot make good his normative case against 
humanism. He cannot answer the question, Why should we oppose a fully 
panopticized, autonomous society? " (Fraser, 1994: 208) 
I shall not be directly concerned, however, with the question, who has got 
Foucault right/ or wrong? I believe that Foucault does not really have a fixed 
single position and that there is some textual evidence in favor of each reading. If 
we are only concerned with the sameness of the themes or the stillness of 
perspectives of his work, there is a contradiction in Foucault's work. However, 
when viewed in terms of a three-fold circular (i. e., non-totalizing) reciprocity 
between knowledge, power and the self, these dimensions are irreducible, yet 
constantly imply one another. If we step back and examine Foucault's work in 
context, and relate the earlier work to the later (in the 1980s), there is the 
underlying continuity in his thought on knowledge, power, and self 
It is not the seeming continuity or the comforting integrity in the close space of 
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description that matters. It is his perpetual concern for things and words, others 
and ourselves and the relations between them that put Foucault's work together. 
Foucault always seeks to harmonize any description with any kind of "virtual 
fracture which open up the space of freedom ... of possible transformation" 
(Foucault, 1988e: 36), of course, but it does not mean that his work is done in 
disorder and contingency. He is unpredictable by reason that he is not seeking for 
an ahistorical (or mctahistorical) universal normative rule, but, on the contrary, he 
is too systematic and rigid by reason that he maintains theoretical and practical 
coherence within a limit, and that he takes writing itself as a training of oneself by 
oneself, requiring a vigorous rigor. In this relation, it is important to remember 
that Foucault has chosen as the title of his chair at the College de France, 
Professor of the History of Systems of Thought. He always deals with systems of 
thought and practices and gives us the systems of categories for analyzing 
thoughts and practices. He knows very well that history of science doesn't 
develop in the same way as social sensibility and that thought must obey certain 
criteria in order to be recognized as scientific discourse. 
More important, it is practice that constitutes the sole continuity between the 
historical analysis and the present problem, or, conversely, the way in which the 
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present explains the past. If Foucault's interviews form an integral part of his 
work, ffirthermore, if Foucault's life, in itself, composes an intertextual space of 
his work-, it is because Foucault extends the problem at ization of each of his books 
into the construction of the present problem, i. e. madness, punishment or sexuality. 
What is our "trutW' today? What powers must we confront, and what is our 
capacity for resistance today? And do we not bear witness and even participate in 
the production of a new subjectivity? This is the present triple root of the 
questions: What do we know, What can we do, "What are we? " (Foucault, 1982a: 
216), which obviously stems from three dimensions of thought: knowledge, power 
and self We should see through the systernaticity and generality of Foucault's 
thought a bit beneath unpredictability and a bit behind discontinuity. 
At bottorn, what obsesses Foucault is always thought. Foucault fires an arrow, the 
question, "What does thinking mean? " He writes a history, but a history of 
thought. This is why he calls his work historical research and not the work of a 
historian. To think means to experiment, to problematize and to challenge. 
Knowledge, power and self are the triple root of a problematization of thought. He 
sets up his observatory on the regions of living being where the traditional 
distinctions between body and soul, between instinct and idea, seem absurd, i. e. 
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madness, crime and sexuality. He converts, or rather doubles the thought and the 
unthought, the outside and the inside, "the othee' and "myself', from the visible 
and the articulable (knowledge) via the thought of the outside (power) through the 
inside of thought (subjectivation). (see Deleuze, 1988). He shows that truth offers 
itself to knowledge only through a series of problernatizations and that these 
probi ematizat ions are created only on the basis of practices, that is, practices of 
discourse involving statements, and practices of non-discourse such as institutions, 
political events, economic processes. He challenges Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Marx, 
Heidegger and the Frankfurt School, those who diagnose their own times in their 
own ways, that is, those who constitute the Zeitgeist. Foucault encounters with 
them in a blind zone, by following lines of fragility in the present, in managing to 
grasp "what are we today? " (Foucault, 1988d: 145), which is the permanent and 
ever-changing question in the activity of philosophizing since the end of the 
eighteenth century. He thinks the history of the past, but in order to free himself 
from what he thinks in the present and be able finally to "think differently" 
(Foucault, 1992; orig. 1984: 9) in the future. This is the way in which Foucault 
brings the past and the future into confrontation at the limit of the living present in 
the breach between social history and the history of thought, at the cross road of 
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philosophy and history. 
In Foucault, I suggest, there are three dimensions of thought: knowledge, power 
and self, and that there is a theme of double and doubling that transforms any 
dimension; and that everything is subject to variables and variations and 
polyvalence'; and that at the very heart of his analysis, it is critique, whose focus 
is the relationships between truth, power, and the self-, and finally that his 
philosophy is not just to be sought in his ideas, or to be deduced from them, but 
rather it should be found in his philosophy-as life, his philosophical life, his ethos. 
These are red threads that penetrate Foucault's work throughout. By way of my 
reaction to the misreading of Foucault's work, I shall try to show these veins more 
clearly and persuasively than I think Foucault has done. 
2. How to read Foucault? 
Everybody is free to do with Foucault's work what he/she pleases, and yet it does 
not mean in any way that one may say just anything within the order of theory. 
Rather, a demanding and prudent attitude is required in order to recover the 
critiral function. Since I began to read Foucault seriously, I have had the bitter 
' Foucault presents, in a preliminary way, four rules of his work: Rules of immanence; Rules of 
continual mariations; Rules of double conditioningý Rules of tactical polyvalcncc of discourses 
(Foucault, 1990a; orig. 1976: 98-102), and yet he adds that "'Ibcsc are not intended as 
methodological impcmti-%-cs; at most they arc cautionary prcscriptionr (Foucault, 1990a; orig. 
1976: 98). 
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feeling that Foucault had been ill-read and ill-understood. The point is that 
conventional Foucault critiques mostly devote their energies to the question of 
"what Foucault should have said" instead of seeking "what Foucault is trying to 
say", for example, as Habermas accuses Foucault, whose entire oeuvre is a revolt 
against universal and normative thinking, of not propounding a normative theory. 
This is nothing more than the decline of the critical function. It seems to me that 
there is no longer any place where discussions, perhaps a rather lively debate 
among unconventional or different ideas can be expressed. To read or to 
understand an independent thinker should be an exercise one engages in somehow 
for oneself, for one's profit to change - or at least to ready to change - oneself 
Speaking well of a thinker that one do not like or trying to take enough distance in 
speaking of a thinker one likes a bit too much, might be one of the remedies for 
this impoverished situation. In a 1984 interview with Paul Rabinow, Foucault 
expressed his position about polemics as follows': 
A whole morality is at stake, the morality that concems the search for the truth 
and the relation to the other. In the serious play of questions and answers, in the 
work of reciprocal elucidation, the rights of each person in some sense 
2 Foucault did not mcntion Habcrmas dircctly hcrc. But tWs statcmcnt took aim at Habcrmas's 
unilatcral attack on Foucault (scc Habcrmas, 1986; 1987; 1996) by implication. 
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immanent in discussion. They depend only on the dialogue situation..... The 
polemicist, on the other hand, proceeds encased in privileges that he possesses 
in advance and will never agree to question. On principle, he possesses rights 
authorizing him to wage war and making that struggle a just undertaking; the 
person he confronts is not a partner in the search for the truth, but an adversary, 
an enemy who is wrong, who is harmful and whose very existence constitutes a 
threat (Foucault, 1984: 381-382). 
Although Foucault chose the "theory-as-tool-kit" approach, and challenged the 
notion of author by saying that "what matter who's speaking? " (Foucault, 1977: 
138), when I read Foucault it is his specific, individual voice and presence that 
make an impression on me over and above his argument because he is speaking 
out for his belief There is no such thing as an isolated sparkling voice, but equally, 
Foucault cannot be mistaken for an anonymous author function. His writings, it 
seems to me that, carry profound emotional undercurrents unusual in scholarly 
analyses - bleakness in the Use of Pleasure, agony in Discipline and Punish, 
ridicule and hope in The Order of Things, fury and grief in Madness and 
Civilization. As Foucault once said, "Everytime I have tried to do a piece of 
theoretical work it has been on the basis of elements of my own experience: 
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always in connection with processes I saw unfolding around me ... each time was 
partly a fragment of autobiography" (Foucault, 2000: 458). 
I am talking about not just Foucault's phenomenology in the vulgar sense of the 
terms, but his attempt to link the historical and theoretical analysis of power 
relations, institutions, and knowledge, to the movements, critiques, and 
experiences that call them into question in reality. Foucault's philosophy is not 
just to be sought in his ideas, or to be deduced from them, but rather it should be 
found in his philosophy-as life, his philosophical life, what Foucault calls "an 
ethoe' (Foucault, 1984: 39). 
Foucault never thought of writing as an aim or an end in itself. This is what makes 
Foucault a great writer. In fact, he, on many occasions, challenged the notion of 
author. As he is fond of quoting Beckett - "what matter who's speaking? " 
(Foucault, 1977: 115). In an indifference like this Foucault discovers one of the 
fundamental ethical principles of contemporary writing, that is, to look on writing 
not as "the finished project", but as "an ongoing practice" (Ibid.: 116). It should 
be noted that Foucault is concerned here not with the discourse of individuals but 
with the discourse of entire periods, that is, the underlying meaning of the 
episterne itself As he puts it, "the subject (and its substitutes) must be stripped of 
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its creative role and analysed as a complex and variable function of discourse" 
(Ibid.: 138). Because in our societies the circulation of discourses have to yield to 
limited forms imposed by notions of author, work, and commentary. In this 
respect, Foucault could not isolate himself from the society in which he lived. He, 
like everyone else, was forced to fulfill the "functione' he described. Foucault has 
a clear position about the relationship between his work and himself as an author. 
He does not assume that there is the writing subject, the real author who gives 
meaning to one's work, instead he tries to explore the possible condition within 
which the work is produced. For Foucault, this condition is an intertextual space 
which is already there before the author speaks. 
The subject is constituted not only in a symbolic system, but in real practices, that 
is, historically analyzable practices. There is more. As Foucault puts it, "There is a 
technology of the constitution of the self which cuts across symbolic systems 
while using them" (Foucault, 1983b: 250). Indeed, one of the studies of The Care 
of the Se#' (Foucault, 1990; orig. 1984) concerns the role of writing in the 
formation of the self. In Foucault's reading of Roman culture, writing connects up 
with ethics and the self because writing is technique or professional skill which 
can be acquired only through exercise just as one cannot learn the art of living 
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without a training oneself by oneself This is not to say that there is no social 
component to writing, because in the activity of writing, the work of oneself on 
oneself and communication with others are linked together. Writing is "not an 
exercise in solitude, but a true social practice" (Foucault, 1990b; orig. 1984: 51), 
that is, it is not a psychological but an ontological form of the constitution of the 
self Also, writing is a political practice because the question of writing and the 
self converge into the goal of "the perfect government of the self -a sort of 
political relationship between self and self' (Foucault, 1983b: 246) - it being 
understood that only free man can dominate others. How could one claim to 
govern others if one could not govem oneself? The domination of others must be 
doubled by a domination of oneself. The relation with others must be doubled by 
a relation with others. In a citation from Plato, Foucault says, "How can the eye 
see itself? ... One cannot simply look at oneself in a mirror. One has to look into 
another eye. That is, one in oneself, however in oneself in the shape of the eye of 
the other" (Foucault, 1983b: 249). The process of subjectivation is accompanied 
by writing of self, or rather, memory, contemplation or writing is the real name of 
the relation to oneself, the affect on self by self, i. e., subjectivation. It is here we 
obtain a certain theoretical understanding why to write is to resist and struggle and 
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why to write is to become while avoiding the philosophy of the meaning giving 
subject. We could even say that to write is to think, to find the others and the 
outside in oneself and that the thought of the other and the outside in oneself is the 
thought of resistance. 
What I have said so far is the effort to find a path to Foucault, or rather to avoid 
obstacles that prevent us from grasping Foucault. In my reading, Foucault's 
thought presents not the philosophy of agreement but the philosophy of refusal. 
As Foucault puts it, "Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are, 
but to refuse what we are. We have to imagine and to build up what we could be 
to get rid of this kind of political "double bind", which is the simultaneous 
individualization and totalization of modem power structuresý' (Foucault, 1982a: 
216). Foucault decentralizes his own work with openness and evasiveness. I 
maintain that the very strengths of Foucault's method also breed the unpleasant 
consequences, though I think that it is not theoretical flaws but procedural 
problems in the circulation of discourse. in other words, Foucault's writings have 
a potential utility, helping us to see the world in ways that we might not have 
thought of otherwise. Without presenting a normative theory nor addressing a 
program of the future, they enable us to think and act by showing that we are freer 
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than we feel, and that the so-called truth, that we accept as truth, is not eternal and 
self-evident but can be criticized and destroyed. However, they also have a 
potential pitfall of misuse including sterile rhetoric or justification, whether it is 
intended or not. It is dangerous to reduce Foucault's philosophy, which is so 
subtle and complex, to a textbook formula. In this sense, work on Foucault today 
should be focused on the removal of margin for misunderstanding, however 
imperfectly, rather than on understanding itself This is, in my view, the only spirit 
that can take us along Foucault's path in such a way that we can understand him, 
then can indeed go beyond him. 
In Foucault's view, knowledge is not science and cannot be separated from even 
the experience of perception, the values of the imagination, the prevailing ideas or 
commonly held beliefs. Things and words designate the two poles of knowledge, 
and there are only practices, or positivities, which are constitutive of knowledge: 
the discursive practices of statements, or the non-discursive practices of 
visibilities. This is Foucault's positivism or pragmatism. He has never had any 
problem concerning the links between science and literature, or the imaginary and 
the scientific, or the known and the lived, because the conception of knowledge 
impregnated and mobilized perception, imagination and ideas. He poses a 
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complementarity between the rarity of statements (as a substitute for totality of 
statements) and the effective formation of discourse by non-discursive practices as 
follows: 
Critical and genealogical description are to alternate, support and complete 
each other. The critical side of the analysis deals with the systems enveloping 
discourse; attempting to mark out and distinguish the principles of ordering, 
exclusion and rarity in discourse. We might, to play with our words, say it 
pactises a kind of studied casualness. The genealogical side of discourse, by 
way of contrast, deals with series of effective formation of discourse: it 
attempts to grasp it in its power of affirmation, by which I do not mean a power 
opposed to that of negation, but the power of constituting domains of objects, in 
relation to which one can affirm or deny true or false propositions. Let us call 
these domains of objects positivists and, to play on words yet again, let us say 
that, if the critical style is one of studied casualness, then the genealogical 
mood is one of felicitous positivism (Foucault, 1972b; orig, 1971: 234). 
On the other hand, as Habermas points out (Habermas, 1987: 238-265), it is true 
that he is not following in the philosophical tradition of using language to 
represent reality, nor is he using language as a vehicle for undistorted 
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communication. But, pace Habermas, neither is Foucault prepared to abandon 
himself to the free play of self-referential signifiers. Foucault has been at pains to 
criticize and distant himself from French anti-thinkers, those who in the name of 
post-enlightenment and postmodern discourse, question seriousness in general and 
understand nothing but the subversive role of language and desire. In this respect, 
Dreyfus and Rabinow remark that Foucault uses texts as clues to other social 
practices, rather than deconstructing texts to reveal their attempt to conceal their 
self-reference to their own textuality: "Like the pre-Platonic rhetoricians, Foucault 
uses language to articulate an understanding of our situation which moves us to 
actiorf' (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1986: 114). He positively embraces the effect of 
language "as a means for moving us to concerted action. " (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 
1986: 115) This is why Foucault does not propound a normative theory, yet as 
Habermas points out (1986: 107), Foucault's work certainly has a normative 
thrust. 
Foucault is not trying to construct a general theory, not deconstruct the possibility 
of any metanarrative, rather, he is offering us an analytic of our current situation. 
It is Foucault's unique combination of genealogy and archaeology that enables 
him to go beyond theory and yet to take problems seriously. The practitioner of 
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genealogy realizes that he himself is produced by what he is studying, 
consequently he can never stand outside. The genealogist sees that cultural 
practices are more basic than any theory and that the seriousness of theory can 
only be understood as part of a society's on-going history. The archaeological step 
back that Foucault takes does not mean that he considers these practices 
meaningless. Since we share cultural practices with others, and since these 
practices have made us what we are, we have some common footing from which 
to proceed, to understand, to act. But that foothold is no longer one which is 
universal, guaranteed, verified, or grounded. 
Foucault's approach consists in identifying what he takes to be our current 
problem, describing with detachment how this situation arose and, at the same 
time, using his rhetorical skills to reflect and increase shared uneasiness in the 
face of the omnipresent danger. Thus the tension between Foucault's method and 
his insight into the impossibility and undesirability of offering a theory justifying 
his action only seems a contradiction, however, this very tension provides the 
elements for a unique work. 
What I am trying to say is that Foucault's approach is not as subjective nor as 
objective. Rather, "it is an act of imagination, analysis, and commitment". 
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(Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 253) Although presented with detached objectivity 
(Foucault's happy positivism), the shifting boundary between reason and unreason, 
health and disease, science and pleasure could not be singled out as the basic issue 
of our time by any objective method. But equally, Foucault's interest in writing 
history from the perspective of these concerns could not be taken to express 
merely his personal situation. 
The key to Foucault, therefore, is to grasp this subtle, sophisticated, but not well 
conceptualized ironic stance towards knowledge as well as practice, the 
techniques of life as well as political choices. Foucault should not be regarded as 
an authority, but as an animator or as a diagnostician of the relation of power, 
knowledge and the body in modern society. With a constant alertness in mind, we 
should read Foucault not only literally but ironically. 
3. Foucault's Thought: Rupture or Continuity? 
In several essays and interviews (Foucault, 1983a, 'The Subject and Power'; 1984, 
'What is Enlightenment? '; 1988b, 'Truth, Power, Self; 1992,7he Use ofPleasure, 
'Introduction'), Foucault reveals the structure of his work as a whole. On this 
ground, it is generally understood that there is the third shift in Foucault's work, 
from the archaeology of knowledge in the 1960s, through the genealogy of power 
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in the 1970s, to a hermeneutics of the subject in the 1980s. The axis of knowledge 
was studied in The Birth of the Clinic, Yhe Order of Things and Ae Archaeologý 
of Knowledge, the axis of power was studied in Discipline and Punish and Yhe 
Will to Knowledge and the axis of ethics was studied in Ae Use of Pleasure and 
The Care of the Self In Madness and Civilization, all three axes were present, 
albeit in a somewhat confused manner. If we compare the early, the middle, and 
the later, there are continuities and discontinuities on the surface. Then, the 
question arises: Is it a merely arbitrary shift in terms of his postmodernist 
sensibility, which manifests a disabused attitude toward any given order? Or, 
rather, is it both differentiation and integration of the same analysis, which are 
irreducible yet constantly imply one another? In a word, is it a real rupture or 
continuity? 
Let me be clear about my purpose here. I am aware of the fact that once this kind 
of question is posed, it degenerates into slogans, as we have already witnessed in 
Marx's case. It is not the responsibility of any one person in particular, rather it is 
the slice of our reality that philosophical thought, or a sociological issue, becomes 
a consumer item. Nevertheless, it is important to confront this kind of question at 
any risk rather than avoiding or ignoring it. Also, it should be remembered that 
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this kind of challenge means added responsibility for people who speak and write. 
In Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (1982; 1983, 
Second Edition), Dreyfus and Rabinow suggest that while Foucault in the 1960s 
was caught within "the illusion of autonomous discourse", in the 1970s he worked 
himself free from this enclosure, turning to a "genealogy of the modem 
individual" that strives to articulate an "interpretive analytics of power, truth, and 
the body". In Dreyfiis and Rabinow's view, whereas in his writings of 1963-69 
Foucault dwelt almost exclusively on "linguistic practices", in his post-1969 
writings he deals with "the social practices that formed both institutions and 
discourse" (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 101, viii). In the second edition of this 
book, they add "Foucault's interpretive analytic of ethics" (Ibid.: ix), still they 
maintain that Foucault devoted the last decade of his life, from the 1970s to the 
1980s, to rethinking and rectifying his earlier position in the 1960s. 
In Ae Philosophical Discourse of Modemity (1987), Habermas suggests that 
while Foucault focused on "the critique of reason as an unmasking of the human 
sciences" in the 1960s, in the 1970s he turned to "some questions concerning the 
theory of power" (Habermas, 1987: vi). Habermas sees that this conversion was 
caused by the very aporia immanent in Foucault's problematic itself, and that each 
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attempt inevitably ended in failure. In addition, in his article, 'Taking Aim at the 
Heart of the Present' (Habermas, 1986), Habermas highlights a fundamental 
rupture between the earlier Foucault and the Foucault in the 1980s, particularly 
the incompatibility between Me Order of Ihitigs and 'What is Enlightenment? '. 
On the contrary, Deleuze (1988), Efibon (1991), Flynn (1988), and Negri and 
Hardt (2000) interpret Foucault otherwise. Seeing Foucault's work in continuity, 
they argue that while there is internal tension between each shift, each move is 
already anticipated and comprised in the earlier. 
In Roucault (1988), Deleuze says cryptically that Foucault should be seen not as a 
historian, but as a new kind of "cartographer" (Deleuze, 1988: 44) - maps made 
for use not to mirror the terrain but to mirror the diagram of power. Seeing 
Foucault's work in continuity, Deleuze traces Foucault's thought from knowledge 
through power to subjectivation in terms of "the thought of the outside" (Ibid.: 43). 
To think in the field of power involves a dice throw. What the dice-throw 
represents is that thinking always comes from the outside where the force belongs. 
The dice-throw does in fact express chance, the simplest possible power relation. 
Chances works only in the first dice-throw, while the second case operates under 
conditions that are partially determined by the first. This is the outside that 
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continues to link up random events in a mixture of chances and dependency' 
Obviously, the knowledge/ power relationship in Foucault's earlier work appears 
in the form of the thought of the outside. Then, how is it possible to explain his 
later work on subjectivation in the line of the thought of outside? The thought of 
the outside, Deleuze argues, should not be completed until the outside in itself 
constitutes a coexistensive inside. A technique of knowledge and a politics of 
power can be led to an ontology of self only by folding outside to inside so as to 
be self-action, the affect of self by self Therefore, subjectivation in his later work 
is not a refusal of the thought of the outside, rather it is the inside of the thought, 
i. e., the deepening and the final stage of the thought of the outside. 
In 'Foucault as parrhesiast' (1988), Flynn argues that the power-knowledge 
relationship of his earlier work is not only focused upon but is in turn translated 
by the relation of subjectivation in his later writings. Here, he uses the term, 
"transiatioif' rather than "mediation7 considering Foucault's hostility to Hegelian 
dialectic. As Flynn understands it, Foucault intends his project to be a three-fold 
'"The world of effective history knows only one kingdom, without pro, %idcnce or final cause, 
%Nhcre there is only "the iron hand of necessity shaking the dice box of chance". Chance is not 
simply the drawing of lots, but raising the stakes in every attempt to master chance through the 
will to power, and gKing rise to the risk of an even greater chance. The world Nvc know is not this 
ultimately simple configuration -*%here events are reduced to accentuate their essential traits, their 
final meaning, or their initial and final value. On the contrary, it is a profusion of entangled events" 
(Foucault, 1977: 155, my emphasis). 
110 
circular (i. e. non-totalizing) reciprocity between truth, power and subjectivation, 
for it is the only way to escape the philosophy of the (meaning-giving) subject 
while charting the advent of the modem subject. 
In Empire (2000), Negri and Hardt suggest that Foucault did not reverse his earlier 
position in his work of the ethical care of the self, rather that he was always so 
insistent about the continuity of his discourse. As Negri and Hardt see it, Foucault 
raises in his final work a paradoxical and urgent question: What is humanism after 
the death of Man? Or rather, what is an antihumanist (or posthuman) humanism? 
In addition, they point out that misunderstanding about Foucault derives at least in 
part from a terminological confusion between two distinct notions of humanism. " 
If we are to conceive Man as separate from nature, this recognition is precisely the 
death of Man. On the other hand, if we consider an antihumanist (or posthuman) 
humanism and the revolutionary spirit of Renaissance humanism in terms of an 
attack on transcendence, there is a strict continuity between both projects. In other 
words, the religious thought that accords a power above nature to God is simply 
transferred to the modem secular thought that accords the same power above 
nature to Man. The refusal of transcendence, for Foucault, is the condition of 
" For more detailed notions of humanism in Foucault, see Fraser (1994). She c. x-an-dned Foucault's 
refusal of humanism on three grounds: on conceptual and philosophical grounds; on strategic 
growids; on normative grounds. 
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possibility of thinking this immanent power, a sort of anarchic basis of 
philosophy: neither God, nor master, nor Man. 
The humanism of Foucault's final works, then, should not be seen as 
contradictory to or even as a departure from the death of Man that he proclaimed 
earlier. Foucault's attempt in his final work is, Negri and Hardt argue, not about 
the refusal of the death of man but about humanism after the death of man, the 
continuous constituent project to create and re-create ourselves and our world. 
In what follows, I should like to develop a sort of anatomy pursuing the naked 
skeleton of Foucault's thought. What interests me is the way in which the 
problematic appears and develops in each particular theoretical formation. 
Knowledge 
Foucault continued to be enchanted by what he saw as much as what he heard or 
read. He enjoyed articulating statements, only because he also had a passion for 
seeing. It is knowledge that is made from things and words, from seeing and 
speaking, from the visible and the sayable. In other words, "words and things" 
(Foucault, 1972a; orig. 1969: 49) are terms with which to designate the two poles 
of knowledge. Foucault defines knowledge in 7he ArchaeolpSD7 of KnoWedge as 
follows: 
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This group of elements, formed in a regular manner by a discursive practice, 
and which are indispensable to the constitution of a science, although they are 
not necessarily destined to give rise to one, can be called knowledge. 
Knowledge is that of which one can speak in a discursive practice, and which is 
specified by that fact: the domain constituted by the different objects that will 
or will not acquire a scientific status ... Discursive practice does not coincide 
with the scientific development that it may give rise to; and the knowledge that 
it forms is neither an unfinished prototype nor the by-product to be found in 
daily life of a constituted science (1972a; orig. 1969: 181,182,184). 
Knowledge is not science and cannot be separated from the various thresholds 
including "the threshold of Positivity", that of "ep i sternologizat ion", that of 
64 sci entifi city", and that of "formalization" (1972a; orig. 1969: 186-187). Ideology 
is not exclusive of scientificity, rather "the hold of ideology over scientific 
discourse and the ideological functioning of the science" are articulated "where 
science is articulated upon knowledge" (1972a; orig. 1969: 185). In fact, there is 
nothing prior to, and behind knowledge, for knowledge is defined by the 
combination of things and words that are unique to each historical formation. 
Knowledge is a practical assemblage, a mechanism of statements and visibilities, 
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and exists only according to certain widely varying thresholds. There are only 
practices, or positivities, which are constitutive of knowledge: the discursive 
practices, or the non-discursive practices. Foucault puts forward a distinction 
between two types of practical formation: the one "discursive" involving 
statements, the other "non-discursive", involving environment. Here, "non- 
discursive" environment includes "an institutional field, a set of events, practices, 
and political decisions, a sequence of economic processes ... demographic 
fluctuations, techniques of public assistance, manpower needs, different levels of 
unemploymenf' (Foucault, 1972a; orig. 1969: 157). Naturally, environments also 
produce statements, just as statements determine environments. But the fact 
remains that the two formations are heterogeneous, even though they may overlap. 
The history of knowledge, in Foucault's view, is neither a history of mentality, nor 
of behavior. It is a history of the conditions governing everything that has a 
mental existence, i. e., the system of language and a history of the conditions 
governing that has a visual existence, like asylum and prison. Speaking and seeing, 
or rather statements and visibilities, are pure elements, a priori conditions under 
which all ideas are formulated and behaviors displayed, at some moment or other. 
Moreover, from the beginning, one of Foucault's fundamental theses is that there 
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is a difference in nature between the visible and the articulable although they 
continually overlap. 
NVith this epistemological framework in mind, what is Foucault trying to show in 
the field of knowledge? He attempts to seek, in the first place, the whole picture 
of the relationships we have to truth through scientific knowledge, to truth games, 
in the second place, the vague draft of the relationships we have to others through 
strategies and power relationships in the sense that power is presupposed cause of 
knowledge. A series of questions for knowledge constitute the problem of truth. 
Moreover, the process to pose those questions constitute "games of truth" 
(Foucault, 1988b; 15). Throughout his work, Foucault shows that truth offers 
itself to knowledge only through a series of problernatizations and that these 
problernatizations are created only on the basis of practices, practices of seeing 
and speaking, of things and words, of non-discourse and discourse. These 
practices, the process and method, constitute the procedures for truth, "a histoty of 
trutlf'. 77ze Use of Pleasure draws out the conclusions of all his earlier books as 
follows: 
I seem to have gained a better perspective on the way I worked ... on this project, 
whose goal is a history of truth. It was a matter of analyzing, not behaviours or 
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ideas, nor societies and their "ideologies, " but the problentalizalions through 
which being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought - and the practices on the 
basis of which these problernatizations are formed. The archaeological 
dimension of the analysis made it possible to examine the forms themselves; its 
gcnealogical dimension enabled me to analyze their formation out of the 
practices and the modifications undergone by the latter (Foucault, 1992; orig. 
1984: 11-12). 
In Madness and Civilization, there is a problematization of madness and illness in 
social and medical practices that define a certain pattern of "normalization". In 
Ae Order of 77fings, there is a problernatization of life, language, and labour in 
discursive practices that confonn to certain "epistemic! ' rules. In Discipline and 
Punish, there is a problematization of crime and criminal behaviour in certain 
punitive practices that conform to a "disciplinary" model. In Me Use of Pleasure, 
there is a problernatization of sexual activity and sexual pleasure in practices of 
the self that bring into play the criteria of an "aesthetics of existence". 
Now, it is necessary to point out some theses about the relation between 
knowledge and power so as to move from knowledge to power, from 
epistemology in the field of knowledge to strategy in the social field. Firstly, it 
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should be noted that knowledge does not merge with power and that knowledge is 
not a simple mask of power. In a word, knowledge is not power. As Foucault says 
it: "Having made them [power and knowledge] identical, I don't see why I would 
have taken the trouble to show the different relations between them. What I set out 
to show was how certain forms of power that were extremely different both in 
their object and in their structure ... Those who say that for me knowledge is the 
mask of power seem to be quite incapable of understanding7' (Foucault, 1988e: 
264-265). 
Secondly, it should be noted that knowledge relations presuppose power relations, 
and that power relations imply knowledge relations. Power is presupposed cause 
of knowledge, but conversely, power implies knowledge in order to become an act. 
As Foucault puts it: "There is no power relation without the correlative 
constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose 
and constitute at the same time power relatione' (Foucault, 199 1; orig. 1975: 27). 
Thirdly, however, it should be noted that knowledge is not equivalent to power, 
that is, there is a primacy of power over knowledge, or of power relations over 
knowledge relations. If we consider in the abstract, no doubt power neither sees 
nor speaks. Rather precisely, it does not itself speak and see, it makes us speak 
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and see. "Power produces knowledge" (Foucault, 1991; orig. 1975: 27), which 
means that in relation to knowledge, power produces truth, in so far as it makes us 
see and speak. In a word, power produces truth as a problem. 
Power 
What is power? Foucault's definition is a very simple one that power is "the 
multiplicity of force relations" (Foucault, 1990a; orig. 1976: 92). Naturally, force 
is never singular but essentially exists in relation with other forces, that is, force is 
already a relation. In this sense, power is a relation between forces, therefore 
power is nothing but "power relation7 (Foucault, 1990a; orig. 1976: 94). ' 
'Foucault does not adequately specify the meaning of the terms force, power, force relation, 
powcr-relation, and resistance. He dcfines power (power relation) as "a relation between forces". 
He also characterizes resistance not as cxteriority but as immanence in relation to power. For 
Foucault, each force has the power to affect and to be affected such that each force implies power 
relations. These power relations, which are simultaneously local, unstable, and diffuse, do not 
emanate from a central point or unique locus of sovereignty, but at each moment move "from one 
point to another" in a field of forces, maldng resistances, twists, and turns. In a word, it is the 
instability of power relations which provokes a certain capacity for resistance. In order to 
understand what a "microphysics of power" is about, we should investigate a relational concept of 
power. 
The text in which Foucault first presents a -microphysics of power" is Discipline and Punish 
(199 la; orig. 1975: 23-3 1; 195-228). In this work, power is not conceptualized as a possession or a 
privilege; rather it is considered to be exercised through dispositions, tactics, and techniques. 
Power relations are not localized in confrontations between social classes or between citizens and 
the state; rather they are conceptualized as existing at the most elemental level of the social 
domain. Rcductionist analyses, which locate the origin of power and its effects within a structure 
or an institution, at a center, arc rejected, and instead it is proposed that power relations should be 
conceptualized in terms of innumerable points of confrontation or instability, each of which 
constitutes an irreducible event. Such a "microphysics of powce' reveals the poverty of political 
analyses which assume the possibility of overthrowing an existing power, either by seizing or by 
destroying the apparatuses through which power, conceptualized as a possession, is exercised. 
Foucault's conception addresses the presence of power relations in the thresholds of social order, 
indeed, its limit point is considered to be equivalence of power relations with sociality itscIL 
A "microphysics of power" is developed further in The 11711 to Knowledge (1990a; orig. 1976: 92- 
102). Where a positive conception is advanced it takes the form of a description as a multiplicity 
of force relations, as a process, and as a strategy. Power is presented as the appropriate term for the 
unstable state which emerge from the inequalities inherent in the highly mobile field of force 
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In addition, it is important to understand that power is not a form, such as the 
state-form, and that the power relation does not lie between two forms, as 
knowledge lies between the discursive form and the non-discursive form. 
Foucault's argument on power develop under following headings (Foucault, 
1990a; orig. 1976: 94-96): 
- Power is a relation between forces. 
- Power is exercised from innumerable points. 
- Power is exercised in the interplay of relations. 
- Power comes from below, that is, there is no binary opposition, rather there 
are the manifold relationships of forces. 
In terms of the relational character of power, resistance is not exterior to power, 
relation; or put the matter more simply, power as a property located in institutions, social positions, 
or within a social class is comprehended as the effect of mobile force relations, of the emergent 
multiplicity of force relations. 
The further characteristic of Foucault's conception of power should be noted. The very existence 
of power relations presupposes forms of resistance, not as an external cffect or consequence of the 
exercise of power, but as an inherent feature of the power relation. If we accept the view that 
where there is power there is resistance, then it follows that just as power is present everywhere in 
the social field so is resistance. Thus broad cleavages in the social order, massive binary divisions, 
constitute at best possible fleeting moments in the history of a society in the heart of plurality of 
irregular resistances. 
While Foucault argues that power breeds resistance and on occasion points to tactics of resistance, 
there is no specific description of resistance, the scope, detail, and rigor. To put it another way, a 
genealogy of resistance remains to be written as a full-scale study and historical perspective in its 
own right Interestingly, in his later essay 'Subject and Power' (1983a; orig. 1982), Foucault 
proposes an alternative methods of studying power relations from the perspective of resistance to 
power rather than the exercise of power. However, Foucault never carried through this proposal. In 
his later work, he might have theorized political resistance as a form of technologies of the self, as 
a creative response to coercive practices, but he couldn't make it 
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but it is immanent in, and is related to power. In other words, power relation exists 
in relation to "a multiplicity of points of resistance" (Foucault, 1990a; orig. 1976: 
95). As Foucault puts it: 
These points of resistance present everywhere in the power network. Hence 
there is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all 
rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary. Instead there is a plurality of 
resistances ... Just as the network of power relations ends by 
forming a dense 
web that passes through apparatuses and institutions, without being exactly 
localized in them, so too the swarm of points of resistance traverses social 
stratifications and individual unities. And it is doubtless the strategic 
codification of these points of resistance that makes a revolution possible, 
somewhat similar to the way in which the state relies on the institutional 
integration of power relationships (Foucault, 1990a; orig. 1976: 95-96). 
In order to grasp what power relations are about, it is necessary to investigate the 
forms of resistance and attempts made to dissociate these relations. ' Moreover, 
6 In 'Ile Subject and Power' (Foucault, 1983a; orig. 1982: 211-212), Foucault presents the six 
particalar features displayed by contemporary forms of resistance. Especially, the 'transvcrsality' 
of present struggles, seems an idea common to Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and Fdlix Guattari (see 
'Intellectuals and Power', Foucault, 1977; Deleuze, 1988; Delcuze and Guattari, 1983; 1987; 
Guattari and Negri, 1990). In Foucault, there is an echo of the interpretation of 'Italian New Lcft' 
about Marxism. For example, it is similar to the proposal of Antonio Negri (1984) who analyzed 
class struggle from the perspective of the 'self-valorization' of workers against capital. 
For a critique of monolithic domination models of the Frankfurt School and the alternative 
120 
since power is decentered and plural, so in turn must be form of political struggle. 
Now, two important questions remain to be thought in the field of power: the one, 
"discourse" and the other, the "bio-politi&'. Because, in the first place, it is 
discourse that links power and knowledge together, in the second place, it is 'bio- 
politics' in which power clashes with life and struggles with it. Firstly, in 
discourse politics, marginal groups attempt to contest the hegemonic discourses 
that position individuals within the straitjacket of normal identities to liberate the 
free play of differences. In any society, discourse is "both an instrument and an 
effect of power" (Foucault, 1990a; orig. 1976: 101) because the rules determining 
discourse enforce norms of what is rational, sane, or true, and to speak from 
outside these rules is to risk marginalization and exclusion. And yet, Foucault 
suggests considering discourse not as the divided one between the accepted and 
the excluded, or between the dominant and the dominated, but as a multiple 
discursive elements in various strategies, that is, as "tactical elements in the field 
of force relations" (Foucault, 1990a; orig. 1976: 101-102). In this respect, it is an 
overstatement to say that Foucault identifies discourse with power, moreover that 
he denies the possibilities of counter-discourses. The point lies in a twofold 
perspective of 'Italian New Left' theorists such as Negri and Tronti who focus on workers' 
resistance to capital, see Cleaver, 1979. 
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operation of discourse, in other words, the appearance of a discourse of power 
also made possible the formation of a "reverse" discourse. As Foucault puts it, 
"We must make allowance for the complex and unstable process whereby 
discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also ... a point of 
resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and 
produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it 
fragile and makes it possible to thwart it" (Foucault, 1990a; orig. 1976: 100-101). 
This is to say that discourse is not wholly subservient to power or opposite to it. 
Within this limit, counter discourses could provide a lever of political resistance 
by encapsulating a popular memory of previous forms of oppression and struggle 
and a means of articulating needs and demands. 
Secondly, when the diagram of power becomes the 'bio-power' or 'bio-politics' of 
populations, controlling and administering of life, when it abandons the model of 
sovereignty in favour of a disciplinary model, it is indeed life that emerges as the 
new object of power. According to Foucault, "What was demanded and what 
served as an objective was life ... It was life more than the law that became the 
issue of political struggles, even if the latter were formulated through affirmations 
concerning rights. The 'right' to life, to one's body, to health, to happiness, to the 
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satisfaction of needs ... this 'right' ... which the classical judicial system was 
utterly incapable of comprehending... " (Foucault, 1990a; orig. 1976: 145). 
At this point, law renounces the symbol of sovereign privilege, the right to put 
someone to death (the death penalty), but allows itself to produce more hecatombs 
and genocides, not by returning to the old law of killing, but on the contrary in the 
name of race, territory, conditions of life, and the survival of a population. Now a 
population believes itself to be better than its enemy, and treats its enemy not as 
the juridical enemy of the old sovereign but as a toxic agent, a sort of biological 
danger. The death penalty tends to be abolished and holocausts grow for the same 
reasons. When power takes life as its object, in turn, life becomes resistance to 
power, to the system that controls life. In other words, when power becomes bio- 
power, resistance becomes the power of life. Because the power of life, this vital 
power cannot be confined within species and environment. In this sense, it is in 
man himself that we must liberate life, since man himself is a form of 
imprisonment for man. Life is, in the end, nothing but the capacity to resist 
against power, therefore, it is here that power is connected with subjectivation, 
since what resistance extracts from man is the force of a life. 
In addition, it is this same change that Foucault is observing in the status of the 
123 
intellectual. Foucault explains that the intellectual could claim universality during 
a long period from the eighteenth century to the Second World War, for example, 
to Sartre, by way of Zola and so on. ' This was to the extent that the uniqueness of 
the writer coincided with the position of a 'jurist' or 'notable' who could produce 
an effect of universality. If the intellectual has changed the role including the 
function of writing, it is because his very position has changed and he now tends 
to move from one specific place or point to another producing effects not of 
universality but of transversality. In this way the intellectual or even the writer can 
- at least potentially - participate more in current struggles and resistance. 
Therefore, in Foucault's view, questions of life should be considered more 
important than a reference to man's universal rights, including in the realm of 
pure law. However, I think that speaking the language of law is as important as 
speaking of language of life, and that the point should lie not in resistance of 
transversality but in resistance that connects universality with the local, the minor, 
the here and now. Struggles for universal right is still efficacious, indeed doubly, 
because there are, on the one hand, still-extant forms of premodern domination, 
the forms of administratively rationalized domination described in Discipline of 
' On the 'universal' intellectual and the 'specific' intellectual, see 'Truth and Power' (Foucault, 
1980: 109-133). 
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Punish, on the other (see Habermas, 1987; Fraser, 1994). 
Self 
Up until now, we have encountered two dimensions: the one, knowledge, the 
forms of discursive practices; the other, power, the relations between forces. Now, 
we shall see how Foucault surfaces a new axis, different from the axes of both 
knowledge and power. I think that this third axis was present from the beginning 
Foucault just as power was present from the beginning in knowledge. Foucault 
felt it necessary to carry out a general reorganization in order to elucidate this path 
which was so tangled up in the others that it remained hidden. It is this 
reconstruction which Foucault puts forward in the general introduction to The Use 
of Pleasure: 
To speak of 'sexuality' as a historically singular experience also presupposed 
the availability of tools capable of analyzing the peculiar characteristics and 
interrelations of the three axes that constitute it: (1) the formation of sciences 
(savoirs) that refers to it, (2) the systems of power that regulate its practice, (3) 
the forms within which individuals are able, are obliged, to recognized 
themselves as subjects of this sexuality (Foucault, 1992; orig. 1984: 4). 
In order to analyze the advancement of knowledge, Foucault examined the form 
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of discursive practices, while escaping the dilemma of science versus ideology. 
Then, in order to analyze the manifestations of power, Foucault examined the 
manifold relations, the open strategies, and the rational techniques, while escaping 
the alternative of power recognized as domination or exposed as an illusion. 
Finally, in order to analyze what is termed the subject, Foucault examines the 
forms of the relation to self by which the individual constitutes and recognizes 
himself qua subject, while escaping a relapse into 'the philosophy of subject' such 
as Sartrian existentialism. According to Foucault: 
I think that from the theoretical point of view, Sartre avoids the idea of the self 
as something which is given to us ... From the idea that the self is not given to us, 
I think that there is only one practical consequences: we have to create 
ourselves as a work of art ... I would 
like to say exactly the contrary: we should 
not have to refer the creative activity of somebody to the kind of relation he has 
to himself, but should relate the kind of relation one has to oneself to a creative 
activity (Foucault, 1983b: 237). 
Although Foucault increased the focus on the subject in his last work, it is a 
mistake to understand that Foucault was growing soft on subjectivism. There is no 
indication that this was the case. As Deleuze (1988) has shown, he maintains the 
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thought of the outside throughout his career by reason that subjectivation, i. e., the 
theme of the inside is not something other than the theme of the outside, more 
precisely, that of the inside of the outside, which is converged into the theme of 
the double. The ground work was already in place for a genealogy of the modem 
subject, only at this stage, the relation of subjectivation comes to the surface 
through a power-knowledge interlocking. In his 1980 Howison Lectures at the 
University of California, Berkeley, he insists that "if one wants to analyze the 
genealogy of the subject in Western societies, one has to take into account ... the 
interaction between those two techniques of domination and of the self. " Earlier in 
the same talk he reminds us that "all the practices by which the subject is defined 
and transformed are accompanied by the formation of certain types of 
knowledge. " (Foucault, 'Truth and Subjectivity', Howison Lecture, Berkeley, 
California, October 20,1980). 
Here, I must quote Madness and Civilization and Me Order of lhings because I 
feel each book involves something that concerns Foucault's trajectory (of whole 
life as well as) of whole thought. On the subject of Renaissance madman who is 
put to sea in his boat, Foucault wrote: 
Navigation delivers man to the uncertainty of fate; on water, each of us is in the 
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hands of his own destiny; every embarkation is, potentially, the last ... The 
madman's voyage is at once a rigorous division and an absolute Passage. In one 
sense, it simply develops, across a half-real, half-imaginary geography, the 
madman's liminal position on the horizon of medieval concern -a position 
symbolized and made real at the same time by the madman's privilege of being 
confined within the city gates: his exclusion must enclose him; if he cannot and 
must not have another prison than the threshold itself, he is kept at the point of 
passage. He is put in the interior of the exterior, and inversely ... He 
is a prisoner 
in the midst of what is the freest, the openest of routes: bound fast at the infinite 
crossroads. He is the Passenger par excellence: that is, the prisoner of the 
passage. And the land he will come to is unknown - as is, once he disembarks 
the land from which he comes. He has his truth and his homeland only in that 
fruitless expanse between two countries that cannot belong to him (Foucault, 
1989; orig. 196 1: 11). 
In this description, the madman's passage is no other than the odyssey of 
Foucault's work, which started from 'knowledge' -a half real, half imaginary 
geography, i. e. the strata of the archives - and passed through 'power' - the 
uncertainty of fate on water, i. e., the contingency of power - and finally 
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culminated in 'self', in 7he Use of Pleasure's phrase, "to get free of oneself' 
(Foucault, 1992; orig. 1984: 11) - being a master of one's boat as interior of the 
exterior, i. e., subjectivation. 
In all his work, Foucault seems to stick to the theme of an inside which is merely 
"the hollow of ... [the] fold" (Foucault, 1994; orig. 1966: 34 1) of the outside, as 
if 
the ship were a folding of the sea. In this regard, although Foucault surfaces the 
theme of an inside in his last work, this inside should be seen as an operation of 
the outside. In other words, the ship controls herself not to be wrecked only by 
following the movement of the sea, and yet, the sea is not a fixed thing but a 
moving thing animated by movements, folds and the ship, consequently the ship, 
this inad man in the ship, i. e., the inside, is not external to the sea, i. e., the outside, 
but lies at the very heart of the sea which doubles or hollows out the outside. In a 
word, as Deleuze interprets (1988), the question of subjectivation in Foucault 
constitutes the inside of thought of the outside. 
Foucault continued to pursue the theme of inside/ outside, and developed it into 
the theme of double. In 7he Order of Aings, he wrote, " It [the analytic of 
finitude] is always concerned with showing how the Other, the Distant, is also the 
Near and the Same" (Foucault, 1994; orig. 1966: 339). Foucault describes how 
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modern philosophy constructs 'Man' - both object and subject of knowledge - 
within a series of unstable 'doublets'. First, there is the cogito/ unthought doublet, 
in which Man is determined by external forces yet aware of this determination and 
able to free himself from it. Second, there is the retreat-and-retum-of-the-origin 
doublet, in which history precedes Man but he is the phenomenological source 
from which history unfolds. Finally, there is the transcental/ empirical doublet, in 
which Man both constitutes and is constituted by the external world. In each of 
these doublets, humanist thought attempts to recover the primacy and autonomy 
of the thinking subject and to master all that is other to it. Here, Foucault's initial 
critique of the human sciences is that they, like philosophy, are premised on an 
impossible attempt to reconcile irreconcilable poles of thought and posit a 
constituting subject. 
In fact, since Kant, as Foucault properly points out, "the whole of modem thought 
is imbued with the necessity of thinking the unthought - of reflecting the contents 
of the In-itseq'in the form of the For-itself' (Foucault, 1994; orig. 1996: 327). 
Then, we should think about whether Foucault is free from these doubles and thus 
provides a genuine alternative to the science of man. I think that, although beyond 
talk of man, Foucault's attempt runs into problems similar to those Foucault so 
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clearly sees in the science of man, that is, an interminable drift of a double system, 
however through an opposite detour. And yet, it is utterly important to 
acknowledge what the theme of double implies in Foucault and thus to what 
extent he detaches himself from those very difficulties Foucault criticizes. 
According to Deleuze: 
The theme which has always haunted Foucault is that of the double. But the 
double is never a projection of the interior; on the contrary, it is an 
interiorization of the outside. It is not a doubling of the One, but a redoubling of 
the Other. It is not a reproduction of the Same, but a repetition of the Different. 
It is not the emanation of an T, but something that places in immanence an 
always other or a Non-self It is never the other who is a double in the doubling 
process, it is a self that lives me as the double of the other: I do not encounter 
myself on the outside, I find the other in me (Deleuze, 1988: 97-98). 
As we have seen, Foucault prefers to show the limits of the present by 
juxtaposition with a different and strange past, not with an ideal. Perhaps this is 
why he had to go back to the Greeks. Foucault seems to be attracted to the fact 
that Greek (and Roman) cultures inspire contemporary individuals to retrieve an 
original form of freedom, that is, a sort of nostalgia for a lost world or a past 
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experience to reproduce in the present. In other words, Foucault seems to use the 
Greek experience for a path "to promote new forms of subjectivity" (Foucault, 
1983a: 216) without inventing the subject. However, Foucault claims firmly that 
the Greeks do not offer an "alternative" (Foucault, 1983b: 23 1) for contemporary 
society, only an example of a non-normalizing morality which modern cultures 
will have to develop themselves: 
Trying to rethink the Greeks today does not consist of setting off Greek 
morality as the domain of morality par excellence which one would need self- 
reflection. The point is rather to see to it that European thinking can take up 
Greek thinking again as an experience which took place once and with regard 
to which one can be completely free ... All of 
Greek experience can be taken up 
in nearly the same manner by each time taking into account differences of 
context and by indicating those aspects of the experience which could be 
salvaged and those which could, on the contrary, be abandoned (Foucault, 0 
1 
1988e: 249). 
For Foucault, the novelty of the Greeks emerges through a double 
"differentiatiorf' (Foucault, 1992; orig. 1984: 77) when the "exercises that enabled 
one to govern oneself' (Ibid. ) become detached both from power such as a 
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relation with others, and from knowledge such as code of virtue. One the one hand 
there is a "relation with oneself' (Ibid.: 63) that consciously derives from one's 
relation with others. On the other hand there is equally "the art of the self' 
(lbid.: 77), i. e. "the constitution of oneself' (Foucault, 1983b: 247) that 
consciously derives from the moral code as a rule of knowledge. 
The relation with oneself, what is called "enkrateia7' (Foucault, 1992; orig. 1984: 
63), is an attitude which is necessary to the ethics of pleasure and desire, therefore, 
it is characterized by self-mastery resisting, struggling, and achieving domination 
in the area of desires and pleasures. In addition, this self-mastery and the mastery 
of others are considered as having the same form: "Governing oneself, managing 
one's estate, and participating in the administration of the city were three practices 
of the same type. " (Foucault, 1992; orig. 1984: 76) 
More importantly, self-mastery is related to, and is identified with the notion of 
freedom. This freedom that is more than a nonslavement and an emancipation, is 
"a power that one brought to bear on oneself in the power that one exercised over 
others" (Foucault, 1992; orig. 1984: 80, my emphasis) to the point where the 
relation with oneself becomes a "principle of internal regulation7' (Foucault, 1992; 
orig. 1984: 81) in relation to the constituent power of politics, the family, and even 
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virtue. This is a Foucauldian version of the Greeks, his interpretation of the 
doubling -a differentiation that leads to a reflection. While other forms of ethics 
such as Kantianism focus on the duties and obligations the self has to others, the 
Greek model defines freedom not as free will or in opposition to determinism, but 
in relation to mastery of one's desires and pleasures. In this regard, the use of the 
vocabulary of freedom, liberty, and autonomy, along with the creative subject 
should be regarded not as a turn to Renaissance humanism but as a pursuit of 
"humanism after the death of maif' or rather, "antihumanist or posthuman 
humanisnf' (Negri and Hardt, 2000: 9 1). 
In the Greek model, the relation to self that constitutes the final goal of all 
practices of the self belongs to an ethics of control, which is governed by 
4C relations of forces - the force against which one must struggle and over which 
the subject is expected to establish his dominatioe' (Foucault, 1990b; orig. 1984: 
67). In this sense, the care of self - to transform, to develop, and to rejoin oneself 
- is not an exercise in solitude but appears as "an intensification of social 
relationsý' (Foucault, 1990b; orig. 1984: 53). What the Greeks did is therefore to 
bend the outside, through a series of practical exercises which include writing, 
reading, abstinences, memorizations, examinations of conscience, meditations, 
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silence, and listening to others. The Greeks are the first doubling. Force is what 
belongs to outside, since it is essentially a relation between other forces. It is 
inseparable in itself from the power to affect other forces (spontaneity) and to be 
affected by others (receptivity). But what comes about as a result is a relation 
which force has with itself, a power of self on self. Following the Greek model, 
only free men can dominate others, thus free agents and the "agonistic relation" 
(Foucault, 1992; orig. 1984: 65) in and between them are its characteristics. But 
how could they dominate others if they could not dominate themselves? The 
domination of others must be doubled by a domination of oneself. The relation 
with others must be doubled by a relation with oneself 
This is what the Greeks did. They folded forces from the outside into the inside. 
They made it relate to back to itself Far from ignoring interiority, individuality or 
su. ectivity they invented subject, but only as a derivative or the product of a 
subjectivation. They discovered the aesthetic existence - the doubling or relation 
with oneself, the facultative rule of free man. Indeed, if we do not regard this 
subject as a derivation, and especially if we look for it on the level of obligatory 
rules, then we must say that there is no sense of subjectivity in the Greeks. 
Foucault's fundamental idea is that of a dimension of subjectivity derived from 
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power and knowledge without being dependent on them. 
What is Foucault ultimately trying to say? How can we transform the classical self 
into the modem subject that is unique to our own social field? What can we say 
about our own contemporary modes and our modem relation to oneself from it? 
Here, it should be noted that what interests Foucault has been always not "I, as a 
unique but universal and unhistorical subject" (Foucault, 1983a: 216) in the 
Cartesian term, but 1, "in a very precise moment of history" (Ibid. ) for the self is 
determined by the process of subjectivation which is itself based on particular 
features that vary according to each age. Foucault does go back to the Greek, yet 
this is not a return in a strict sense, since there never is a return in his lexicon. He 
clarifies this point that the struggle for a modem subjectivity passes through a 
resistance to the two present forms of subjection, the one consisting of 
individualizing ourselves on the basis of constrains of power, the other of 
attra,, -. ting each individual to a known and recognized identity, fixed once and for 
all: "On the one hand, they assert the right to be different and they underline 
everything which makes individuals truly individual. On the other hand, they 
attack everything which separates the individual, breaks his links with others, 
splits up community life, forces the individual back on himself and ties him to his 
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own identity in a constraining way" (Foucault, 1983a: 211-212). The struggle for 
subjectivity presents itself, therefore, as the right to difference. It is not exactly for 
or against the individual but against both the "government of individualization" 
(Ibid. ) and government of totalization. Because in the modern power structures, 
there is such a tricky combination of individualization techniques, and of 
totalization procedures: "Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we 
are, but to refuse what we are. We have to imagine and to build up what we could 
get rid of this kind of political "double binds, " which is the simultaneous 
individualization and totalization of modem power structur&' (Foucault, 1983a: 
216). 
In Yhe Use of Pleasure and 7he Care of the Seff, Foucault does not discover the 
subject. In fact, he had already defined it as a derivative, a function derived from 
the discourse. To awaken thought from its humanist sleep, Foucault argues, "the 
subject must be ... analyzed as a complex and variable function of discourse" 
(Foucault, 1977: 138). But he defines the subject now as "a derivative of the 
outside" (Deleuze, 1988: 106) giving it - this relation to oneself -a new 
irreducible dimension that is neither knowledge nor power. As Foucault 
understands it, the term "subject" has a double meaning: one is both "subject to 
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someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a 
conscience or self-knowledge" (Foucault, 1983a: 212). According to Dews 
(1987: 144-170), Foucault rejects the Enlightenment model which links 
consciousness, self-reflection, and freedom, and instead follows Nietzsche's claim 
in The genealogy ofMorals that self-knowledge, particularly in the form of moral 
consciousness, is a strategy and effect of power by which one internalizes social 
control. Although, in this book (1987), Dews only deals with Foucault in the 
1960s and the 1970s, from The Madness and Civilization to 7be Will to 
Knowledge, his view is valuable for understanding Foucault's whole project, since 
Foucault's concern is always a history of the organization of knowledge and 
subjectivity, only in the 1980s, the emphasis is on the knowledge relation a self 
has with itself With regard to Enlightenment value, however, I should like to 
point out that Foucault does not see Enlightenment or modernity as a specific 
historical event, but as a historical conjuncture which has happened several times 
in history, albeit with different form and content. Therefore, for Foucault, 
vocabularies like freedom and self-reflection are not a legacy which belongs to the 
end of metaphysics at the time of Kant, but components of both relationship with 
oneself and to the present in each age. In other words, for Foucault, freedom and 
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self-reflection are understood in terms of the relation with oneself, and are 
connected with a specific attitude or practice to imagine and to transform toward 
reality, which is, for example, the attitude of the Sophists in Greece, the Stoics in 
Alexandria, of course, Kant. 
In my reading, in all Foucault's work, there is primacy of relation over substance. 
No doubt nothing in Foucualt is really closed off. Furthermore, the whole group of 
relations appears in the form of 'the thought of the outside'. According to Deleuze, 
"Foucault's general principle is that every form is a compound of relations 
between forces. Given these forces, our first question is with what forces from the 
outside they enter into a relation. And then what form is created as a result" 
(Deleuze, 1988: 124). Hence, with this relational character in mind, we should 
approach delicate questions such as resistance, subjectivity, and freedom. In a 
word, every relation is connected from one point to another, thus, there is no 
power relation that does not include certain relatively free or unbound points, 
point of creativity, changes, and resistance. 
"What I am attentive to is the fact that every human relation is to some degree a 
power relation. We move in a world of perpetual strategic relatione' (Foucault, 
1988e: 168). It may sound like the intense vision of oppression, but it is a mistake 
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to see that Foucault is a fatalist with respect to social and political change or that 
Foucault presents subjects as helpless and passive victims of power. We should 
not forget at any moment that, for Foucault, human relation is made up of not only 
the relation with others but the relation with oneself Similarly, there is a 
misinterpretation (see Fine, 1979; 1984) that starts from a conflation. between 
power as omnipresent and as omnipotent. While power is everywhere, it is 
indissociable from contestation and struggle, resistance and freedom: "I am just 
saying: as soon as there is power relation, there is possibility of resistance. We can 
never be ensnared by power: we can always modify its grip in determinate 
conditions and according to a precise strategy" (Foucault, 1988e: 123). As 
resistance is not exterior to power, freedom is never in a position of exteriority in 
relation to power. In order to define freedom more clearly, Foucault also 
distinguishes between power and domination, seeing domination as the 
solidification of power relations such that they become relatively fixed in 
asymmetrical forms and spaces of liberty and resistance thus become limited 
(Foucault, 1988a: 12). According to Foucault: 
Where the determining factors saturate the whole there is no relationship of 
power; slavery is not a power relationship when man is in chains. (In this case it 
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is a question of a physical relationship of constraint. ) ... The relationship 
between power and freedom's refusal to submit cannot therefore be separated. 
The crucial problem of power is not that of voluntary servitude (how could we 
seek to be slaves? ). At the very heart of the relationship, and constantly 
provoking it, are calcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom. 
Rather than speaking of an essential freedom, it would be better to speak of an 
"agonism" - of a relationship which is at the same time reciprocal incitation 
atid struggle; less of a face-to-face confrontation which paralyzes both sides 
than a permanent provocation (Foucault, 1983a: 221-222). 
Foucault's perspective to see power not in terms of a binary antagonism but in 
terms of a "multiplicity of force relationsý' (Foucault, 1990a; orig. 1976: 92) 
certainly allows him to elucidate the enormous richness and complexity of power i 
relations in contemporary society and, more important, the richness and 
complexity of resistance to power. However, the richness and complexity remains 
the richness of a still photograph, or of a painting. It is as if Foucault were a 
painter who blends in with the splendorous style and the political content without 
assuming a single center of movement or a unity in the relations of power. If 
Waiting for Godot is an allegory of Samuel Beckett, then one can imagine an 
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allegory of Foucault's project entitled Running after Godot - it being understood 
that Godot will not allow himself to be caught, if he exists at all. In Foucault's 
analysis, there are a host of resistances which are integral to power, but there is no 
intention of emancipation. While resistance is central to Foucault's approach, 
particularly in his later work, the notion of emancipation is ruled out as being 
absurd, thus he only describes vigorously an endlessly shifting constellation of 
power-and-resistance. Foucault believes that it is necessary for the analysis of 
power and resistance to be a real part of political struggle - not that it attempts to 
give such struggles a guiding thread or a theoretical apparatus, but rather that it 
constitutes their possible strategies, and enables us to think and act. 
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Chapter 4 Foucault: Exile, Engagement, and Critique 
1. Exile, Engagement, and Ethos 
Foucault has written three kinds of books, those concern scientific thought such as 
Ae Order of Things, those concern social principles and institutions such as 
Discipline and Punish, those concem private life such as Ae Use of Pleasure. 
The theoretical has become the material and the political, and the material and the 
political have become the personal. A cipher has been deciphered, then once again 
has been enciphered. It is as if Foucault were a modern version of Penelope, 
unraveling by night what he weaves by day, or rather, raveling and unraveling at 
the same time, as he waits for a modem version of Ulysses who might never come 
home. 
An irony penetrates Foucault's work throughout. In the study of irony, 
Kierkegaard notes that the ironist "must always be understood at a distance" 
(Kierkegaard, 1965: 85). In other words, we must not allow ourselves to become 
too caught up in the individual brushstrokes. We must rather step back. We must 
open ourselves up to the effect of the canvas as a whole. To be sure, each 
brushstroke contributes to this effect, but only through our 'reading' it in relation 
to something larger. It is the same with Foucault. In addition, and more important, 
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we must not cage ourselves in a space where the traditional distinctions between 
the personal and the political, between despair and hope, between passion and 
intellect, between exile and engagement, seem clear. We must allow ourselves to 
accept anything except that of coming to rest at an orthodoxy In a word, we must 
free ourselves from the intellectual blackmail of being for or against, of being in 
or out. 
I believe that what is true for life and for a love relationship is true also for writing. 
The intellectual work is worthwhile insofar as we don't know what will be the end. 
Besides, to make sense of it, or to make fun of it, is not the task of an original 
author, but that of commentators, afterwards. I dare to say that to produce a book 
is a rather minute event as against an endless play of repetitions, imitations, 
interpretations and reinterpretations. Each reading gives a book a unique body that 
varies according to each age. The book changes. Therefore, an author doesn't 
have to prescribe the correct direction of a book too much to readers as well as to 
oneself To read means to be embedded in the present-time. What can we see and 
what can we say about it today? But, to read also involves thinking of the past as 
it is caught up by an author. There is Foucault in me as the past, as a memory, or 
Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Marx, Arendt and so on. We read the past against the 
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present and resist the present not in favour of a return but in order to free oneself 
from what one thinks and finally to think differently. In a word, reading, thinking 
and writing enable us to bring the past and the future into confrontation with the 
present. 
One of the difficulties in reading Foucault is not the absence of focuses or 
positions but their variation or differentiation. The point, therefore, should not be 
their rapid succession but their specitficiy and their interconnections. Although his 
seemingly arbitrary position, in an extreme sense, rejects the notion of coherence, 
his whole project embodies a coherent perspective. From a theoretical point of 
view, unlike theorists such as Baudrillard, Lyotard or Derrida, Foucault does not 
dissolve all forms of structure, coherence, and intelligibility into an endless flow 
of signification. Having cleared the ground, he attempts to grasp what forms of 
regularities, relations, continuities really do exist. In addition, Foucault presents a 
cautious discontinuity of discourse. While he appropriates the continuous shift to 
attack the traditional way of being a good academic, he rejects the interpretation 
of his work as simply a "philosophy of discontinuity" (Foucault, 1988e: 99-100). 
For Foucault, discontinuity always includes some "overlapping, interaction, and 
echoee' (Foucault, 1990a; orig. 1976: 149) between the earlier and the later, 
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between the old and the new. He pursues an open series of questions from 
knowledge through power to self, which are irreducible, yet constantly imply one 
another. Foucault's project is to write a "permanent critique of our historical era" 
(Foucault, 1984: 42) which problematizes modem forms of knowledge, social 
institutions, and subjectivity, in search of "the art of not being governed" 
(Foucault, 1996: 3 84). 
About the criticism that he was always shifting his interests and positions, 
Foucault replies in 1969: "Do not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain the 
samc: leave it to our bureaucrats and our police to see that our papers are in order" 
(Foucault, 1972a; orig. 1969: 17). This statement is typical Foucault and resonates 
throughout his work. It is important to recognize that this statement conveys not 
just a personal pleasure in being different but also a caution of the danger posed to 
intellectual life by any subordination to a professional bureaucracy or even to 
one's own project. The attempt to balance both his own selfbood and the demand 
of publishing and speaking out in his professionalized activity brings him to the 
question of redefining the relation of the self to the self, of getting away from the 
self, and finally to a more explicit understanding of what it means to lead an 
intellectual life: "After all, what would be the value of the passion for knowledge 
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it resulted only in a certain amount of knowledgeableness and not ... 
in the 
knower's straying afield of himself? " (Foucault, 1992; orig. 1984: 8). The nucleus 
of this "straying afield of himself' is indeed 'wise madness', which involves 'the 
will not to be governed' beyond 'the will to knowledge'. 
A kind of intellectual nomadism motivates Foucault's personal intellectual ethic. 
Or, conversely, his personal intellectual ethic provides a rationale for the shifts of 
emphasis and mode of analysis which characterize his whole work. The opposite 
of a dogmatic persistence in one's position should not be reduced to an 
unconditional refusal of intellectual tradition, or to a subordination to intellectual 
trend. It is rather a consequence of the concern to address always present 
problems and it requires "a studious, slow and arduous modification, governed by 
a constant concern for the truth" (Foucault, 1988e: 264). The work of modifying 
one's own thought and that of others, Foucault suggests, should be seen to 
constitute "the intellectual's raison d'etre" (Foucault, 1988e: 264). 
Let's go back to Foucault's first major book, Madness and Civilization, here. In 
this book, Foucault follows the images of woe-begotten yet holy lepers with 
equally compelling description of the Ship of Fools, Narrenschiff. During the 
Renaissance the mad were loaded onto the ship and sent off to sail down Europe's 
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rivers in search of their sanity. On this subject, Foucault wrote: "He [the madman] 
is put in the interior of the exterior, and inversely ... He 
is a prisoner in the midst of 
what is the freest, the openest of routes: bound fast at the infinite crossroads. He is 
the Passenger par excellence: that is, the prisoner of the passage" (Foucault, 1989; 
orig. 1961: 11). As I said before, in this description, the madman's passage is no 
other than the odyssey of Foucault's thought, from the sea to the ship of the sea, 
or rather precisely, from 'the thought of the outside' (power) to 'the inside of 
thought' (subjectivation) (see Deleuze, 1988). But, there is more. It is, to some 
extent, an analogy of his life as an exile. 
I see Foucault as an exile not only because of his sexuality but also because of his 
ethos, his philosophical life. According to Young-Bruehl, "a self-conscious 
pariah" is not only the theme of Arendt's book, Rahel Hirnhagen, but also the 
theme of her exile years (Young-Bruehl in Hill, 1979: 3). 1 would rather suggest 
that for Arendt the pariah or the exile consciousness is the theme of her work and 
life throughout. What is more, "in Hannah Arendt's lexicon ... real people were 
pariahs" (Young-Bruehl, 1982: xv). This is the same with Foucault. I think that the 
exile or the pariah consciousness is not limited to an actual condition -a Jew or a 
homosexual and so on - but linked to the philosophical question, i. e. the ontology 
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of human beings. In this context, for Arendt and Foucault, the exile conscience is 
no other than the ethics of an intellectual. 
It is possible to see that Foucault had to give sexuality a central position in his 
work, since it was central in his life, or that his last books in some ways constitute 
the personal ethics he imposed upon himself by force of will. Nevertheless, one 
cannot pretend that Foucault's entire work is explained by his homosexuality, as 
certain American academics do (see Miller, 1993; Lila, 2001), imagining, 
moreover, that this would be enough to discredit it. Of course Foucault is a 
homosexual, but not all homosexuals are Foucault. It is interesting to see how an 
intellectual project is bom in an experience that should perhaps be described as 
primary. However, it is much more important to see how an intellectual adventure 
is created in the struggle of individual and social life, not to remain stuck in them, 
but to think them through, to go beyond them, to problematize them. In doing so, 
Foucault ironically turns the question back on those who level it. Do you really 
know who you are? Are you so sure of your reason, of your scientific concept, of 
your categories of your conception? 
Foucault tries to perforra the philosophical task as an exile by taking the double 
detour of literature and theory. On the one hand, there is his fascination with 
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writers who deal with 'transgression', the 'limit experience'. By reading Bataille, 
Maurice Blanchot, and Klossowski, Foucault seeks to discover the possibility of a 
mad philosopher (see Foucault, 1977a, 'A Preface to Transgression'). On the other 
hand, there is his examination at a historical level of the scientific status of 
psychological disciplines, the medical gaze, and then the established human 
sciences as a whole. "Every time I have tried to do a piece of theoretical worle', he 
said in 1981, "it has been on the basis of elements of my own experience: always 
in connection with processes I saw unfolding around me ... each time was partly a 
fragment of autobiography" (Foucault, 2000: 458). 
Exile is one of the saddest fates. In premodern times, banishment was a 
particularly dreadful punishment. There has always been an association between 
the idea of exile and the terrors of being a leper or a madman, a social and moral 
untouchable. And yet, it is true that in the idea of exile, there is, in a self-tortured 
way, the irresistible temptation of not following the prescribed path. Originally, 
exile is an actual condition, but it is also a metaphorical condition. In other words, 
the condition of exile is produced not only by the social and political trimming but 
also by the censorship of conscience. As Foucault describes, the exile is put 
ccacross a half-real, half-imaginary geography", from "a visible fortress of order" 
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to the "castle of our conscience" (Foucault, 1989; orig. 196 1: 11). 
In Presentations of the Intellectual (1994), Edward Said explores the role of the 
intellectual. He sees intellectual as an exile, whose spirit is "in opposition, rather 
than in accommodation" (Said, 1994: xvii), whose challenge is to be found in 
"dissent against the status quo" (Said, 1994: xvii). His diagnosis of the intellectual 
in exile is derives from the social and political history of dislocation and 
migration, for example, the widespread territorial rearrangements of the post- 
World War Two period, but his observation is not limited to it. Said argues that 
even intellectuals who are lifelong members of a society can be divided into 
insiders and outsiders: those, on the one hand, who belong fully society as it is, 
those who can be called yea-sayers; and on the other hand, the nay -sayers, the 
individuals at odds with their society and therefore outsiders and exiles so far as 
privileges and power are concerned (Said, 1994: 52-53). 
In this book, Said does not deal with Foucault as an example, but his diagnosis of 
the intellectual in exile explains Foucault very well. It is a matter of thinking of 
the intellectual vocation as maintaining a state of constant alertness, of a perpetual 
willingness not to let the one and only truth or accepted ideas dominate. It also 
involves a sense of the present, an almost athletic rational energy, and a 
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complicated struggle to balance the problems of one's own selfliood against the 
public demands, an everlasting effort, constitutionally unfinished and necessarily 
imperfect. The exile sees things both in terms of what has been left behind and 
what is actual here and now, there is a double perspective that never sees things in 
isolation. Also, the exile intellectual does not respond to the logic of the 
conventional but to the audacity of daring, and to representing change, to moving 
on, not standing still. In a very Deleuzian passage, Foucault speaks for himself: "I 
dream of the intellectual who destroys evidence and generalities, the one who, in 
the inertias constraints of the present time, locates and marks the weak points, the 
openings, the lines of force, who is incessantly on the move, doesn't know exactly 
where he is heading nor what he will think tomorrow for he is too attentive to the 
present" (Foucault, 1988e: 124). 
On this subject, however, there are a couple of potential pitfalls, which should be 
pointed out. Politics is everywhere. There can be no escape into the realms of pure 
art and thought or, into the realm of disinterested objectivity or transcendental 
theory. There is no real escape, even for the exile who tries to remain suspended, 
since the state of inbetweenness can itself become a rigid ideological position. 
Furthermore, there is a fine line between escape and challenge. For the intellectual 
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in exile, there is a danger of being irresponsible and flippant under the disguise of 
marginality In any case, intellectuals are individuals with a vocation for 
commitment and risk, boldness and vulnerability, consequently, work on 
intellectuals always involves a dilemma, not to be removed but to be embraced, 
and it requires a constant checking to balance on the edge of a judgement. 
2. Intellectual and Critique 
The intellectual, in my sense of the word, is someone whose whole being is staked 
on a critical sense, a sense of being unwilling to accept easy formulas, or ready- 
made clich6s, or orthodox party line, or fixed dogma, or the smooth confirmations 
of what the powerful or conventional say and do. I am against belief in a 
theoretical god or a political god of any sort. In my mind, there are no rules by 
which intellectuals can know what to say or do, nor are there any gods to be 
worshiped for unwavering guidance. Of course, we have convictions and we make 
judgements, but what strikes me as much more important is how to keep a space 
in the mind open for doubt and for the part of an alert, skeptical irony, also self- 
irony. It is "the ethics of discomfort" that consists in revising certainties without 
renouncing convictions, in managing to change one's opinion and at the same 
time to remain faithful to oneself It is Foucault's urging that one "never to 
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consent to being completely comfortable with one's own presuppositione' 
(Foucault, 2000: 448). 
It is in a novel or a drama not the raw material for a sociological monograph that 
we can most readily see and understand what a critical sense means for 
inteliectuals. For example, in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Matt, Joyce 
explores the young modern intellectual, Stephen Dedalus, whose entire early 
career is a seesaw between the blandishments of institutions like the church, the 
profession of teaching, Irish nationalism, and his slowly emerging and stubborn 
selfhood as an intellectual whose motto is the Luciferian non serviam [I will not 
serve]. The spirit of 'I will not serve', the rigorous concern for not being governed, 
I believe, is the nucleus of critical desires for intellectuals. 
Theoretically, though Kantian in its modem origin, critique is the term that Marx 
had made his own, fashioning 'A Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy' (Marx, 1970; orig. 1859). For both Marx and Kant, the purpose of 
critique is to make explicit what otherwise remain implicit, bringing to light 
buried assumptions to public examination. In Kant's work, critique reveals the 
limits of reason, as well as the indomitable urge of the human spirit to pass 
beyond those limits. In Marx's case, on the other hand, critique reveals how the 
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categories of modem economics correspond to the conditions and relations of a 
definite, historically determined mode of production. 
Despite its archaeological step back, Foucault's work is imprinted by engagement 
through the style and choice of words. Critical gesture controls the theory as much 
as the self-description of the entire work as a form of critique. Thereby Foucault 
distinguishes himself, as Habermas points out, on the one hand, from the engaged 
positivism of Max Weber, who wanted to separate a value basis from an analysis 
carried out in a value-free way On the other hand, Foucault also distinguishes 
himself from the ideology critique of Marx, who unmasked the humanistic self- 
understanding of modernity by suing for the normative content of bourgeois ideals 
(Habermas, 1987: 282). 
Foucault describes genealogy as research directed towards a resurrection of 
"local", "popular", and "disqualified" (Foucault, 1980: 82) knowledges through 
the production of critical discourses. The function of such discourses is to 
interrupt the smooth passage of regimes of truth, to disrupt those forms of 
knowledge which assume a self-evident quality, and to produce a state of 
uncertainty in those responsible for servicing the network of power/ knowledge 
relations. Therefore, at the very heart of genealogical analysis, there is the activity 
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of critique, rather than, for example, the provision of programs, prophecies, or 
policies. As Foucault observes: "Critique doesn't have to be the premise of a 
deduction that concludes, "this, then, is what needs to be done. " It should be an 
instrument for those who fight, those who resist and refuse what is. its use should 
be in processes of conflict and confrontation, essays in refusal. It doesn't have to 
lay down the law for law. It isn't a stage in a programming. It is a challenge 
directed to what ie' (Foucault, 2000: 236). Foucault intends his work to enlist 
itself into the reality of a contest, as an instrument of tactics, of illumination. It is 
necessary, Foucault believes, for critical historical analysis to be a real part of 
political struggle - not that it attempts to give such struggles a guiding thread or a 
theoretical apparatus, but rather that it constitutes their possible strategies. 
"Theory does not express, translate, or serve to apply practice; it is practice" 
(Foucault, 1977a: 208), which means that theory is not a totalizing instrument, but 
one that multiplies potentialities. 
In this light, the objective of Foucault's analysis is not the construction or 
preservation of a particular truth within theory, or a formulation of the process by 
which theory might be realized in practice, or an elevation of theory as the final 
refuge of resistance. Rather, the objective is an analysis of the interrelationship 
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between the formation of domains and objects (e. g. madness, sexuality, etc. ) and 
their articulation within discourse - itself subject to rules and procedures of 
verification and falsification - and the effects of this complex relationship in the 
real. In brief, it is the politics of truth with which Foucault has been concerned: 
"(1) What are the relations we have to truth through scientific knowledge, to those 
'truth games' which are so important in civilization and in which we are both 
subject and object? (2) What are the relationship we have to others through those 
strange strategies and power relationships? And (3) what are the relationships 
between truth, power, and seIP" (Foucault, 1888b: 15). 
While the Frankfurt School theorists, who have remained broadly within the 
Young Hegelian Marxist tradition, treat "all dominant and socially ratified forms 
of knowledge as masks and instruments of oppressiorf' (Gordon, 1979: 28), 
Foucault's analyses are situated beyond good and evil, in a concern with the 
historical interconnections between relations of power (positive and productive 
rather than repressive) and knowledge. On this ground, Gordon (1979: 28) argues 
that the interpretation of Foucault's analysis of power and knowledge relations as 
a form of ideology critique comparable to the work of the Frankfurt School is 
misleading. Thus, Gordon concludes, Foucault's conception of the relationship 
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between power and knowledge is the very antithesis of that to be found in the 
work of critical theorists. I agree to the view that Foucault's conception and 
analysis of power-knowledge relations is not equivalent, or reducible, to the 
conception which informs the work of the critical theorists, i. e. the work of a 
relationship between knowledge and ideology. However, I argue, the concept of 
critique has at least two different meanings in the work of the critical theorists, 
and while one of these undoubtedly signifies a process of reflection on humanly 
produced illusions, distortions, and systems of constraints, i. e. 'critique of 
ideology', another, deeper sense, derived from the Enlightenment, is present in 
critical theory, i. e. the work of critique as oppositional thinking against 
transcendence. It is this latter sense of critique, I believe, which constitutes the 
least common denominator between Foucault and the Frankfurt School. 
In his essay, 'What is CritiqueT, Foucault suggests approaching the problem of 
Enlightenment "in a meaningful enough proximity with the work of the Frankfurt 
School" (Foucault, 1996: 389). He understands the problem of Enlightenment as a 
still existing historico-critical outlook on the present and on ourselves, which 
makes Foucault "brothers with the Frankfurt School" (Foucault, 1996: 391). 
Foucault sees in Kant's answer to the question 'What is Enlightenment? ' (Kant, 
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1970; orig. 1784) and 'What is the Revolution? ' (Kant, 'The Contest of Faculties', 
1970; orig. 1798) the origin of a critical ontology leading through Hegel, 
Nietzsche, and Max Weber to Horkheimer and Adorno. Foucault adds himself to 
this tradition: 
Kant seems ... to have founded the two great critical traditions between which 
modern philosophy has been divided ... One can opt for a critical philosophy 
which is framed as an analytical philosophy of truth in general, or one can opt 
for a critical thought which has the form of an ontology of ourselves, an 
ontology of the present; it is this latter form of philosophy which, from Hegel to 
the Frankfurt school by way of Nietzsce and Max Weber, has founded a form of 
reflection within which I have tried to work (Foucault, 1993: 17-18). 
What makes Foucault's own concept of critique distinctive is that he approaches 
critique not as an instrument, but rather as an "attitude", or a "virtue in general" 
(Foucault, 1996: 383), defining it as "the art of not being governed" (Foucault, 
1993: 384). As Foucault understands it, the question 'how not to be governed' 
cannot be dissociated from the question of governmentalization. It is on this note 
that Foucault suggests: "if it is necessary to pose the question of knowledge in its 
relation to domination, it would be first and foremost on the basis of a certain 
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decisive will not to be governed" (Foucault, 1996: 398). Thus the point lies in the 
game of governmentalization and critique, that is, the relations between power, 
truth and the subject: 
If governmentalization is ... this movement concerned with subjugating 
individuals in the very reality of a social practice by mechanisms of power that 
appeal to a truth ... critique is the movement through which the subject gives 
itself the right to question truth concerning its power effects and to question 
power about its discourse of truth. Critique will be the art of voluntary 
inservitude, of reflective indocility. The essential function of critique would be 
that of desubjectification in the game of .. the politics of truth (Foucault, 1996: 
386). 
Foucault claims that the two dominant models for theorizing modem power, "the 
juridical, liberal" model and the economistic, "Marxist" model (Foucault, 1980: 
88), are flawed by outmoded and erroneous assumptions. The economistic model, 
as maintained by Marxists, is rejected as a reductionistic subordination of power 
to class domination and economic imperatives. The judicial model, his primary 
target, analyzes power in terms of law, legal and moral rights, and political 
sovereignty While the bourgeois revolution beheaded the king in the 
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sociupolitical realm, Foucault argues that many concepts and assumptions of the 
sovereign-juridical model continue to inform modem thought. He therefore 
attempts to cut off the head of the king in the realm of theory with a genealogical 
guillotine. 
Foucault attempts to rethink the nature of modem power in a non-totalizing and 
non-presentational scheme. He rejects all modem theories that see power to be 
anchored in macrostructures or ruling classes and to be repressive in nature. He 
continues to hold that all social relations are characterized by power and 
resistance (Foucault, 1988a: 11-12), but, in the later work, he distinguishes 
I 
between power and domination, seeing domination as the solidification of power 
relations such that they become relatively fixed in asymmetrical forms and the 
spaces of liberty and resistance thus become limited (Foucault, 1988a: 12). 
Considering the restricted sense of domination, it could be said that power 
relations have been elaborated, rationalized, and centralized, that is, 
govemmentalized in the form of state institutions. Domination is a part of power 
structure, at the same time it is a strategic situation. In this regard, Foucault 
approaches to the question of the state not in terms of the unity of power but in 
terms of the tactics of government, which is at once internal and external to the 
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state. As he observes: 
The state is no more than a composite reality and a mythicized abstraction, 
whose importance is a lot more limited than many of us think. Maybe what is 
really important for our modernity - that is, for our present - is not so much the 
6tatisation [nationalization] of society, as the 'governmentalization' of the 
state ... The state can only 
be understood in its survival and its limits on the 
basis of the general tactics of governmentality (Foucault, 1991b: 103). 
What Foucualt calls "governmentality" indicates his interest not only in the 
political aspects of government, but also in its pedagogical, spiritual, and religious 
dimensions. Trying to understand how we have been trapped in our own history, 
Foucualt began to explore such questions like how to govern oneself, how not to 
be governed, how to govern others, etc. (see Foucault, 1988e; 1991b). Early 
modern theorists of government, Foucault argues, began to combine two disparate 
ways of thinking. On the one hand, secular philosophers had approached the art of 
government in worldly terms alone. Theologians, on the other hand, had 
approached the art of government in terms that were explicitly otherworldly. It 
was in the sixteenth century that these two ways of thinking came together in 
practice for the first time. In this process, political rationality took its stand on the 
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idea of "pastoral" power, then on that of "reason of state", correspondingly, the 
form of power appeared as an "administrative", or "police state" (Foucault, 
1988e: 77,82,85; 1991b: 103; 1983a: 214), which is organized through new 
technique of pedagogy and political science. The result was a hybrid new art of 
government, concerned with "both individualization and totalization" (Foucault, 
1988e: 85), regulating and monitoring the outward and inward life of each and 
everv citizen. Through the development of political rationality, finally, the 
"governmentar' or "moderif' state (Foucault, 1991b: 103; 1983a: 214) came in the 
eighteenth century, which is the regime of power that Foucault tried to define in 
terms of bio-politics in the Will to Knowledge. 
Foucault rejects the view that the state is a kind of political power which ignores 
individuals, representing the totality of a class, or a group among the citizens. 
Instead, he argues, right from the start, the state has been a kind of political power 
which is "both individualizing and totalitariaW' (Foucault, 1988e: 84), and has 
been developing to "a modem matrix of individualization, or a new form of 
pastoral power" (Foucault, 1983a: 215). This form of power applies itself to 
everyday life and makes individuals subjects. In other word, individuals become 
subjects by both individualizing and totalizing power. Here, the term "subject" has 
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a double meaning: one is both "subject to someone else by control and 
dependence, and tied to ... [their] own identity by a conscience or self 
knowledge" 
(Foucault, 083a: 212). Therefore, liberation can be achieved by attacking, not 
individualization or totalization separately, but political rationality's very roots. 
As Foucault suggests: "The political, ethical, social, philosophical problem of our 
days is not to try to liberate the individual from the state, and from the state's 
institutions, but to liberate us both from the state and from the type of 
individualization which is linked to the state. We have to promote new forms of 
subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of individuality which has been 
imposed on us for several centuries" (Foucault, 1983a: 216). 
Foucault's argument on governmentlaity delivers a certain irony of power effect 
between totalization and individualization. On one side stands an almost 
omnipotent machine of government, while on the other side stands the solitary 
human being, its instinct for freedom pushed back, incarcerated. Foucault's 
intention is not just to expose the totalitarian effect of govemmentality but to link 
it with the idea of liberalism. Furthermore it leads us to the problem between 
reason and power once again, the reciprocal and the inverse of the problem of 
Enlightenment: how is that rationalization leads to the disease of power such as 
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fascism and Stalinism? In Foucault's word, "how is that the great movement of 
rationalization led us to so much noise, so much rage, so much silence and dismal 
mechanism? " (Foucault, 1996: 390). In the end, what Foucault is trying to do is to 
suggest an "Introduction to the Non-Fascist Life", that contains essential 
deindividualizing principles. Here what Foucault means by fascism is "not only 
historical fascism, the fascism of Hitler and Mussolini, " but also "the fascism in 
us all, in our heads and in our everyday behavior, " in "our speech and our acts, 
our hearts and our pleasures, " buried deep in "the body, " its traces brutally 
difficult to expunge, "the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very 
thing that dominates and exploits us. " (Foucault, 1977b: xiii, in Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1977). 
In Madness and Civilization, and Discipline and Punish, Foucault evokes the 
totalitarian implications of institutions that aim to rationalize the technique of 
government by detailing the horrors of Pinel's model asylum and Bentham's 
model prison. In Madness and Civilization, Foucault argue, the utopian effort to 
forge communities of "ethical uniformity" (Foucault, 1989; orig. 1961: 257) 
trapped any human being who didn't conforra into "a relation to himself that was 
of the order of transgression, and in a nonrelation to others that was of the order of 
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shame" (Foucault, 1989: 261). In Discipline and Punish, the whole notion of a 
visual and spatial metaphor is subjected to a penetrating examination. Visibility 
itself, in the form of Bentham's project for a "panoptic" prison, is brought into 
question. According to Foucault, the "major effect" of the Panopticon was "to 
induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the 
automatic functioning of power". The aim was "so to arrange things that the 
surveillance is permanent in its effect, even if it is discontinuous in its action; that 
the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary; that 
this architectural apparatus should be a machine for creating and sustaining a 
power relation independent of the person who exercise it; in short, that the 
inmates should be caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the 
bearers" (Foucault, 1991a; orig. 1975: 201) 
Foucault's argument is not confined to the prison. On the contrary, it is his 
contention that we are all caught within disciplinary systems, systems of micro- 
power. These systems, he asserts, exist throughout bourgeois society and control 
our behavior without our knowing it. Their functioning is dependent on a regime 
of observation, surveillance, and inspection similar to Bentham's Panopticon, 
even though less obvious in its working. The whole exercise of discipline within 
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modern society presupposes, according to Foucault, "a mechanism that coerces by 
means of observation7' (Foucault, 1991 a; orig. 1975: 170). This disciplinary power 
"is exercised through its visibility", yet, at the same time, it "imposes on those 
whom its subjects a principle of compulsory visibility" (Foucault, 1991a; orig. 
1975: 187). Interestingly, in an interview, Foucault goes on to link the Bentham's 
project with Rousseau's dream "of a transparent society, visible and legible in 
each of its parts", the dream "of there no longer existing any zones of darkness, 
zones established by the privileges of royal power or the prerogative of some 
corporatioif' (Foucault, 1980: 152). Foucault sees the Panopticon as a 
combination of "Rousseau's lyricism and Bentham's obsession" (Foucault, 1980: 
152), that is, Rousseau's lyrical note of the Revolution, a dream of a republic of 
virtue, to be untrammeled exercise of popular sovereignty, and Bentham's 
obsession, the technical idea of the exercise of an all-seeing power. In an 
important sense, Foucault engages in a reversal of Rousseau, viewing as insidious 
and threatening what Rousseau saw as desirable. 
According to Machiavellian principle of "raison Atat" [reason of state] in Me 
Prince, the state constituted an end itself, regulated only by its internal structure, 
and enjoying its own justification in terms of its success in increasing the scope 
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and power of its rule. Liberalism, by contrast, is a new principle and method for 
rationalizing the exercise of government. In 'Governmentality', Foucault analyzes 
that the novelty of liberalism lies in its break with the rival modern principle of 
reason of state. In other words, if the Machiavellian maxim is that one governs too 
little, the liberal maxim is that one always governs too much, or at least to suspect 
that one governs too much. As a consequence of this liberal principle, 
governmentality cannot be exercised without a critique. Foucault turns his 
attention to modem liberalism, analyzing its character with sympathy. Still, 
Foucualt considers the positive freedom secured by law and institutions as 
suspicious. What Foucault has in mind is an alternative idea, of a negative 
freedom, expressed in the demand "not to be governed". To some extent, it 
reminds me of Isaiah Berlin's notion of freedom. To be free, in this negative sense, 
means, as he once put it, "not being interfered with by others". "The wider the 
area of noninterference", Berlin suggested, "the wider my freedom" (Berlin, 
1969: 123). Or, in Foucauldian terms, the less discipline and bio-power imposed 
from above, the larger the scope left open for the individual's enigmatic, but 
decisive will. 
I think that Foucault's position towards liberalism is not simple, particularly in 
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connection with his wary, complicated, and intelligent attempt to get philosophy 
and politics together. I am arguing, therefore, against nalive reading about it. 
Theoretically, Foucault does not commit himself to any conventional 
understanding of liberalism. He does not identify himself with the liberal jurist or 
the Kantian philosopher, struggling to see things impartially, from the perspective 
of a universal subject. The idea of right, he cannot help but regard as a kind of 
political fiction. As he puts it, "all the forms of established or demanded freedom, 
all the rights that one asserte' find in revolt "a last anchor point", which is "more 
solid and closer to experience than natural righte' (Foucault, 2000: 449). 
Nevertheless, Foucault's political pronouncements on human rights are often 
appealingly modest, open, and undoctorinaire. He spoke on behalf of prison 
reform, and the rights of homosexuals. He involved in efforts to improve the 
plight of refugees and to safeguard the rights of dissidents around the world. The 
social crititic and political commitment must always proceed with caution and 
humility at the point where ideas and reality intersect. In this sense, he considers 
that to defend the rights of the individual against the power of government is a 
useful and worthy try, however incomplete it may seem to him. From the 
Foucauldian perspective, political action is a matter not of "engagement in" but 
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rather of "experience with" (Foucault, 2000: 445). 
It is possible to see his political commitment to human rights is basically tactical. 
Or, it is possible to see that it only involves an act of will rather than a reasoned 
argument. In fact, throughout his work, archaeology and genealogy are well 
combined tactically in the form of theory/practice where theory is immediately 
practical in character. However, I argue, his political commitment is not tactical 
but antistrategic, and beyond the confines of a theory/practice combination. As 
Foucault freely admitted, "my theoretical ethic ... 
is antistrategic: to be respectful 
when singularity revolts, intransigent as soon as power violates the universal. A 
simple choice, a difficult job" (Foucault, 2000: 453). What is necessary and 
important for Foucault is unrelenting practice of critique. Faced with any form of 
government, whether liberal or totalitarian, it is the vocation of the intellectual to 
exercise a "decisive will not to be governed", voicing concerns in public about 
whatever appears intolerable. By withholding consent, the intellectual could 
remind others of their, what Kant calls, "self-incurred immaturitý' (Kant, 1970a: 
54), and also of their ability to emerge from this immaturity This is the reason 
why Foucault took up Kant's task two centuries later (see Foucault, 1983a, 
'Subject and Power'; 1993, 'Kant on Enlightenment and Revolution'; 1996, 
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'What is Critique? '; 2000, 'For an Ethic of Discomfort'), and why this task of 
Enlightenment returns to us over and over again. We must be joined in an ongoing 
effort to challenge every abuse of power, in theory as well as practice. If we are all 
governed, one way and another, then, as such, we are in solidarity. 
It is also Foucault's conviction that phenomenon of revolt is itself inherently 
mysterious and inscrutable. As he puts it, "the man who rebels is finally 
inexplicable; it takes a wrenching away that interrupt the flow of history, and its 
long chains of reasons" (Foucault, 2000: 449). Therefore, the rationale for 
rebellion or resistance cannot lie with outcomes, or with the achievement of a 
final desirable state. Rebellion or resistance, whether a single cry or a collective 
one, is not means to an end, but rather an end in itself. His faith in revolt comes 
out very clearly in his writings on the Iranian Revolution in 1978. As Foucault 
puts it, "people do revolt; that is a fact. And that is how subjectivity (not that of 
great men, but that of anyone) is brought into history, breathing life into it A 
question of ethics? Perhaps. A question of reality, without a doubt" (Foucault, 
2000: 452). The generosity of Foucault's response to the Iranian revolution brings 
to mind one of Kant's most famous remarks about the French Revolution, and 
Camus's remarks about the French Resistance. 
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The revolution which we have seen taking place in our own times in a nation of 
gifted people may succeed, or it may fail. It may be so filled with misery and 
atrocities that no right-thinking man would ever decide to make the same 
experiment again at such a price, even if he could hope to carry it out 
successfully at the second attempt. But I maintain that this revolution has 
aroused in the hearts and desires of all spectators who are not themselves 
caught up in it a sympathy which borders almost on enthusiasm, although the 
very utterance of this sympathy was fraught with danger. It cannot therefore 
have been caused by anything other than a moral disposition within the human 
race (Kant, 1970b: 182). 
What matters in the Revolution is not the revolutionary process, nor its special 
content, nor its result whether it succeeds or fails. What, on the contrary, does 
have meaning is the fact that, as Kant expresses it, the Revolution is surrounded 
by ', (. a sympathy which borders almost on enthusiasd'. What matters in the 
Revolution is not the Revolution itself, but what takes place in the heads of the 
people who witness this revolution as an event. Enthusiasm for the Revolution is, 
according to Kant, the sign of "a moral dispositioW' of humanity. The Revolution 
is an event which can never be forgotten because such a phenomenon is "too 
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momentous, too intimately interwoven with the interests of humanity and too 
widespread in its influence upon all parts of the worlds for nations not to be 
reminded of it when favourable circumstances present themselves, and to rise up 
and make renewed attempts of the same kind as before" (Kant, 1970b; 185). In a 
word, it is the very existence of the Revolution that attests to a permanent 
virtuality which cannot be ignored. 
An experience of the French Resistance, Camus recollected, left a "nasty wound" 
that "men discovered ... that one can be right and still be beaten, that 
force can 
overcome spirit, that there are times when courage is not its own recompense" 
(Camus, 1946, in Wilkinson, 1981: 5). "Whatever our personal failings maybe", 
Camus added later, "the nobility of our calling will always grounded in two 
obligations that are difficult to fulfill: the refusal to lie about what one knows, and 
resistance against oppression" (Camus, 1957, in Wilkinson, 1981: 261). 
For Kant, enthusiasm for the Revolution is the sign of "a moral disposition7' of 
humanity, which can be called freedom, for Camus, rebellion, or resistance 
constitutes something like an existential act, for Foucault, it is "the will not to be 
governed", an expression of the human potential which escapes every abuse of 
power including the disciplinary techniques of reason. 
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3. Is it Useless to Resist? 
Foucault identifies himself as a "skeptical thinker" (Foucault, 1988e: 254). His 
analysis manifests grim pessimism and despair penetrating history. As Foucault 
puts it, "the fear of ridicule or the bitterness of history prevents most of us from 
putting side by side: revolution and happiness ... or indeed, revolution and 
pleasure" (Foucault, 1990a; orig. 1976: 7). And yet, at the same time, Foucault 
adopts an activist stance affirming his faith in revolt. As he puts it, "revolts belong 
to history. But, in a certain way, they escape from it. The impulse by which a 
single individual, a group, a minority, or an entire people says, "I will not obey", 
and throws the risk of their life in the face of an authority they consider unjust 
seems to me to be something irreducible. Because no authority is capable of 
making it utterly impossible" (Foucault, 2000: 449). 
The despair arises from the "bitterness of history", but if there is no resistance to 
that bitterness, the one-dimensional despair leads only to political depression and 
theoretical closure. Similarly, if the hope is not grounded firmly in that same 
bitterness of history, it becomes just a one-dimensional and naive expression of 
optimism. Precisely such a separation of despair and hope, of pessimism and 
optimism is expressed in Romain Rolland's maxim, "pessimism of the 
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intelligence, optimism of the will", which is made by Gramsci into something of a 
programmatic slogan (Gramsci, 1971: 175, fn. 75). For Foucault, "pessimism of 
the intelligence, optimism of the will" is the matter not of separation but rather of 
differentiation or doubling. It is Foucault's optimism inside of pessimism that 
issues from his belief in the contingency and vulnerability of power: "There's an 
optimism that consists rather in saying that things couldn't be better. My optimism 
would consist rather in saying that so many things can be changed, fragile as they 
are, bound up more with circumstances than necessities, more arbitrary than self- 
evident, more a matter of complex, but temporary, historical circumstances than 
with inevitable anthropological constrainte' (Foucault 1988e: 156). 
I am against a separation of optimism and pessimism, for despair and hope are 
irreducible, yet constantly imply one another. Critical thought must constantly live 
in a field of tension and its function is to accept and theorize a kind of revolving 
door of despair and hope, and to show "how the Other, the Distant, is also the 
Near and the Same7' (Foucault, 1994; orig. 1966: 339). As Arendt argues, 
c4progress and doom are two sides of the same medal" and "both are articles of 
superstitions, not of faitif ' (Arendt, 195 1: vii). Furthermore, as Ernst Bloch puts it 
in the foreword to his Principle of Hope, written largely during his exile from 
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Nazi Germany, it is precisely in such a fearsome world that "it is a question of 
learning hope" (Bloch, 1986: 3). 
We can't have a perfect world, therefore, to some extent, intellectuals are "men in 
dark timee' (Arendt, 1968a) as well as dreamers. To live in a threatening world 
that have to change, that have to lead to another world, for better or worse, means 
to spend one's life in the night, waiting for dawn. Whether it is passively subdued, 
or actively expressed in public, every intellectual has a kind of dream of 
Apocalypse, however different it may be. Confronted by ongoing crisis, 
intellectuals could end in a quietism, in an attitude of letting beings be, or could 
adopt an activist stance, engaging in what seems to be an unending critique of the 
world as it is. Foucault seems to choose the latter. From a slightly different point 
of view, intellectuals in the crisis tend toward an ideal past, the nostalgic side, or 
seek to invent a myth of the future, the imaginative side. Of course, this division 
between the imaginative and the nostalgic is by no means absolute, for the ideal 
past and the ideal future have in common a critical sense towards the present. In 
Foucault's case, the nostalgic side appears in Yhe Use of Pleasure and The Care of 
the Setf by returning to the Greek, while the imaginative side appears in The 
Order of Aings by anticipating a "future thought" (Foucault, 1994; orig.. 1966: 
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386). What fascinates Foucault most, however, is not the past nor the future but 
the question of today. Foucault tells us that "I have learnt not so much from 
history as from the present" and that "I would like to write the history" not as 
"writing a history of the past in terms of the present", but as "writing the history 
of the present" (Foucault, 1991; orig. 1975: 30-31). As Deleuze understands it, 
Foucault "frees a sense of time that fits the past into the inside, brings about the 
future in the outside, and brings the two into confrontation at the limit of living 
present" (Deleuze, 1988: 119). 
Foucault sees the job of the intellectual as one of identifying the specific forms 
and specific interrelationships which truth and power have taken in our history. 
His aim has never been to destroy every form of power nor to undermine every 
truth claim but to use his analysis to throw light on the specific dangers that each 
specific type of power/ knowledge produces. He has been at pains to criticize and 
distance himself from those who speak the truth against power as if truth and 
power were self-evidently external to each other, and from those who, in the name 
of post-enlightenment and postmodem discourse, question philosophical 
seriousness in general. Foucault has never taken this position. Foucault wants to 
change our world. But he never mourned the default of god, nor looked for a new 
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one, nor considered his main task to offer alternatives. He was trying to diagnose 
the contemporary danger, and in his last works, to provide the elements of a 
modern ethics. If everything is dangerous, as Foucault asserts, then we always 
have something to do. At every moment, step by step, we have something to fight 
against the present, for the firing line is not somewhere over there but where we 
stand here and now. As Foucault once said, "my position leads not to apathy but to 
a hyper-and pessimistic activism" (Foucault, 1983b: 232). ' 
Although Foucault is adamant that he does not intend to offer an "alternative" 
(Foucault, 1983b: 231), 1 strongly believe that he presents his own dream of 
Apocalypse. But equally, I believe that it is not that important whether the dream 
of Apocalypse that Foucault puts before us is really one what we want to make 
our own. Rather, I am interested in the fact that he offers us the possibility of a 
new way of thinking and acting as the intellectual. What Foucault means by irony 
and maturity (see Foucault, 1984, 'What is Enlightenment? '; Dreyfus and 
Rabinow, 1986, 'What is Maturity? ') suggests that there is no such thing as a 
1 In The Use ofPleasure, Foucault describes the Greek virtue of sophrosyne as a general state that 
ensures the individual will be moderate and will do "what is fitting as regards both god and mcif'. 
While the Greek virtue includes moderation and prefers insensitivity to excess, Foucault chooses a 
"hyper- and pessimistic activisnf' rather am "apathy". 
"The former [sophrosynel is characterized in the Nicomachean Ethics by the fact that the subject 
deliberately chooses reasonable principles of action, that he is capable of following and applying 
them, that he holds to the 'right mean' between insensitivity and excess (a middle course that is 
not equidistant between the two, because moderation is actually much further away from excess 
than from insensitivity), and that he derives pleasure from the moderation he displaye' (Foucault, 
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private intellectual, nor is there only a public intellectual; and that the intellectual 
cannot be reduced simply to being a faceless functionary, nor a careful bureaucrat, 
nor a professional politician, nor a strategic revolutionary; and finally that the role 
of the intellectual entails a difficult interplay between being a spectator and being 
a principal actor. As Foucault showed us in his books and in his life, there is a 
kind of ethical and intellectual integrity, which seeks to produce a new ethical 
form of life of the intellectual. It is an abandonment of traditional seriousness and 
of postmodem frivolity, while preserving active engagement in the concerns of the 
present. It is a refusal of justifications of one's actions in terms of religion, law, 
science, or philosophical grounding, while maintaining imagination, lucidity, 
humour, disciplined thought and practical wisdom. 
1992; orig. 1984: 64-65). 
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Chapter 5 
Arendt: Fragmentary Historiography and the Critique of 
Modernity 
1. Introduction 
Hannah Arendt is one of the great outsiders of twentieth-century political thought, 
at once original and unorthodox. Indeed, the exceptional originality of her ideas is 
itself a constant source of misunderstanding. Rejected by the Left because of its 
problematic analogies between Stalinism and National Socialism, denounced by 
the Right for its irreverence toward the polarizing thinking of Cold War camp, and 
ridiculed by empirical political scientists for its journalistic, literary, and 
philosophical generalizations, Arendt became one of the most controversial 
political thinker in the twentieth century. Three decades after her death on 
December 4,1975, the interest in Arendt's work shows no signs of diminishing. 
One can even note "a contemporary Arendt renaissance" (Benhabib, 2003: xxxvii) 
beyond disciplinary boundaries. In part this has to do with the fact that her work 
always defied categorization, at least in terms of the usual Left/ Right or liberal/ 
conservative labels. But it also has to do with the end of the Cold War, the demise 
of authoritarian communism and the worldwide retreat of Marxist theory. Arendt's 
180 
thought has emerged, on the one hand, as the alternative critical political theory 
toward Kantian bent, on the other hand, as the politics of resistance toward 
Nietzschean bent. It is in this context that so many have turned to Arendt's work, 
making her, in Seyla Benhabib's felicitous phrase, the thinker of "the post- 
totalitarian momenf' (2003: 198). 
This current has been motivated by complex sets of sensibilities and concerns. 
First, for the participatory democrat, it is Arendt's identification of action and 
politics, and her reconceptualization of citizenship, that open new prospect to 
contemporary theory. As Sheldon Wolin (1960) and Barber (1984) point out, 
Arendt's theory of action reformulates politics in terms of continuous and direct 
civic involvement. She thereby challenges our liberal preconceptions about the 
nature of politics. Arendt (1958) asserts that the essence of politics is action. Laws 
and institutions, which to the liberal mind are, the stuff of politics, for Arendt 
supply the framework for action. The activities of debate, deliberation, and 
participation in decision making come to occupy central stage. Moreover, since 
politics is action, we need to recast our notion of citizenship in a participatory 
mode. Also, by dramatically distinguishing the political realm from the economic, 
Arendt (1958: 22-78) restores to politics an integrity and dignity, that is denied by 
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the liberal tradition. Because the liberal tradition, according to Barber, views 
politics as, "the conduct of public affairs for private advantage" (Barber, 2003: 4), 
that is, the chambermaid of private interests. 
Second, a very different, but equally influential, appropriation of Arendt has been 
performed by Habermas and others working within the tradition of Critical 
Theory (Habermas, 1973; 1984; Bernstein, 1984; Benhabib, 1987). These 
theorists, like their Frankfurt School predecessors, have been concerned with the 
threat posed by the universalization of technical rationality, in particular its 
extension to the political sphere. As areas of social existence are subjected to the 
dictates of instrumental reason and rational administration, the space left for the 
exercise of citizenship gradually disappears. Enlightenment ideals of freedom, 
autonomy, and a rational democratic political order are undermined and 
extinguished by the process of economic and bureaucratic rationalization, in 
Weber's words, the "iron cage" (1976: 181). Indeed, for an earlier generation of 
critical theorists such as Horkheimer and Adorno, the "dialectic of enlightenment" 
offered nothing but irony. The emancipatory potential of the Enlightenment was 
revealed as a mask for a reason whose essence was domination on a global scale 
(Adomo & Horkheimer, 1972: 3-42). 
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While agreeing with Horkheimer and Adorno, and of course, Weber, that the 
process of rationalization has been far more ambiguous than Marx ever imagined, 
Habermas and others of his generation have been unable to accept their totalizing 
critique of reason with its accompanying retreat to the aesthetic realm. In reaction 
to Horkheimer and Adomo's negative dialectic, Habermas has struggled to show 
that "rationalization" does not inevitably mean domination. The imperialism of 
purposive rationality needs to be combated, and this can be done effectively only 
in the name of an alternative rationality, the rationality that aims at consensus. 
Habermas thinks that such a dialogical rationality is perhaps the central 
component of our identity as modems. And while this rationality may be covered 
over by technocratic doctrines of decisionism, it remains implicit in the very 
structure of communicative action (Habermas, 1984; 1987, chaps. II and 12). 
For Habermas, then, the important thing is to bring to light the consensual 
rationality implicit in speech, to show the progress of this rationality toward 
autonomy throughout the modem period, and to remind us of the claim that this 
rationality still exercises upon our political lives. However, this project cannot 
even be formulated using only the conceptual resources of Marxism or Weberian 
social science. Marx's notion of labor as praxis conflates acting and making, 
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blinding him to the specificity of the political realm and the peculiar structure of 
practical discourse. Weber's conception of rationalization explicitly denies the 
possibility of a disenchanted, yet substantively rational, form of social action. 
Critical Theory thus found itself at an impasse, but it escaped, according to 
Habermas, thanks largely to Hannah Arendt (Habermas, 1983; 1973: 42,286; 
Benhabib, 1987: 243-245). 
The rigorous distinction between action (praxis) and fabrication (poiesis) posed 
by Arendt's theory of action enabled Habermas to distinguish systematically 
between communicative and instrumental action and to identify their respective 
logics of rationalization. Whereas rationalization in the economic sphere implies 
greater order, efficiency, and system coherence, the rationalization of 
communicative action means increasing acceptance of the principle. That is, 
validity claims should be redeemed discursively through a process of rational 
argumentation. Moreover, Arendt's sketches of the form of intersubjectivity 
engendered in the practice of speech supplied Habermas with a standard of ideal 
speech situation (flabermas, 1983: 174-175). Thanks to Arendt's theory of action, 
the way to a comprehensive theory of communicative rationality was opened. 
Third, Arendt's theory has been appropriated by communitarian critics of liberal 
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theories of justice. Sandel (1982; 1984), Taylor (1989), and MacIntyre (1981) 
have all questioned the Enlightenment effort to derive principles of political right 
and practical judgement independent of any concrete, particular vision of the good. 
Such a question is to be found in Arendt's theory of political action. Arendt's 
theory identifies freedom not with an individual's choice of life-style, but with 
"acting together" for the sake of the community (Arendt, 1958: 200-201; 1951: 
474; 1972: 142-143). Her account stresses how such acting together - "the sharing 
of words and deede' - is in fact the medium through which the self is defined. A 
community, a shared world, a common space of appearance, is the fundamental 
condition for the achievement of selfhood. Further, it is by "acting together" that 
our sense of the world is developed. That is to say, it is through political action 
that our sense of justice - of what we owe to our fellow citizens and to those who 
come after us - is both articulated and preserved. Without a "community sense", 
justice becomes mere legality (Arendt: 1951: 465; 1963: chap. 3). Therefore, the 
communitarians see Arendt as placing community at the heart of politics, making 
it the cornerstone of selfbood, freedom, and justice. Arendt's theory of action 
frees us from the anomie of the "procedural republic" and gives us a taste of the 
"good in commoW' that only a healthy political life can deliver (Sandel, 1982: 
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Finally, many contemporary political theorists (Wolin, S. 1996; Conolly, 1998; 
Mouffe, 1996; Honig, 1993; Villa, 1992; 1996) have turned to a broadly agonistic 
model of politics articulated by Nietzsche, Foucault, and Arendt for a radical 
democracy agenda. These theorists worry that modem democracies are hardly 
democratic at all and that the bureaucratic edifice of the state has seized the space 
of political, making citizens the passive recipient of policy decisions. They also 
worry that liberal theory seeks to diminish or eradicate the contest and debate that 
is the lifeblood of democratic politics by promoting a conception of politics which 
is judicial/ administrative. 
Contemporary agonists remind us that public sphere is as much a stage for 
conflict and expression as it is a set of procedures or institutions designed to 
preserve peace, fairness, or consensus. They also insist that ultimate values are 
always in play and that the content of basic rights and the purpose of political 
association are not the objects of a consensus but are contested everyday 
Therefore political agonism provides a return to the repressed essence of 
democratic politics, that is, conflict. 
In Beyond Good and Evil and On the Genealogy ofMorals, Nietzsche addresses 
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the problem of a modem, democratic culture that has inherited the prejudice of 
slave morality against heroic or individualizing action. Given Nietzche's coupling 
of the "herd animal"(Nietzsche, 2000: 113) with democracy, and his aristocratic 
conception of the agonistic virtues, it is hardly surprising that his agonism fell on 
deaf ears for so long. As Conolly (1991) and Butler (1990) have demonstrated, 
Foucault's Discipline and Punish changed all that by showing how the modem 
state produced "docile" (Foucault, 1991a: 135) subjects through the proliferation 
of "micro-physics of power" (Foucault, 1991a: 26). Quite self-consciously, 
Foucault provided a Genealogy of Morals for the democratic age by 
demonstrating that rights and disciplines are two sides of the same coin (see 
Foucault, 1991a). From a Foucauldian point of view, our seemingly greater 
freedom masks a more profound internalization of norms. Indeed, it is possible 
only on the basis of our becoming self-surveilling subjects. 
Foucault's analysis provides an essential touchstone for most contemporary 
agonists. Their call for resistance presuppose that liberal democracy has been too 0 
successful in domesticating its citizens, diminishing or diverting their potentially 
political energies. Foucault's unique contribution to this thematic was to suggest 
not only that power permeated everyday life in the form of the discipline, but that 
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the very process of producing docile subjects created resistance and multiple sites 
of struggle in the margins of political life such as hospitals, factories, and prisons. 
Thus, when the agon seemed like the most ancient of history, it reemerged in the 
interstices of the welfare state itself (see Foucault, 1983a). Nietzsche's agonistic 
subjectivity returned in the democratized form of the politics of resistance. 
But Foucault's updating Nietzsche remained insufficient from the standpoint of 
the radical democratic project. While generating a politics of everyday life, its 
center of gravity was, in fact, ethical rather than political. Its foremost concern is 
to resist the imposition of identities on groups and individuals. And for this reason 
the radical democrats have turned to Arendt's expressly political reformulation of 
Nietzsche's agonism. 
First, they are attracted by the fact that Arendt (1958) gives a central place to 
action in her conception of the political. This sets Arendt at odds with the liberal 
focus on institutions, procedures, interests, and negative freedom, the freedom 
from politics (see Barber, 1984). Like Nietzsche, she affirms the initiatory 
dimension of all genuine action, and the contingency of human affairs (Arendt, 
1968b: 151; 1958: 177; 1963: 21). Unlike Nietzsche, however, she insists action 
properly occurs only in public sphere characterized by relations of equality. Citing 
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Greek polis, she identifies freedom with (political) equality. (Arendt, 1963: 3 0-3 1). 
Human plurality - the existence of diverse equals - is for her the sine qua non of 
political action. Indeed, all genuinely political action is, in fact, an acting together 
(Arendt, 1958: 188-189). Contra Nietzsche, rulership signals the end of political 
action, its dissolution into the instrumental and fundamentally unfree activity of 
command and obedience. 
Second, radical democrats are attracted by Arendt's endorsement of the agonal 
spirit, which she sees as animating all genuine political action. Like Nietzsche, 
Arendt turns to Greek in order to isolate the passion for "greatnessý' as the 
specially political action. But while Nietzsche's agonistic stance culminates in a 
heroic individualism, Arendt's expressly political version combines with what she 
calls "revolutionary spirit" (Arendt, 1963: 221) and the spirit of resistance (Arendt, 
1963, chap. 6,1968b, Preface). Her examples are not great statesmen, but the 
spontaneous heroic action manifest in the American Revolution, the Paris 
Commune of 1871, the 1905 Russian Revolution, the French Resistance during 
World War II, and the Hungarian revolt of 1956. This makes it possible and 
plausible for contemporary agonists to assimilate her to "an activist, democratic 
politics of contest, resistance, and amendment" (Honig, 1993: 77). 
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Third, radical democrats are attracted by the fact that Arendt draws out the 
specifically political consequence of Nietzsche's anti-foundationalism, showing 
how the will to an extrapolitical ground in the modem age can only be nihilistic, 
anti-political, and antidemocratic. The will to find a transcendent ground for 
politics is a will to escape the irreducible relativity of human agreements and 
opinions. It is the will to discover an immovable authority which will put an end 
to the debate and contestation that is democratic politics. Arendt gives Nietzsche a 
political and democratic twist by arguing for a groundless politics of "opinion" 
(Arendt, 1968b: 233). What makes Arendt's conception of an agonistic public 
sphere so attractive to radical democrats is that the authoritativeness of the basic 
institutions are detennined by the clash of conflicting interpretations. Therefore, 
the public sphere is, above all, an institutionally articulated site of perpetual 
debate and contestation. 
This is not to say, however, that radical democrats believe that Arendt succeeds in 
stripping agonism of its aristocratic trapping. On the contrary, Sheldon Wolin 
(1994), Connolly (1998) and Honig (1993) take her to task for maintaining 
distinctions which they view as either unjustifiably elitist or essentialist. Thus, 
Wolin attacks Arendt's distinction between the social and the political, charging 
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that her desire for a "pure politics" unsoiled by economic concerns and the needs 
of the "massee' is, at base, deeply antidemocratic. An Arendtian politics of 
memorable deeds performed by virtuosic actors is, according to Wolin, scarcely 
compatible with democratic politics. Because the primary thrust of democratic 
politics is to "extend the broad egalitarianism of ordinary lives into public lif6" 
(Wolin, S. 1994: 290). Similarly, Conolly charges her with maintaining a 
"political purism" parallel to Kant's moral purism. Because it purges "the social 
question and body" from the public realm. The result is "bleached and 
aristocratic" version of plurality to deprive important "dimensions of diversity 
which might otherwise enrich and fortify it" (Conolly, 1998: 170). 
From a somewhat different angle, Honig attacks Arendt's distinction between 
public and private, which she views as both arbitrary and self-defending (Honig, 
1993: 118-123, see Pitkin, 1994). Arendt's conception of the public sphere, 
according to Honig, overly formalistic. It is also deeply conservative insofar as it 
naturalizes the public/ private distinction. It thereby seals off inherited race, class, 
gender, and ethnic identities from contest and reformulation. While Wolin sees 
Arendt's conception of agonistic action as entailing the social/ political distinction, 
Honig suggests that action as theorized by Arendt is essentially destabilizing, 
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boundless, and unpredictable. 
The four main projects occupying the Hannah Arendt renaissance described above, 
all draw heavily upon Arendt's theory of action in their attempt to come to the 
grips with the ills of modem politics. Their criticism and goals are diverse, but the 
former three readings of Arendt that they sketch are remarkably similar. They 
locate Arendt's work within the Aristotelian horizon viewing it as "the systematic 
renewal of the Aristotelian concept of praxis" (Habermas, 1983: 174). The latter 
reading, on the other hand, locates Arendt's work within the Nietzschean horizon. 
The Aristotelian reading has transformed into a more Kantian reading of her 
political theory. The hope is that Kant -after Aristotle, the greatest traditional 
influence upon Arendt - provides an alternative way of reading Arendt to put 
Arendt's Nietzschean sensibility in perspective. Benhabib and Habermas have 
explored this vein, assimilating Arendt to a broadly modernist or universalist 
position by emphasizing the deliberative elements of her theories of action and 
judgement over the performative and agonistic ones (Benhabib, 1992b; Habermas, 
1983). ' The Nietzschean reading, on the other hand, has attempted to assimilate 
Arendt to a broadly postmodernist position, seeing her as a postmodernist avant la 
1 Berhabib (2003) characterizes Arendt as a "reluctant"modernist in her book of the same name. 
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leure. According to Villa, for example, Arendt becomes a "high modernist" who 
insists "on politics for the sake of politic" (Villa, 1996: 55). 2 
Bearing this theoretical current in mind, I shall begin with methodological 
observations to clarify Arendt's philosophical intentions. I shall then explicate 
Arendt's critique of modernity to show how she has sharpened her critical insight 
into modem society and its discontent. 
2. The Fragmentary Historiography 
Arendt did not want to build a system of political philosophy, and did not engage 
in methodological reflections. On the infrequent occasions when she made 
statements about her approach to her work she emphasized its tentativeness and 
flexibility (Arendt, 1979: 338). More importantly, Arendt is not concerned to 
establish some inevitable continuity between the past and the present that compels 
us to see what happens as what had to happen. She objects to this trap of historical 
understanding and maintains that the future is radically underdetermined, and that 
more importantly, to place the present in inevitable continuity with the past will 
result in a failure to recognize the novelty of what has taken place. 
2 From a different angle, a number of recent interpretations have attempted to push Arendt's 
thought toward a more postmodern bent. Isaac (1992,227-259), for example, has explored 
Arendt's affinities with Albert Camus in relation to postmodem politics. But he has indicated his 
disagreement with any reading of Arendt in terms of "agonistic democracy"(1992: 229). See also 
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As Arendt understands it, there is a dilemma in historiography Historiography 
originates with the human desire to overcome oblivion and nothingness. It is the 
attempt to save, in the face of the frailty of human affairs and the inescapability of 
death, something "which is even more than remembrance" (Arendt, 1994: 402). 
Although the structure of traditional historiography described as it is in 
chronological sequence, serves to "preserve7' what has happened by making it 
seem inevitable, necessary and justifiable, for Arendt, the first dilemma posed by 
the historiography of totalitarianism was the impulse to destroy rather than to 
preserve: "Thus my first problem was how to write historically about something - 
totalitarianism - which I did not want to conserve but on the contrary felt engaged 
to destroy" (Arendt, 1994: 402). Her response to this dilemma was the same as 
Walter Benjamin's: to break the chain of narrative continuity, to shatter 
chronology as the natural structure of narrative, to stress fragmentariness, 
historical dead ends, failures, and ruptures (Arendt, 1968a: 193-206). This method 
of fragmentary historiography does justice to the memory of the dead by the 
telling the story of history in terms of their failed hopes and efforts. But also it is a 
way of preserving the past without being enslaved by it, in particular without 
Honig (1991), 'Declarations of Independence: Arendt and Derrida on the Problem of Founding 
Republic'. 
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having one's historical imagination suffocated by argument of historical necessity. 
Relating historical understanding to imagination, Arendt said: "Understanding is 
closely related to that faculty of imagination which Kant called Einbildungskraft 
and which has nothing in common with fictional ability. The spiritual exercises 
are exercises of imagination and they may be more relevant to method in the 
historical sciences than academic training realizee' (Arendt, 1994: 404). 
Arendt understands that historical understanding is exercises in reproductive 
imagination and that one has to recreate from the evidence a new perspective. 
Since historical understanding cannot be the mere reproduction of the standpoint 
of the past historical actors, and to pretend to be objective only serves to disguise 
the standpoint of the narrator or the historian. That is, historical understanding is 
perspectival in nature, and only reveals its plurality in narrative forms. 
Arendt's work has been seen as primarily an exercise in remembrance, as the 
recovery of traditional concepts and the recollection of political events. However, 
in my reading, the Arendtian term 'remembrance' has a double meaning. One is 
the brief memory that comes afterwards and is the opposite of oblivion. The other 
is the absolute memory, beyond the brief memory, which aims to intensify our 
sense of "the gap between past and future" (Arendt, 1968b: 13). This radical form 
195 
of remembrance brings the fragmented past and the future into a whole at the 
present time, since it is endlessly forgotten and reconstituted. Then, all historical 
writing is implicitly a history of the present. According to Deleuze: 
Memory is the real name of the relation to oneself, or the affect on self by self 
According to Kant, time was the form in which the mind affected itself, just as 
space was the form in which the mind was affected by something else: time was 
therefore 'auto-affection' and made up the essential structure of subjectivity 
But time as subject ... 
is called memory. Not that brief memory that... is opposite 
of forgetting, but the 'absolute memory' which doubles the present ... and is one 
with forgetting ... Time ... 
forces every present into forgetting, but preserves the 
whole of the past within [the absolute] memory. Forgetting is the impossibility 
of return, and [the absolute] memory is the necessity of renewal (Deleuze, 
1988: 107-108). 
Only if we are sensitive to the specific twist she gives this terni, then, Arendt's 
historiography can be seen as part of a larger project of 'remembrance'. 
'Remembrance' as Arendt practices it, does not just seek to revive concepts or 
events, but to "distill from them anew their original spirit", to arrive at the 
69 underlying phenomenal reality" concealed by such "empty shelle' (Arendt, 
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1968b: 15). The irreparable break in tradition requires, in Walter Benjamin's 
phrase, "a tiger's leap into the pasf' (Benjamin, 1999: 253). This fragmentary 
approach eschews the comfort to be gained by recasting the tradition in the form 
of dialogue, such as Gadamer's "fusion of horizone' (Gadamer, 1975). It takes the 
gap or break in tradition as its starting point, as the "non-time-space" (Arendt, 
1968b: 13), which is, in Arendt's view, the contemporary conditions of thought. 
Arendt faced up this historical dilemma when reflecting upon totalitarianism, but 
this method of writing history in defiance of the traditional canons is also what 
guided her controversial account of the Eichmann trial as well as her account of 
the French and American Revolution. Furthermore, this fragmentary 
historiography is also the unifying ftead of Arendt's political and philosophical 
analyses from The Origins of Totalitarianism to the alternative archaeology of 
modernity in Ae Human Condition and to 7he Life of the Mind on 'thinking'. In 
the closing statements of The Life of the Mind, Arendt wrote: 
I have clearly joined the ranks of those who for some time now have been 
attempting to dismantle metaphysics, and philosophy with all its categories, as 
we have known them from their beginning in Greece until today. Such 
dismantling is possible only on the assumption that the thread of tradition is 
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broken and that we shall not be able to renew it. Historically speaking, what 
actually has broken down is the Roman trinity that for thousands of years 
united religion, authority, and tradition ... What 
has been lost is the continuity of 
the past as it seemed to be handed down from generation to generation, 
developing in the process its own consistency ... What you then are 
left with is 
still the past, but a fragmented past, which has lost its certainty of evaluation 
(Arendt, 1971: 212). 
The fragmentation of the past and the loss of its relevance for the present have 
created gap between past and future. For a very long time this gap was bridged by 
tradition, which "selects and names, which hands down and preserves, which 
indicates where the treasures are and what their worth W' (Arendt, 1968b: 5). But 
with the breakdown of tradition we must move within this gap without any secure 
sense of direction, without the help of any established principle. Each new 
generation "must discover and ploddingly pave it aneAV' (Arendt, 1968b: 13), 
since no precedent, no testament, no authoritative instructions have been 
bequeathed to us from tradition. In this situation, where, as Arendt says, "without 
testament ... without traditiorf' (Arendt, 1968b: 5), her thinking seeks to preserve 
the meaning of the past outside the framework of any tradition. The break in our 
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tradition has, in fact, become complete after the terrible events of the twentieth 
century and the triumph of totalitarian movements in East and West. In the form 
of Stalinism and Fascism, totalitarianism has exploded the established categories 
of political thought and the accepted standard of moral judgement, and has 
thereby broken the continuity of our history. These events have brought us to the 
point where, in Arendt's words: 
We can no longer afford to take that which was good in the past and simply call 
it our heritage, to discard the bad and simply think of it as a dead load which by 
itself time will bury in oblivion. The subterranean stream of Western history has 
finally come to the surface and usurped the dignity of our tradition. This is the 
reality in which we live. And this is why all efforts to escape from the grimness 
of the present into nostalgia for a still intact past, or into the anticipated 
oblivion of a better future, are vain (Arendt, 195 1: ix). 
Faced with the reality of the Holocaust, we cannot go back to traditional concepts 
and values, so as to explain the unprecedented by means of precedents or 
understand the monstrous by means of the familiar. "Comprehension", Arendt 
says, "does not mean denying the outrageous ... It means, rather, examining and 
bearing consciously the burden which our century has placed on us - neither 
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denying its existence nor submitting meekly to its weight. Comprehension, in 
short, means the unpremeditated, attentive facing up to, and resisting of, reality - 
whatever it may be" (Arendt, 195 1: viii). 
The burden of our time must, therefore, be faced without the aid of tradition, or, as 
Arendt once declared, "without a bannister" (Arendt, 1979: 336). Our inheritance 
has been dissolved under the impact of modem political events, and the task now 
is to re-establish the meaning of the past outside the framework of any tradition, 
since none has retained its original validity It is the past, then not tradition that 
Arendt attempts to redeem from the rupture in modern time-consciousness. Only 
through such a redemption of the past, we can hope to restore meaning to our lives 
and throw some light on the contemporary situation. In Arendt's words: 
The undeniable loss of tradition in the modem world does not all entail a loss of 
the past, for tradition and past are not the same, as the believers in tradition on 
one side and the believers in progress on the other would have us believe - 
whereby it makes little difference that the former deplore this state of affairs 
while the latter extend their congratulations. With the loss of tradition we have 
lost the thread which safely guided us through the vast realms of the past, but 
this thread was also the chain fettering each successive generation to a 
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predetermined aspect of the past. It could be that only now will the past open up 
to us with unexpected freshness and tell us things no one has yet had ears to 
hear. But it cannot be denied that without a securely anchored tradition ... the 
whole dimension of the past has also been endangered. We are in danger of 
forgetting, and such an oblivion ... would mean that, humanly speaking, we 
would deprive ourselves of one dimension, the dimension of depth in human 
existence. For memory and depth are the same, or rather, depth cannot be 
reached by man except through remembrance (Arendt, 1968b: 94). 
This exercise in remembrance, without the aid of tradition, embodying a 
continuity between past and present now irrevocably lost, is compared by Arendt 
to the activity of the pearl diver who brings to the surface the pearls and corals 
hidden in the depths of the sea. Just as the pearl diver recovers these treasures by 
extracting them forcibly from their surroundings, so anamnestic thinking delves 
into the depths of the past, not to resuscitate it the way it was or to glorify past 
ages, but to recover and save from forgetfulness those fragments that are still able 
to illuminate our situation. Arendt's indebtedness to Benjamin's notion of 
cc profane illumination" is made clear in the following passage: 
Like a pearl diver who descends to the bottom of the sea, not to excavate the 
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bottom and bring it to light but to pry loose the rich and the strange, the pearls 
and the coral in the depths and to carry them to the surface, this thinking [of 
Benjamin] delves into the depths of the past - but not in order to resuscitate it 
the way it was and to contribute to the renewal of extinct ages. What guides this 
thinking is the conviction that although the living is subject to the ruin of time, 
the process of decay is at the same time a process of crystallization, that in the 
depth of the sea, into which it sinks and is dissolved what once was alive, some 
things "suffer a sea-change" and survive in new crystallized forms and shapes 
that remain immune to the elements, as though they waited only for the pearl 
diver who one day will come down to them and bring them up into the world of 
the living - as -thought fragments, " as something "rich and strange, " and 
perhaps as everlasting Urphaenomene (Arendt, 1968a: 205-206). 
For Arendt, these thought fragments have to be preserved against the collapse of 
tradition and against the obliteration of memory. In her view, it is no longer 
possible, after the breakdown of tradition, to save the past as a whole. We are 
faced, rather, with the task of redeeming from oblivion those elements of the past 
that are relevant to our present. To re-establish a linkage with the past is not, for 
Arendt, an antiquarian exercise. On the contrary, without the critical 
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reappropriation of the past our temporal horizon becomes disrupted, our 
experience precarious, and our identity less and less secure. In Arendt's view, 
therefore, it is necessary to redeem from the past those moments worth preserving, 
to save those fragments from the past treasures that are significant for us. Only by 
means of this selective reappropriation we can discover the past anew, endow it 
the source of inspiration for a future yet to come. 
Arendt's hermeneutic strategy is also indebted to Heidegger's deconstruction of 
Western metaphysics, the uncovering and subsequent displacement of our 
philosophical categories by a mode of thinking that identifies and recovers their 
ontological determinations (see Bakan, 1985: 224-247; 1987: 71-98). Heidegger 
called this mode of thinking a "destruction" (Heidegger, 1962: 44), since in order 
to recover the original meaning of our categories we had to violence to the 
philosophical tradition in which they were embedded; the Western metaphysical 
tradition, in his view, no longer to be trusted as a valid source of insight (see 
Heidegger, 1962: 43-44). In an essay written on the occasion of Heidegger's 
eightieth birthday, Arendt claimed that Heidegger's thinking has a peculiar 
"digging quality": 
He penetrates to the depths, but not to discover, let alone bring to light, some 
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ultimate, secure foundations which one could say had been undiscovered earlier 
in this manner. Rather, he persistently remains there, ungrounded, in order to 
lay down pathways and fix "trail marks"... On this deep plane, dug up and 
cleared, as it were, by his own thinking, Heidegger has laid down a vast 
network of thought-paths; and this single immediate result ... is that he has 
caused the edifice of traditional metaphysics ... to collapse, just as underground 
tunnels and subversing burrowings cause the collapse of structures whose 
foundations are not deeply enough secured (Arendt, 1978a: 296). 
The undermining of the categories of the Western metaphysical tradition is not, 
however, a purely destructive enterprise. As Heidegger himself remarked, the aim 
is to "stake out the positive possibilities of that traditioW' by recovering those 
"primordial experiencee' out of which it originated (Heidegger, 1962: 44). Once 
liberated from the artificial and distorting incrustations of the tradition, the 
original meaning of our metaphysical categories could be discovered anew. It is in 
this redemptive sense that we must do violence to the tradition, so as to recover 
for the present the forgotten phenomenon. Arendt herself made an interesting 
comparison between Heidegger and Benjamin on this point: "Without realizing it, 
Benjamin actually had more in common with Heidegger's remarkable sense for 
204 
living bones that had sea-changed into pearls and coral, and as such could be 
saved and lifted into the present only by doing violence to their context in 
interpreting them with "the 'deadly impacf' of new thoughts, than he did with the 
dialectical subtitles of his Marxist friends" (Arendt, 1968a: 201). 
The "deadly impact" of new thoughts can thus re-establish our links with the past 
in fresh and novel ways, endowing it with an authority that issues from a critical 
reappropriation of its meaning. As Arendt put, "The cultural treasures of the past, 
believed to be dead, are being made to speak, in the course of which it turns out 
that they propose things altogether different from the familiar, worn-out trivialities 
they had been presumed to say' (Arendt, 1978a: 295). 
As we shall see shortly, Arendt's writings on modernity have a disturbing capacity 
to unsettle our fixed categories, to shake our inherited conceptual habits, and to let 
us see phenomena in a new light. And what enables her to do this is the loss of 
tradition, the loss of the thread which safely guided us through the vast realms of 
the past, but which also constrained our understanding of it. Arendt herself 
maintains that only after the rupture introduced by modernity the past can "open 
up to us with unexpected freshness and tell us things no one has yet had ears to 
hear" (Arendt, 1968b: 94). Indeed, the loss of authority in the modem age may 
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signal "the great chance to look upon the past with eyes undistorted by any 
tradition, with a directness which has disappeared from Occidental reading and 
hearing ever since Roman civilization submitted to the authority of Greek 
thoughf' (Arendt, 1968b: 28-9). ' 
it is possible to see that Arendt's claims are, to some extent, hermeneutically 
nalve. To look upon the past with eyes undistorted by any tradition, or in Arendt"s 
words, "to read past authors as though nobody had ever read them before" (1968b: 
204), goes against the hermeneutic principle that we are always already situated in 
a tradition, so that our appreciation of the past is always mediated by our present 
standpoint, with its forestructure of understanding and prejudgments. The 
understanding and reappropriation of the past can, in this view, be achieved only 
by an effective historical consciousness that links past and present (or text and 
interpreter), in what Gadamer calls a "fusion of horizone'. Any direct, unmediated 
return to the past would be excluded on methodological and ontological grounds 
(Gadamer, 1975). Arendt's intent, however, is not to do away with the notion of 
tradition per se, but to make us aware that the extant traditions of thought and 
' Also see, Arendt, 1968b: 204. 
"The task of preserving the past without the help of tradition, and often even against traditional 
standards and interpretations, is the same for the whole Western Civilization. Intellectually, though 
not socially, America and Europe are in the same situation: the thread of tradition is broken, and 
we must discover the past for ourselves - that is, read its authors as though nobody had ever read 
them before". 
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interpretation have been dissolved under the impact of the tragic events of the 
twentieth century, so that we are left in the unprecedented situation of having to 
reconstitute our hermeneutic standpoint. ' 
Therefore I argue that Arendt's return to the original experience of the Greek polis 
in Ae Human Condition represents an attempt to break the fetters of a worn-out 
tradition and to rediscover a past over which tradition has no longer a claim. 
Against tradition Arendt sets the criterion of genuineness, against the authoritative, 10 
that which is forgotten, concealed, or displaced at the margins of history. ' Only in 
this way the past can be made meaningful again, provide sources of illumination 
for the present, and yield its treasures to those who search for them with "new 
4 In The Life ofthe Mind, Arendt provides some insights to show how this standpoint could be 
reconstituted. In her view, the activity of thought and the exercise ofjudgement can rc-establisli a 
link between the past and the future, the former by operating in the nunc stans of the present the 
latter by reconciling us to time and, retrospectively, to tragedy. 
"It [the thought train] remains bound to and is rooted in the present - an entirely human present 
though it is fully actualized only in the thinking process and last no longer than this process lasts. 
It is the quite of the Now in the time-pressed, time-tossed existence of man; it is somehow, to 
change the metaphor, the quiet in the center of a storm ... In this gap between past and future, we find our place in time we think that is, when we are sufficiently removed from past and future to 
be relied on to find out their meaning, to assume the position of "umpire", of arbiter and judge 
over the manifold, never-criding affairs of human existence in the world, never arriving at a final 
solution to their riddles but ready with cvcr-ncNv answers to the question of what it may be all 
about ... The gap [between past and future] ... as a nunc stans, the 
"standing now"... is not a 
historical datum; it seems to be coeval with the existence of man on earth. Using a different 
metaphor, we call it the region of the spirit but it is perhaps rather the path paced by thinking, the 
small inconspicuous track of non-time beaten by the activity of thought within the time-space 
given the natal and mortal men. Following that course, the thought-trains, remembrance and 
anticipation, save whatever they tough from the ruin of historical and biographical time. Ths small 
non-time space in the very heart of time... cannot be inherited and handed down by tradition" 
(Arendt 1971: 209-210). See, Arendt 1968b: 262; 1982. 
' Genuineness is established by the "deadly impact of new thoughts" w1iich liberate phenomena 
from the incrustation of tradition. The lost or forgotten treasures are redeemed by the saving power 
of remembrance and by the retrospective judgement of the historian. See Arendt 1968a: 198-20 1; 
1971: 216; 1982: 77; Luban, 1994. 
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thoughts" and saving acts of remembrance. 
3. The Critique of Modernity 
Yhe Human Condition presents Arendt's phenomenology of human activity. This 
analysis, however, is interwoven with a narrative about the decline of action and 
the public realm throughout the modem age. "The purpose of the historical 
analysie', she tells us, "is to trace back modem world alienation, its twofold flight 
from the earth into the universe and from the world into the self' (Arendt, 1958: 
6). The story she unfolds is not an optimistic one. The modem "rise of the social" 
promotes the absorption of the public realm by household concerns, while honio 
faber's utilitarianism result in "the instrumentalization of the whole world and the 
eartW' (Arendt, 1958: 157). In addition, the developments of modem science 
provoke the tendency to view the earth, which Arendt calls "the very quintessence 
of the human condition" (Arendt, 1958: 2), as merely one more object, and 
technological automation leads to the transformation of work into a form of labor. 
The overall result is pervasive and radical world alienation. 
Worldlessness, a loss of the world, is "always a form of barbarism" (Arendt, 
1968a: 13), and the forces released by modernity are, according to Arendt, 
directly responsible for this state of affairs. In other words, the forces of capitalist 
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expropriation and accumulation of wealth, of modem science, and of technology 
have contributed intensively to the undermining of the world, then eventually to 
an alicnation from the world. 
For Arendt, the modem project of technological mastery has an ironic outcome. 
Freedom is not enhanced by the extension of control and the overcoming of 
necessity. Rather, it is gradually eliminated as it loses its place in the world. In this 
respect, Arendt seems very much on the terrain of the Frankfurt School. Her 
critical thrust, however, is different from that of Adorno and Horkheimer. While 
they emphasize the domination of nature and the ways it gets back on a subject 
who is also nature (Adomo and Horkheimer, 1972: 54), Arendt stresses the fact 
that technology assimilates human existence to the natural. The problem is not 
merely the modemAill to expunge otherness and subjugate nature. What concerns 
Arendt most is not the natural basis of the self but the -in-between" (Arendt, 
1958: 52) of the world, the integrity of the world that stands between humanity 
and nature. 
Moreover, Arendt believes that modemity rebels -against human existence as it 
has been given, a free gift from nowhere" (Arendt, 1958: 2-3). It is driven by a 
resentment of finitude and limitation, that is, by the desire to exchange the human 
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condition as a given for "something he has made himself' (Arendt, 1958: 3). 
From the perspective of late modemity, the world seems to be a prison. 
Technology presents itself as the means by which this prison can be removed. 
However, technology reveals itself to be something much more than a means. It is 
a world-destroying power that makes the category of means and ends irrelevant 
through its focus on process. 
The Human Condition provides an account of the modem project that focuses on 
"the decay of.. [the] public realm7' promoted by the energies of modernity. The 
decline of the public realm, of the world, in the modem age raises the possibility 
that "the survival of the speciee' will be secured at the cost of "humanity of 
extinction7 (Arendt, 1958: 46), that is, at the cost of extinguishing the capacity for 
action that makes us human. The paradoxical logic of modern existential rebel is 
that "the modem age" that "began with such an unprecedented and promising 
outburst of human activity" may in fact end "in the deadliest, most sterile 
passivity history has ever known" (Arendt, 1958: 322). 
In what follows, I shall examine Arendt's critique of modernity in light of this 
fear. Leading themes of her critique include world alienation, earth alienation, the 
victory of animal laboram, the rise of the social. 
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World Alienation 
The world and its correlative condition, worldliness, are part of what Arendt 
considered to be the human condition; In contradiction to nature, the world is the 
artificial environment of humanly created objects, institutions, and settings that 
provide us with an abode upon this earth, with a shelter from the natural elements, 
and in so far as it is relatively stable and permanent, with a sense of belonging, of 
being at home with our surroundings. 
What happens then when this world is lost, when we find ourselves in that 
condition that Arendt calls "world alienation7? The first and most important 
consequence is that we lose our sense of being at home in the world and, with that, 
our identity, our sense of reality, and the possibility of endowing our existence 
with meaning (Arendt, 1958: 248-257). Kateb (1984: 158) has claimed that 
Arendt displays here a religious commitment to the notion that we exist to be at 
home in the world and that our identity depends on it. However valid, this claim 
must be complemented by another, namely, that in order to live meaningful lives 
our human environment must present certain features (e. g. relative familiarity, 
stability, permanence) that enable our expectations to be satisfied in a non-random 
manner. The fact that our sense of belonging, of rootedness, and of self may have 
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religious underpinnings does not therefore invalidate certain of our existential 
predicaments. 
Another consequence of the condition of world alienation is that, lacking a world 
in common, the individual is thrown back upon himself, into the private sphere of 
introspection. Moreover, being thrown back upon ourselves means also losing 
ourselves, losing the faith in our senses and ultimately, in our reason, a condition 
well be defined as self-alienation. The result is that, alienated from ourselves and 
from others, we become doubtful of our experience and of the reality of the world 
(Arendt, 1958: 273-284). Such a situation is conductive, in Arendt eyes, to mass 
manipulation and totalitarian indoctrination, if only as a way of relieving 
individuals of their anxiety and their sense of isolation. 
These extreme developments are also encouraged by another phenomenon arising 
from world alienation: the restriction or elimination of the public sphere, of the 
sphere of appearances, where the words and deeds of individuals can be preserved 
for posterity and identity of each disclosed and sustained. Being at home in the 
world is, in fact, one of the preconditions for the constitution of a public realm; 
with the loss of the world the framework for public activities can never come into 
being. What remains in common is then only the bare fact of life, the natural life- 
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cycle of the human species governed by sheer animal needs. Having lost the world, 
we are left with onlY nature in common. 
Arendt identifies two main causes of world alienation: expropriation and wealth 
accumulation. Expropriation is a process that started with the Reformation and the 
concomitant separation of church and state. All stable forms of landed property, 
beginning with church property, were eliminated and replaced with an ever- 
increasing accumulation of social wealth. This, in turn, brought into existence a 
laboring class directly compelled by life's necessities, simulated an enormous 
increase of productivity, and generated more expropriation and further wealth 
accumulation. As she describes it: 
Expropriation, the deprivation for certain groups of their place in the world and 
their naked exposure to the exigencies of life, created both the original 
accumulation of wealth and the possibility of transforming this wealth into 
capital through labor. These together constituted the conditions for the rise of a 
capitalist economy ... What 
distinguishes this development at the beginning of 
the modem age from similar occurrence in the past is that expropriation and 
wealth accumulation did not simply result in new property or lead to a new 
redistribution of wealth, but were fed back into the process to generate further 
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expropriations, greater productivity, and more appropriation (Arendt, 1958: 
254-255). 
This remorseless dynamic of economic growth, which Arendt compares to a 
natural process in its compulsion and inexhaustibility, destroys all worldly 
stability and durability; everything becomes an object of production and 
consumption, of acquisition and exchange, and individuals are forced to 
concentrate on their purely biological needs, that is, on laboring to produce their 
condition of existence on an ever-expanding scale. All values attached the world - 
permanence, stability, durability- are sacrificed in favor of the values of labor- 
life, productivity, and abundance. The introduction of automation would only 
make matters worse, since "the rhythm of machines would magnify and intensify 
the natural rhythm of life enormously, but it would not change, only make more 
deadly, life's chief character with respect to the world, which is to wear down 
durability" (Arendt, 1958: 132). 
Arendt then sketches the later phases of this process of expropriation and wealth 
accumulation: having started with the uprooting of people from their land and 
their transformation into a class of wage-laborers, it then substituted membership 
in a social class and identity with the nation-state for their previous allegiances. 
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But with the decline of the nation-state and the integration of the world economy 
we have reached a stage where mankind as a whole replaces nationally bound 
societies, and the earth replaces the limited state territories. Far from representing 
a progressive development, this elimination of cultural specification in favor of a 
global and undifferentiated society is viewed with apprehension by Arendt, since 
in her view "men cannot become citizens of the world as they are citizens of their 
countries, and social men cannot own collectively as family and household men 
own their private property" (Arendt, 1958: 257). 6 
Earth Alienation 
"Earth Alienation7 represents an intensification of the trends identified with world 
alienation. It was partly induced by the discovery of America and the subsequent 
exploration of the whole earth, culminating in the invention of the airplane and in 
the conquest of space. This had the unintended effect of making the earth seem 
much smaller, to the point where modem man could see it as a mere ball. That is, 
man could detach himself and view the earth from a point in space. The more 
proximate cause, however, was the invention of the telescope. Beside destroying 
' It is important to remember that for Arendt property is opposed to wealth, and is thus not to be 
identified with the conventional meaning of the term. For her, property stands for location, for a 
privately held place. It is a privately owned share of a common world, the necessary counterpart to 
the public realm, enabling individuals to find refuge and shelter from the glare and the activity of 
the public sphere. In her view, without a proper establishment and protection of this private space 
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man's faith in the evidence of the senses, it established an Archimedean 
standpoint from which the earth could be viewed as part of an infinitude universe. 
This cosmic standpoint not only displaced the geocentric worldview but enabled 
man to view the universe, including the earth, as subject to the same universe laws, 
so that nothing occurring in earthy nature was viewed any longer as a mere earthy 
happening. It also enabled a tremendous expansion in knowledge and mastery 
over nature, culminating in the ability of contemporary science to introduce 
cosmic processes into the earth - such as the splitting of the atom - and, in so 
doing, to endanger the survival not only of the human species but of the earth 
itself In Arendt's view, then, while world alienation determined the course of 
modern society, earth alienation has been the hallmark of modem science. But as 
she notes: "Compared with the earth alienation underlying the whole development 
of natural science in the modem age, the withdrawal from terrestrial proximity 
contained in the discovery of the globe as a whole and the world alienation 
produced in the twofold process of expropriation and wealth accumulation are of 
minor significance" (Arendt, 1958: 264). 
Earth alienation epitomizes the desire to escape from the confines of the earth: 
there can be no free public realm (Arendt, 1957: 58-67). 
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spurred by modern science and technology, we have searched for ways to 
overcome our earth-bound, and thus limited, condition by setting out on the 
exploration of space, by attempting to recreate life under laboratory conditions, 
and by trying to extend our given-life-span. In doing this, we seem to be driven by 
"a rebellion against human existence" (Arendt, 1958: 2) which we wish to 
exchange for something we have made entirely by ourselves. Earth alienation 
represents thus, in the helpful formulation of Kateb, a resentment against the 
human condition (Kateb, 1984: 162). The paradox of this resentment, however, is 
that it will not lead to liberation, a freedom from earthly constraints. Rather, it will 
only lead us back to the prison of our minds, since we will be able to know only 
those patterns that we ourselves have created. Modem science and technology 
thus make it more and more unlikely "that man will encounter anything in the 
world around him that is not man-made and hence is not, in the last analysis, he 
himself in a different disguise" (Arendt, 168b: 277). Moreover, the conquest of 
space can only lead to an infinite regress, because once we have reached the 
Archimedean point with respect to the earth, we would need "a new Archimedean 
point and so on ad infinifum. In other words, man can only get lost in the 
immensity of the universe, for the only true Archimedean point would be the 
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absolute void behind the universe" (Arendt, 1968b: 278). 
The Hierarchy of Human Activities and the Victory of Anintal Laborans 
Arendt claims that in the tradition of Western philosophy, starting with Plato, 
there occurred a shift away from the activities connected with political life, with 
action and the striving for earthly immortality, in favor of the silent contemplation 
of eternal truths. For Arendt, in fact, our tradition of political philosophy was 
founded in explicit opposition to the polis and its activities, with the philosopher 
turning away from politics and then returning to it in order to impose his alien 
standards upon human affairs (Arendt, 1968b: 17-18; 1958: 14-17). This 
debasement of the values of the vita activa, and especially of political action, was 
continued by the Christian tradition, in so far as it gave a religious sanction to the 
activity of contemplation and stressed the sinfulness of our worldly activities. The 
announcement by Christianity, the belief in the immortality of the soul and in a 
world beyond this one, had fateful consequences for the esteem and dignity of 
politics. Politics was now no longer seen as the sphere where individuals could 
perform noble deeds, reach agreement on matters of mutual concern, and achieve 
a measure of justice; it became, instead, the instrument for checking and 
controlling men's sinful nature, for punishing their evil conduct, and for looking 
218 
after their earthly necessities. As Arendt puts it: "Political activity, which up to 
then had derived its greatest inspiration from the aspiration toward worldly 
immorality, now sank to the low level of an activity subject to necessity, destined 
to remedy the consequences of human sinfulness, on one hand, and to cater to the 
legitimate wants and interests of earthly life, on the other" (Arendt, 1958: 314). 
What Platonism and Christianity achieved, then, was an elevation of the values 
and concerns associated with the vita contemplativa and a corresponding 
denigration of those associated with the vita activa. Henceforth all the values of 
the vita activa had to serve and be justified in terms of the values of the vita 
contemplativa. 
With the emergence of modernity we witness a reversal of this hierarchy, although 
such reversal was not straightforward. What it affected, in fact, was not the 
relation of contemplation and action, but that of thinking and making, of thought 
and fabrication. Contemplation, in the original sense of silently beholding the 
truth, was altogether eliminated, since it was associated with a passive state of the 
mind, with the stillness required for the revelation or apprehension of truth. 
Thinking, on the other hand, was associated with a highly active state, with the 
engagement of the mind with itself, the inner dialogUe between me and myself 
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Thus, when, in Bacon's well-known formulation, science became the acquisition 
of power over nature, it was thinking, and not contemplation, that became the 
servant of making. And it became the servant of making because with the 
scientific revolution it became evident that our claim to knowledge was restricted 
to what we ourselves could produce with our tools and instruments (e. g., through 
the setting up of artificial experiments, through the invention of the telescope). 
According to Arendt, the principle that we could only know what we ourselves 
had produced was summed up in Vico's statement that truth was a product of 
making. Vico's claim, to be sure, was restricted to history, since only history could 
be "made" by man. She argued, however, that the principle itself was already 
established at the time of the discoveries of Galileo. Galileo's telescope had 
demonstrated that merely contemplating the heavens in the belief that truth would 
disclose itself was no longer an adequate way to knowledge. Knowledge was 
arrived at not through contemplation or passive observation, but through making 
and fabricating. As she puts it, "it was not reason but a man-made instrument, the 
telescope, which actually changed the physical world-view; it was not 
contemplation, observation, and speculation which led to the new knowledge, but 
the active stepping in of homofaber, of making and fabricating7 (Arendt, 1957: 
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274). Thus the reversal in the modem age elevated homo faber to the position 
previously enjoyed by contemplation, and channeled all human activities into the 
pursuit of knowledge through making. 
Furthermore, the knowledge was no longer concerned with the why or the what of 
phenomena, with the cause or the substance of things, but only with the how, that 
is, with the processes of generation and development. To know something meant 
to know how it came into beings and to be able to reproduce its processes 
artificially. One of the reasons for this shift, in Arendt's view, was that "the 
scientist made only in order to know, not in order to produce things, and the 
product was a mere by-product, a side-effect" (Arendt, 1958: 297). The result was 
that in the place of the concept of Being we now find the concept of Process: 
nature itself became a process governed by immutable laws, and it was not long 
before history too was viewed in the same light. In Arendt's words, "processes, 
therefore, and not ideas, the models and shapes of the things to be, become the 
gwide of the making and fabricating activities of homofaber in the modern age" 
(Arendt, 1958: 300). One of the key concepts of physical science, that of 
development, was in fact taken up by the historical sciences (Arendt, 1958; 296). 
For Arendt, then, the break with contemplation was finally consummated "not 
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with the elevation of man the maker to the position formerly held by man the 
contemplator, but with the introduction of the concept of process into making7 
(Arendt, 1958: 301). This break had fateful consequences, insofar as it led to the 
final reversal, namely, the elevation of labor to the highest position in the 
hierarchical order of the vita activa, at the expense of both fabrication (poiesis) 
and action (praxis). Man as animal laborans now became the standard against 
which homofaber and man as zoon polilikon were assessed and found wanting. 
And what permitted this to happen was the focus of the concept of process with 
the emergence of modernity As Arendt points out: 
It deprived man as maker and builder of those fixed and permanent standards 
and measurements which, prior to the modem age, have always served him as 
guides for his doing and criteria for his judgement ... For the mentality of 
m3dern man, as it was determined by the development of modem science and 
the concomitant unfolding of modem philosophy, it was at least as decisive that 
man began to consider himself part and parcel of the two superhuman, all- 
encompassing processes of nature and history, both of which seemed doomed to 
an infinite progress without ever reaching any inherent telos or approaching any 
preordained idea (Arendt, 1958: 307). 
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Submerged in the overall process of nature and later, with the rise of the historical 
sciences, of history, man lost all contact with the permanent and durable features 
of the world, and with the objects and standards that previously governed his 
activities. Arendt finds an example of this loss in the transformation of the 
principle of utility, characteristic of the worldview of homofaber, into Bentham's 
principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest number (Arendt, 1958: 308). In 
the principle of greatest happiness all worldly values are replaced by the 
su ective sensations of pleasure and pain, which are geared exclusively to the 
promotion of life and the survival of the species. Life, then, and not the world, 
became the highest good of man, and all activities previously directed at the 
construction of a human world and at the establishment of public spaces where 
speech and action could flourish, were reduced to the single and monotonous 
activity of labor. 
Arendt maintains that the Christian emphasis on the sacredness of life partly 
responsible for the obliteration of the ancient distinctions within the vita activa, 
since it viewed labor, work, and action as equally subject to the necessities of life 
(Arendt, 1958; 316). In this respect, Christianity helped to free labor from the 
contempt in antiquity, paving the way for its revaluation and eventual triumph in 
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the modem age. But as we saw, the impact of modem science and the loss of trust 
in the senses were also contributing factors in the emergence of the worldview of 
animal laborans, insofar as both forced man to concentrate on processes as found 
in nature or in the internal workings of the mind. The overall result was to make 
labor, the endless repetitive cycle of man's metabolism with nature, the highest of 
man's capacities, and to elevate life, or the preservation of our biological species, 
into the highest value. In Arendt's word: "What was left was a "natural force", the 
force of the life process itself, to which all men and all human activities were 
equally submitted and whose only aim, if it had an aim at all, was survival of the 
animal species man. None of the higher capacities of man was any longer 
necessary to connect individual life with the life of the species; individual life 
became part of the life process, and to labor, to assure the continuity of one's own 
life and the life of his family, was all that was needed" (Arendt, 1958: 321). 
A world whose chief values are dictated by labor is a world whose private 
activities, previously enclosed in the sphere of the household (oikos), have taken 
over the public realm and turned it into the oxymoron, i. e., "public household". In 
this respect, the victory of animal laborans has carried forward the obliteration of 
the distinction between the public and the private that started in the eighteenth 
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century with the rise of the social. It has enabled the activities connected to the 
necessities of life to appear in public and therefore the public (the polity) has 
become a function of the private (the economy). As Arendt puts it, "with the rise 
of society, that is, the rise of "the household" (oikia) or of economic activities to 
the public realm, housekeeping and all matters pertaining formerly to the private 
sphere of the family have become a "collective" concerW' (Arendt, 1958: 33). 
This is indeed one of the major objections of Arendt against the modem age, since 
the private's exclusive preoccupation with economic matters has resulted in the 
disappearance of the public sphere, the creation of a society of job-holders, the 
imposition of conformity and isolation, the enforcement of predictable behavior, 
and the establishment of bureaucratic forms of government. All these phenomena 
are connected, in Arendt's view, to the rise of society, or more precisely, to its 
most extreme development, mass society 
The Rise of the Social and the Rule by Nobody 
We know that the contradiction between private and political, typical of the 
initial stages of the modem age, has been a temporary phenomenon which 
introduced the utter extinction of the very difference between the private and 
public realms, the submersion of both in the sphere of the social (Arendt, 1958: 
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69). 
Both the private and the public realm suffer from the threat of extinction; in the 
case of the former, it would mean the destruction of a private space in which to 
find comfort and rest from the activities of work, labor, and action; it would also 
mean the loss of initiative that springs from necessity and the blurring of the 
distinction between freedom and necessity In the case of the latter, it would mean 
the elimination of a public space of appearance where our identities are revealed, 
our deeds remembered, our traditions renewed and our history preserved; it would 
also mean the loss of objectivity, the disappearance of stability and permanence, 
and the destruction of freedom and plurality. 
All these harmful consequences are seen to follow the emergence of mass society 
in the modern age. Such a society, for Arendt, constitutes a novel form of living 
together characterized by the fact that individuals are united only by their 
common membership in the human species, that is, by their common biological 
needs of life and survival, and not by a public world of action and speech. In such 
society, people are expected to conform, to share the same private interests 
(economic by definition), and to behave in a predictable manner, rather than to act 
in original and distinctive fashion. Arendt claims that this form of living together 
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allows for forms of despotic rule which have varied from the more benign one- 
man rule of monarchical absolutism to the more terrifying forms of totalitarianism. 
In the last chapter of Yhe Origins of Totalitarianism, 'Ideology and Terror', 
Arendt writes: 
Totalitarian government, like all tyrannies, certainly could not exist without 
destroying the public realm of life, that is, without destroying, by isolating men, 
their political capacities. But totalitarian domination as a form of government is 
new in that it is not content with this isolation and destroys private life as well. 
It bases itself on loneliness, on the experience of not belonging to the world at 
all, which is among the most radical and desperate experiences of men (Arendt, 
1951: 475). 
Moreover, Arendt claims that, in Western democracies, this form of living has 
encouraged the rule by nobody, namely, a bureaucracy. In the following passage, 
Arendt mediates Nietzsche's critique of the ascetic regimes through which 
individuals are tamed, and Weber's depiction of the bureaucratic penetration of 
everyday life. Also, she prefigures Foucault's basic theme in Discipline and 
Punish: 
The rule by nobody is not necessarily no-rule; it may indeed, under certain 
227 
circumstances, even turn out to be one of its cruelest and most tyrannical 
versions. It is decisive that all society, on all its levels, excludes the possibility 
of action, which formerly was excluded from the household. Instead, society 
expects from each of its members a certain kind of behavior, imposing 
innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to "normalize" its members, to 
make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement 
(Arendt, 1958: 40). 
Therefore this rule by nobody does not mean no rule. It only means that no one 
appears to be responsible, and that no one in particular can be blamed for certain 
policies or programs. As she remarks: "A complete victory of society will always 
produce some sort of "communistic fiction", whose outstanding political 
characteristic is that it is indeed ruled by an "invisible hand", namely, by nobody. 
What we traditionally call state and government gives place here to pure 
administration" (Arendt, 1958: 44-45). 
Moreover such form of rule is perfectly suited to a society that, in Arendt's view, 
has done away with all distinctions of rank, status, or title and replaced them with 
mere function. This process started with the absorption of the family and its 
economic activities by larger social groups; these groups, in turn, expanded and 
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became consolidated as social classes; but with the emergence of mass society 
these classes have themselves been absorbed by society, and we are left with a 
situation where every individual is identified only by his or her function. Thus 
with the establishment of mass society the realm of the social "has finally, after 
several centuries of development, reached the point where it embraces and 
controls all members of a given community equally and with equal strength" 
(Arendt, 1958: 41), and the reason for this is that no boundaries between public 
and private, no distinctions among individuals, and no world common to them all, 
are allowed to exist. In their place we now have the relentless dynamic of wealth 
accumulation characteristic of a society, in which, as Arendt puts it, "the fact of 
mutual dependence for the sake of life and nothing else assumes public 
significance, and where the activities connected with sheer survival are permitted 
to appear in public" (Arendt, 1958: 46). 
As we have seen so far, Arendt's critique of modernity is very harsh. If so, it is 
because of her concern that the trends she has identified in the modem age might 
become permanent, thereby impoverishing our existence. Her most worrisome 
conviction is that the modem age, by restricting the opportunities for political 
action and allowing the unlimited expansion of the social, has undermined the 
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possibilities of politics. Furthermore, by eroding the public world and 
concentrating human energies on the unlimited accumulation of wealth, it has left 
individuals isolated and vulnerable to political manipulation. As she argued in her 
essay 'The Concept of History', modem mass society stands for: "a society of 
men who, without a common world which would at once relate and separate them, 
either live in desperate lonely separation or are pressed together into a mass. For a 
mass-society is nothing more than that kind of organized living which 
automatically establishes itself among human beings who are still related to one 
another but have lost the world once common to all thenf' (Arendt, 1968b: 89-90). 
And as we know from her writings on totalitarianism, these characteristics of 
mass society carry serious political dangers, since "loneliness, the common 
ground for terror, the essence of totalitarian government-is closely connected 
with uprootedness and superfluousness which have been the curse of modem 
masses since the beginning of the industrial revolution' (Arendt, 1951: 475). It is 
important to stress this connection, because in Arendt's indictment of modernity 
the novel and catastrophic event of totalitarianism plays a crucial role. Without a 
deep appreciation of this event and the impact it had on Arendt's life and work, it 
is difficult to understand the harshness of her judgement. In her view the terrible 
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originality of totalitarianism consisted in the fact that through its terror and 
violence, and through the brutality of its ideology, and it constituted a radical 
break with all the standards and categories of our moral and political tradition. As 
she put it in the essay 'Tradition and the Modem Age': "Totalitarian domination 
as an established fact, which in its unprecedentedness cannot be comprehended 
through the usual categories of political thought, and whose 'crimes' cannot be 
judged by traditional moral standards or punished within the legal framework of 
our civilization, has broken the continuity of Occidental history. The break in our 
tradition is now an accomplished facf '(Arendt, 1968b: 26) 
This tragic rupture in our history forced Arendt to rethink the whole tradition of 
political thought in the West and to refashion in the form of a phenomenological 
anthropology and those categories of human condition. 
4. Totalitarianism and Modernity 
Throughout her work, from The Origins of Totalitarianism to Ae Life of the Mind, 
Arendt was extremely skeptical of all causal explanations of totalitarianism. She 
did not think that elements - racism, imperialism, the decline of the nation-state, 
antisemitism - caused it as a kind of logical consequence. Totalitarianism 
remained for her a monstrous, unprecedented event, one that "exploded our 
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traditional categories of political thought (totalitarian domination is unlike all 
forms of tyranny and despotism we know of) and the standard of our moral 
judgement (totalitarian crimes are very inadequately described as 'murder' and 
totalitarian criminals can hardly be punished as 'murderers')" (Arendt, 1994: 405). 
However, Arendt, did see a connection, even if not a causal one, between 
totalitarianism and the spirit of modem age. 
For Arendt, the modem age is boundless self-assertion growing out of a 
resentment of the human condition, a resentment of all the limits that define 
human existence (mortality, labor, and natural necessity, earth-boundedness, etc). 
Unwilling to accept what he hasn't made himself, modern man transforms reality 
by means of modern science and technology, in the hope of creating a totally 
humanized world in which he can be at home. 
What Arendt calls "the modem triumph of homo fabeP' in The Human Condition 
thus gives birth to the modernist faith that "everything is possible" - that there are 
no limits to humanity's capacity to exploit natural processes, and thus no limits to 
the reshaping of reality. It is this hubris - the hubris of homofaber, of "everything 
is possible" - which finds expression in the totalitarian project of "fabricating 
mankind". This project consists in the violent reshaping of available human 
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material so that, in the end, neither classes, races, or individuals exist, but only 
specimens of the species (Arendt, 1951: 475). In such a world, the incalculable 
has been eliminated. 
One of the oddities of totalitarianism is that it couples this distinctively modern 
hubris with an equally modern determinism. As Canovan points out, Arendt's 
thought that modem man was tempted to "purchase unlimited power at the price 
of siding with inhuman forces and giving necessity a helping hand" (Canovan, 
1992: 13). Totalitarian regimes demonstrate what happens when human beings 
surrender to this temptation. Submission to a racist "law of nature", with its 
imperative of genocide, or historical "laws of motioif', which predict not only the 
extinction of capitalism but also class enemies of the proletariat, creates a feeling 
of power in the totalitarian leader and follower. Each feels themselves to be an 
instrument of superhuman necessity, a necessity manifest in the historical laws of 
motion. 
7he Human Condition turns from the danger of totalitarian dynamism to consider 
other "world-destroying7' forces that the modem age has released. Among these 
are the tremendous growth in the forces of production and consumption brought 
about by the rise of capitalism. This growth, with the hegemony of the economic 
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concern, threaten all other relatively autonomous spheres of human activity. Thus, 
it promotes the eradication of human plurality, freedom, and uniqueness. 
The image of fragile "island of freedom" surrounded by a sea of automatic, 
natural processes is a recurrent one in Arendt (see Arendt 1968b: 168). Both 
totalitarianism and modem technological capitalism, with its transformation of 
man into the animal laborans, put this artifice - island of freedom - in processes 
of destruction and reproduction. Arendt reminds us of the differences between 
action, work, and labor in order to underline how dangerous it is to forget that an 
individual's life is human to the extent that it has the possibility of a limited 
transcendence of natural processes. In Arendt's view, action - speech and deed in 
the public realm - is the vehicle by which we achieve this limited transcendence 
and a unique identity To be deprived this opportunity is to be deprived of the 
chance of living a fully human life (see Arendt, 1958: 176). If the goal of 
totalitarianism is to reduce human beings to mere examples of the species, 
technological capitalism has a parallel, if less horrible, logic. Both are damages to 
the human status because they strive to replace human plurality and spontaneity 
with a kind of oneness, while moving us closer to the law of nature and necessity 
On this point, there is the temptation to say that Arendt views capitalist modernity 
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as a kind of "soft" totalitarianism. For what is the difference between 
totalitarianism and capitalist modernity if the result is the same? The destruction 
of the common world, the eradication of freedom understood as speech and deed 
in the public realm, and the ultimate assimilation of human beings to nature and 
necessity are common to both the modem and totalitarian projects. In addition, the 
emphasis on resentment of human condition is common to both projects. 
However, Arendt herself was too far aware of the horrible originality of 
totalitarianism to read it back into some broader, world-historical movement. Even 
if, as Kateb notes, Arendt sees the story of modem Europe as a story of 
pathologies, with Nazi and Stalinist totalitarianism as "the climactic pathologý' 
(Kateb, 1984: 66), she does not identify totalitarianism with capitalist, 
technological modernity, and she does not see totalitarianism as a single metaphor 
or the ultimate culmination of modem age. Despite her harshness of her critique 
of modem age, and despite her conviction that the rootlessness of the modem 
masses provided the soil for totalitarianism to take root, there is no inner link 
between the worldlessness of the modem age and the essence of totalitarianism, 
namely, "terroe', which is not lawlessness, but "lawfulness, if law is the law of the 
movement of some superhuman force, Nature or History", including particularly 
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"the law of killing" (Arendt, 1951: 464-465). 
All we can say is that, for Arendt, the modem age creates unprecedented 
alienation and loneliness; that the experience of loneliness or uprootedness 
deprives people not only of a place of the world, but their sense of identity and 
their feeling for the world, i. e. their common sense; that deprived of the sense that 
relates him or her to the world and the others, the modern individual is likely to 
turn an ideology which explains the past, present and fifture by deductions from 
single premise. Having lost contact with his fellow men and their public reality 
around him, the modem individual loses the capacity both thought and experience. 
Hence the modem individual becomes easily infected with totalitarian fictions. It 
is in this sense that totalitarianism is based on the worldlessness inherent in 
loneliness, on "the experience of not belonging to the world at all, which is among 
the most radical and desperate experiences of man7 (Arendt, 1951: 475). 
The reflection on the "worldlessnessý' of the modem masses in Me Origins of 
Totalitarianism obviously prepare the way for the phenomenology of action and 
the public realm in The Human Condition. Arendt moves from the most 
pathological expression of worldlessness -the intense loneliness and the embrace 
of totalitarian fiction - to a description of how political action on the public realm 
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endows the world with meaning and offers the individual recognition and identity. 
What matters most to her in 7he Origins of Totalitarianism are the pathological 
possibilities caused by the loss of a worldly reality. What leads her to Me Human 
Conditioti is the desire to show how a strong sense of the public world manifests 
itself in political action. 
Both texts, Yhe Origins of Totalitarianism and Yhe Human Condition, locate the 
most basic threat to our political health in the loss of a sense of the public world 
among people. As far as we fail to confront the implications of this loss, we will 
fail to understand why racism, imperialism, antisemitism and totalitarianism had 
such enormous appeal in the late modem age, and why they encountered such 
minimal resistance. We will be unable to understand the peculiar mix of 
"stupidity" and cynicism that characterized European society between wars, and 
that characterizes -our own contemporary political culture (Arendt, 1994: 314). 
Finally, we will be unable to "think what we are doing7 as we make politics, the 
public sphere, and the claims of justice ever more subordinate to the demand of 
the market, technology, and the "national" - now international - household. 
If Arendt's attempt to link totalitarianism to the spirit of the modern age 
sometimes strains credulity, we must remember her original goal of converting 
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trauma into understanding in Yhe Orights of Totalitariatfism. That aim remained 
unfuifilled, in her view, so long as political theorists failed to confront the 
potential disaster in the various formative modem projects to assimilate human 
beings to natural processes. Rights, positive laws, constitutional framework, all 
contribute to containing the tendency to treat human beings as raw material. Yet, 
from Arendt's perspective, liberalism fails to imagine or comprehend the worst, 
and therefore fails to see that the preservation of rights and procedural safeguard 
depends on worldliness. The "right to have right" to membership in a political 
community is more fundamental than the "rights of man7 (Arendt, 1951: 290-3 02). 
This, at any rate, is the fundamental conviction behind her political thought, and 
the reason why it will always remain, for better or worse, beyond the frailty of 
liberalism. 
5. Conclusion 
Arendt's critique of modernity is very harsh and shows a sign of antimodernism. 
However, Arendt's antimodernism does not entirely relapse into such 
conservatism as that of Heidegger, nor attempt to design some sort of utopia. 
Rather, her understanding of politics, her democratically motivated "love of the 
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world"' places her antimodernism not in nostalgia, nor in utopia but in the context 
of "criticism as well as experiment" (Arendt, 1968b: 14). 
As she freely admitted (Arendt, 1979: 334), Arendt's purpose is not to praise 
liberal bourgeois society. In this respect, she barely qualifies as even a 
"antimodern modernist" (Benhabib, 1994: 113) or a "reluctant modernist" 
(Benhabib, 2003: 198). Besides, George Kateb characterizes Arendt as a "great 
antimodernisf' (Kateb, 1984: 183). Yet this description is offered with polemical 
intent. Kateb persuades us to view Arendt as the kind of cultural critic who wishes 
to see modernity undone. This way of understanding strikes me as a liberal 
version of what Foucault calls "the blackmail of Enlightenment" (Foucault, 1984: 
42) - the insistence that one should take a stand "for" or "against" bourgeois 
democracy, enlightenment rationality, and so on, before delivering the specifics of 
one's critique. While Arendt is antimodern in a broad sense, she does not share 
the conservative's wish, such as that of Heidegger, to return to the premodern. 
Arendt refuses to deal in this type of nostalgia, and it is evident throughout her 
theoretical work. Me Human Condition, in particular, is a multifaceted account of 
why the structures of meaning, and politics defining the premodern world are no 
7 Arendt wanted to call her book, Amor Mundi [love of the world] instead of The Human Condition 
(Young-Bruel, 1982: 324). 
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longer possible. 
What is it, then, that makes Arendt's critique of modernity seem like an 
antimodernist, or totalizing critique? Partly, as Kateb notes, it is her unyielding 
focus on the downside of modernity (Kateb, 1984: chapter 5). She describes its 
horror and pathologies at length, but none of its greatness. In addition, her critique 
of modernity develops explicitly on the ontological teffain, focusing on the 
decline of the public realm. In this respect, her critique is different from that of 
Hab, ý. rmas, who takes the Weberian concept of rationalization as its central 
category of analysis, and who attempts to identify both the emancipatory and 
repressive aspects of modemity ý 
Yet, ironically, Arendt believes that the modem era is a kind of progress in terms 
of the refinement of techniques of domination. On this point, her initial position is 
similar to that of Adorno, who speaks of the continuity of disaster "leading from 
the slingshot to the megaton bomb" (Adorno, 1973: 320), and that of Foucault, 
who speaks of a kind of historical progress proceeding "from domination to 
dominatiorf' (Foucault, 1977a: 151). Like Horkheirner and Adorno (1972), and 
Foucault (I 990a; orig. 1976; 1991 a; orig. 1975), Arendt believes that modernity is 
a coercive force, but where Arendt focuses on the decline of the public realm, 
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Horkheimer and Adomo focus on the colonization of nature, and the subsequent 
repression of social and psychic existence, and Foucault concentrates on the 
domination of the individual through social institution, discourses, and practices. 
Despite Arendt's intensive focus on the public and Foucault's focus on the 
individual, it is a mistake to see that their arguments are limited to the public (in 
Arendt's case) or to the individual (in Foucault's case). Arendt believes that mass 
society and loneliness, which are the categories in explaining the rise of 
totalitarianism, threaten the extinction of both the public and the private realm 
(Arendt, 1958: 69), therefore, the annihilation of otherness and plurality For 
Arendt, the world is characterized by two words, the term, "in-between" (1958: 
52; 1968a: 4) and the term, "plurality" (Arendt, 1958: 176,201 and passim; 1963: 
175 and passim), since the world goes on among plural persons with space 
between them. In this context, the term, interest, as Arendt points out (1958: 182), 
originally had nothing to do with the highly individualist meaning we attribute to 
it today. Inter-est means, literally, what is between us, what binds us together and 
draws us apart. On this point, her final position is converged into that of Foucault, 
who warns of "political double bind, which is the simultaneous individualization 
and totalization of modem power structure" (Foucault, 1983a: 216). 
241 
The impression that 7he Human Condition is an exercise in "Hellenic nostalgia" 
(Kateb, 1984: 39; O'Sullivan, 1976; Pitkin, 1981; Bakan, 1979: 59) is created 
when we insert Arendt's ontological concerns into a static phenomenology of 
human activity The old hierarchy of the vita activa then appears as the means to 
condemn the new, i. e., modernity Yet this phenomenology is not as conceptually 
static as it first appears, and in fact, it relies upon an implicit historical ontology 
Arendt reffised to reify the capacities and conditions of human existence into a 
transhistorical human "nature" (Arendt, 1958: 10). As her reply to Eric Voegelin 
makes clear, she was intensely aware of the internal connection between 
individual capacities and the conditions necessary for their exercise (Arendt, 
1994: 407-408). Thus, it is not simply a question of the relative status an activity 
has in the hierarchy of the vita activa. It is also a matter of the peculiar historical 
reality the activity inhabits. Hence it is the matter of the possibility not only a 
change in rank, but of a dis-essencing or transforming of the capacities themselves. 
Admittedly, Arendt shows some qualifications of her critique of modernity. In The 
Human Condition, she writes, "the instrumentalization of action and the 
degradation of politics into a means for something else has of course never really 
succeeded in eliminating action, in preventing its being one of the decisive human 
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experiences, or in destroying the realm of human affairs altogether" (Arendt, 
1958: 230). Moreover, as her interpretation of modem political action in On 
Revolution shows, Arendt believes that authentic political action is manifest in 
select moment of revolutionary upheaval and resistance (Arendt, 1963, chapter 6). 
Yet, these qualifications do little to transform the pessimism that runs through her 
approach to modemity In The Origins of Totalitarianism, she emphasizes how 
totalitarian domination, as an incarnation of the modernist faith that "everything is 
possible", attempts a refabrication of man that threatens humanity (Arendt, 195 1: 
458-459). This nightmare haunts her thinking about modernity as a whole. 
Arendt's analysis of the destruction of the common world, the rise of 
technological automatism, and the victory of the animal laborans implies that, the 
modern project, as a resentment of human existence, will triumph. Modernity will 
attain its goal of not only remaking the world, but man also. 
This line of thought leads Kateb and others to question the validity of Arendt's 
critique. From Kateb's perspective, Arendt's critique of modernity is totalizing in 
the worst way. It leads to a rejection of the energies of the modem age on the basis 
of religious conviction that humanity exist to be at home in the world (Kateb, 
1984: 158). Arendt's emphasis on the redemptive character of political action 
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hinges, Kateb observes, on the possibility of a nonalienated existence. Thus, 
"groups of people must be at home in the world first if the frame of memorable 
deeds, the frame of political action, is to be secured and strengthened" (Kateb, 
1984: 158). Modernity, however, cultivates human capacities that produce world 
and earth alienation, and prevents us from being at home. Arendt condemns 
modernity because it destroys the conditions that enable the existential 
achievement of political action: "The hope is that humanity could be at home 
rightly. The hope is dashed by modemity" (Kateb, 1984: 158). 
Kateb is right to emphasize the redemptive role of political action in Arendt. Her 
desire for "reconciliatioif' comes from the tragic sensibility she shares with the 
Greeks, and it runs through her entire approach to modernity Yet, Kateb's 
exclusive focus on the "existential achievement" of political action distorts 
Arendt's critique of modernity For while Arendt idealizes the Greeks as being 
uniquely at home in the world, she also believes that there is no return. I think that 
it is one of the reasons for her fondness for Rene Char's aphorism: "Our 
inheritance was left to us by no testament" (Arendt, 1963: 215); and Tocqueville's 
epigram: "Since the past has ceased to turn its light upon the Future, the mind of 
man wanders in obscurity" (1968b: 7). 
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If we, like Kateb, insist on seeing Arendt driven by the desire to overcome 
alienation -a desire that transforms into theoretical grief, then Arendt's theory 
would simply be another unhappy expression of utopian hopes. However, Kateb's 
interpretation is insufficient, because Arendt's critique of modernity is not just 
about the "religious" hope for reconciliation, but about the pagan value of 
"worldlinese'. For Arendt, modem existential rebellion is bad not because it 
blocks reconciliation, but because it undermines worldliness. To be sure, "being at 
home" is one of the qualities Arendt attributes to a "worldly" - in Kateb's words, 
"unalienated" - existence. Yet, it is precisely the artificiality of this home that 
Arendt is talking about. In other words, it is not alienation per se that she combats, 
but world alienation. In this sense, Kateb's identification of worldliness with the 
absence of alienation is problematic. 
Unlike Kateb, Habermasians, communitarians, and participatory democrats do not 
see Arendt's antimodernism is totalizing or rejectionist. Instead, they understand 
Arendt's critique of modernity in the light of ontological implications. As we have 
seen earlier, these three schools of thought wish to enlist Arendt in the project of 
recovering a public sphere. Hence, Habermas appeals to her "intersubjective" 
concept of political action, the communitarian appeals to her worldly, "rooted" 
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conception of membership, and the participatory democrat appeals to the tendency 
toward civic republicanism in her text. Each school hopes that the pursuit of one 
of these Arendtian paths will bring us closer to a genuine - more democratic, just, 
and meaningful - public sphere. 
The notion of a unitary or comprehensive public sphere has been the target of 
criticism from Foucauldian, feminist scholars who champion difference wishing 
to expose the disciplinary techniques or the power relations implicit in the 
inteisubjective accounts of discursive rationality Since Arendt's Greek 
masculinist conception of the public sphere, to some extent, shows general 
insensitivity of such concerns, and therefore does not offer an account of the 
irreducibility of mechanisms of exclusion in any discursive community. ' 
Intertstingly, what binds Arendt's contemporary critics and admirers together is 
the unquestioned assumptions that she stands for the recovery of a single, 
institutionalized public sphere. Of course, Arendt's work, particularly its 
idealization of the public realm of polis in Ae Hunian Condition and its 
invocation of the "lost treasure" of the revolutionary tradition in On Revohilion, 
invites this reading. However, I think that her focus on the public sphere cannot be 
' For an overview of these criticisný see Fraser, 1992. 
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identified with her conviction of the recovery of the public sphere. Rather, her 
pronouncement about the end of the common world in the modem age implies 
that the prospect for a comprehensive public sphere is obscure and dark. This is 
not to say she gives up on action and politics. Rather, it is to say that she is aware 
of how the energies of modernity, which initially open the possibility of a 
groundless politics, end in intensifying the paradox of revolution and political 
action. ' In other words, the moment in which a space of freedom emerges is also 
the beginning of its disappearance. The combination of modern world alienation 
with the late-modem escalation of the automatism makes the appearance of 
freedom "miracles" (Arendt, 1968b: 168). 
It is not a question, therefore, of pretending that we can resurrect the agora by 
appealing to deliberation, intersubjectivity, or acting in concert. What matters is 
our ability to resist the demand for functionalized behavior and to preserve, as far 
as possible, our capacity for agonistic action and spontaneous, independent 
judgement. 
' "If foundation was the aim and the end of revolution, then the revolutionary spirit was not merely 
the spirit of beginning something new but of starting something permanent and enduring; a lasting 
institution, embodying this spirit and encouraging it to new achievements, would be self-defeating. 
From which it unfortunately seems to follow that nothing threatens the very achievements of 
revolution more dangerously and more acutely than the spirit which has brought them about. 
Should freedom in its most exalted sense as freedom to act be the price to be paid for foundation? " 
(Arendt, 1963: 232). 
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it is here that Arendt's concerns intersect more sharply with Foucault. Arendt's 
theory of political action, so clearly at odds with a Foucauldian politics of 
everyday life, links up with Foucault's concept of resistance. For where the space 
of action is taken away, as both Arendt and Foucault argue it is, action in the strict 
sense is no longer possible. Resistance becomes the primary vehicle of 
spontaneity and agonistic subjectivity, a kind of alternative concept of action. 
Similarly, critical thinking is not activism per se, but an effort to resist the 
temptation to ground this faculty in a theoretical discourse, that is, thinking 
outside of the concept and habit, in Arendt's words, "thinking without a banister" 
(Arendt, 1979: 336). Also, in an age that has witnessed the withdrawal of the 
political, and its dispersion throughout the social body, as Foucault has recognized, 
Arendt's effort to think the specificity of the political is not an anachronism nor 
opposite to Foucault. For where everything is political, nothing is. 
Arendt's critique of modernity evades easy classification. It is too antinostalgic to 
be premodern or rejectionist, yet too radical to qualify as modem or immanent. 
Among recent theorists, only Foucault can be said to match her Nietzschean 
capacity to distance herself from the unquestioned assumptions of the age. This 
ability is the source of embarrassment and frustration for those theorists, such as 
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Walzer (1987), who believe that the first duty of social or political critics is to 
identify with basic assumptions or values of their age. However, I think that an 
attitude of theoretical detachment is not exclusive privileges for armchair 
philosophers. To be suspicious of grand projects does not necessarily mean not to 
address public issues or not to engage the historical experience or political 
struggle of his or her time. This ability also clashes the current misuse, ironically 
raised by Foucault, which insists on viewing theory as a kind of "tool box7' 
(Foucault in Eribon, 1991: 237), to be judged and deployed according to strategic 
considerations. While Foucault intends his work to enlist itself into the reality of a 
contest, he does not intend his work to be the provision of programs, prophecies, 
or policies. From Foucauldian perspective, theory is not a totalizing instrument, 
but one that multiplies tactics and potentialities. This "tool box7' statement should 
not be understood in terms of guiding thread or theoretical apparatus. Rather it 
should be understood in the sense of detachment from authorship preferring 
instead to see his work as public property, which can be used by anyone. Foucault 
shares this unusual sense of detachment with Arendt: "Each time you write 
something and you send it out into the world and it becomes public, obviously 
everybody is free to do with it what he pleases, and this is as it should be ... You 
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should not try to hold your hand now on whatever may happen to what you have 
been thinking for yourself You should rather try to learn from what other people 
do with it" (Arendt, 1958: xx). 
Arendt's central theoretical works are valuable not just because they offer an 
illuminating lessons of human agency in an age of ideology, as Isaac (1992) has 
observed, or a passionate refusal of docility as Honig (1993) has argued. There is 
more. What Arendt learned from the experience of totalitarianism is that all 
human capacities - and particularly the capacity for action and judgement - 
crucially depend on the conditions of their exercise, and that it is indeed possible 
to u,,, )root such capacities. The urgency of her attempt to "think what we are 
doing7 (Arendt, 1958: 5) in 7he Human Condition flows from this insight. What 
Arendt suggests is that totalitarian ideologies underlying much of the modem 
project may still succeed. For the extermination of the human capacity for action 
by peaceful means is the danger that appears after Auschwitz. 
Arendt was profoundly pessimistic about the prospects for a genuine public 
sphere in our time. Indeed, from the standpoint of her critique of modemity, action 
in the strict sense is no longer possible. It is precisely the impossibility of a 
genuine public sphere in postmodernity that leads Arendt to stress agonism over 
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consensus, resistance over docility, and the "defeated causes" of the 
"revolutionary spirit" over the normalizing politics of representative democracy. 
Her faith in action and her pessimistic prospects for a public sphere reflect a 
continuing wonder at the fact that political action persists in the various "defeated 
causes". For some, this state of affairs may be a source of despair, for Arendt, 
however, it signifies both loss and hope. Her point as a critic of liberalism and 
modernity is similar to Foucault: it is not that everything is bad, but that 
everything is dangerous. This includes those modem political innovations for 
which she - and we - are necessarily grateful. Arendt's theoretical work 
demonstrates how man as a political being must refuse both "the blackmail of 
Enlightenment" and the appeal to a religiosity 
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Chapter Six 
Arendt: Participation, Independent Judgment, and Critical 
Thinking 
1. Introduction 
Arendt insisted that "thinking and acting are not the same", that "they occupy two 
entirely different existential positions" (Arendt, 1979: 304-305). This distinction 
between thinking and acting underlies her phenomenology of human activities, 
providing the basic architecture for her consideration of the active life in The 
Human Condition and mental activities in 7he Life of the Mind. Arendt believed 
that action took place in the world, with others, while thinking involved a 
withdrawal from the world into the solitude of an internal "dialogue ... between me 
and myself' (Arendt, 1971: 185). This formulation of the gap between thinking 
and acting has frustrated many theorists who want to link theory and practice, and 
has driven her sympathetic critics to her fragmentary and unfinished work on 
judgement (flabermas, 1983; Benhabib, 1992b; Gray, 1979; Miller, 1979; 
Bernstein, 1986; Beiner, 1982; 1983). Their paths are diverse, but their hope has 
been that her analysis of this faculty would provide the missing link between the 
life of the citizen and the life of the mind. Arendt encouraged such hopes by 
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referring to the faculty of judgement as "the most political of man's mental 
abilities" and "the political faculty par excellence" (1984: 36). Furthermore, her 
description of political or "representative" thinking in several essays from the 
1960s, certainly seems to show the faculty of judgement as a kind of bridge 
between thought and action. Yet Arendt remained adamant about keeping them 
distinct. She continued to insist upon the distinction between thinking and its "by- 
producf' (Arendt, 1971: 193) judgment, as well as distinction between judgement 
and action. ' 
On the surface of Arendt's work, there are two different accounts of judgement, 
which correspond to two distinct phases of her thought about this faculty. As 
Beiner suggests, it is quite plausible to speak of not one, but two theories of 
judgement in Arendt (Beiner, 1982: 91). The first, earlier theory considers 
judgement from the perspective of vita activa; the second, later theory considers it 
from the standpoint of the life of the mind. Thus, as we move from Arendt's 
1 In The Life of the Mind, Arendt states that "the faculty ofjudging particulars (as brought to light 
by Kant), the ability to say "this is wrong7, "this is beautiful", and so on, is not the same as the 
faculty of thinking. Thinking deals with invisibles, with representations of things that arc absent; 
judging always concerns particulars and things close at hand. But the two are interrelated, as arc 
consciousness and conscience. If thinking - the two-in-one of the soundless dialogue - 
actualizes the difference within our identity as given in consciousness and thereby results in 
conscience as its by-productý then judging, the by -product of the liberating effect of thinking, 
makes it manifest in the world of appearance, where I am never alone and always too busy to 
be able to think. 'Me manifestation of the wind of thought is not knowledge; it is the ability to tell 
right from wrong, beautiful from ugly" (Arendt, 1971: 193, my emphasis). Cf. Arendt, 1971: 69, 
70; 1984: 37. 
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essays of the 1960s to her writings of the 1970s, the emphasis in her account of 
judgement "shifts from the representative thought and enlarged mentality of 
political agents to the spectatorship and retrospective judgement of historians and 
storytellere' (Beiner, 1984: 91). 
I don't want to deny this shift in emphasis. As both Beiner (1984) and Bernstein 
(1986) have shown, it is textually demonstrable. Although perhaps more 
pronounced in the later writings, I do want to argue that Arendt's emphasis on 
independent or autonomous judgment underlies both phases. When viewed in the 
light of "thinking (and judgment) for oneself' (Arendt, 1982: 43,71), her 
articulations of political (or representative) and critical (or Socratic) thinking turn 
out to be more closely related than often assumed. Indeed, interpretations of 
"representative thinking7 as a method of public deliberation and decision-making 
fundamentally distort Arendt's intention. 
This judgment may be that of actor, of a "citizen among citizens", or it may be 
that of the spacially or temporally removed spectator. It is always, however, each 
individual's opinion, that is, the expression of how the world and the things in it 
(actions, events, phenomena) "appear to me" (Arendt, 1990: 80; 1968b: 241-242; 
1968a: 26-27), "me", the engaged actor of enlarged thought, "me", the detached 
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interpreter of impartial judgment. While judging is "one, if not the most important, 
activity in which ... sharing the world with others comes to pase', 
it is also the 
activity by which we express our moral "taste" - our capacity for discrimination 
and discernment - and choose our company (Arendt, 1968b: 221; 223-225). In 
Arendt's case, the expression of her moral "taste" put her at odds with many who 
placed solidarity at the head of the political virtues, who viewed fundamental 
political commitments as entailing the abandonment of the privilege of 
independent judgment. Arendt clung fiercely to this privilege, holding it to be the 
core of any defensible idea of human dignit Y. 2 For Arendt, the world is humanized 
not by consensus but by "the unending discourse" (Arendt, 1968a: 27), and the 
diversity of opinion. 
' "Since Hegel and Marx, these questions [the question of judgement] have been treated in the 
perspective of History and on the assumption that there is such a thing as Progress of the human 
race. Finally we shall be left with the only alternative there is in these matters - we either can say 
with Hegel: Die WelYgeschichte ist das Weligericht, leaving judgment to Success, or we can 
maintain with Kant the autonomy of the minds of men and their possible independence of 
things as they are or as they have come into being, Here we shall have to concern 
ourselves ... with the concept of history ... which ... is Greek in origin and derived from historein, to inquire in order to tell how it was ... But the origin of this verb is again Homer ...... here the noun histor C'historian7, as it were) occurs, and that Homeric historian is the judge. If judgment is our 
faculty for dealing with the past, the historian is the inquiring man who by relating it sits in 
judgment over it. If that is so, we may reclaim our human dignity, win it back, as it were, from 
the pscudo-divinity named History of the modem age, without denying history's importance but 
denying its right to being the ultimate judge. Old Cato, with whom I started these reflections - fiýnevcr am I less alone than when I am by myself, never am I more active than when I do notl-dng" 
- has left us a curious phrase which aptly sums up the political principle implied in the enterprise 
of reclamation. He said... "The victorious cause pleased the gods, but the defeated one pleases 
Cato" (Arendt, 1971: 216, my emphasis). Here, Arendt's sympathies are with Cato rather than 
with Hegel, for Arendt sees history not in terms of Logos and Success, but in terms of historical 
judgment and the defeated causes. For Arendt historical understanding is a form of judging and 
the historical narrator or the spectator is no less than the moral actorwho has to engage in acts of 
judgement 
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2. Arendt's Thought on Judgment 
Judgment: Two Models 
Arendt's theory of judgment was never developed systematically. She intended to 
complete her study of the life of the mind by devoting the third volume to the 
faculty of judgment, but was not able to do so because of her untimely death in 
1975. What she left was a number of reflections scattered in the first two volumes 
on 7hinking and Willing (Arendt, 1971, Thinking 5-6,69-70,76,92-8,111,129- 
130,140,192-193,207-2090 213-216; Willing: 59-62,217), a series of lectures on 
Kant's political philosophy delivered at the New School for Social Research in the 
fall of 1970 (Arendt, 1982), an essay entitled 'Thinking and Moral 
Considerations' written at the time she was composing 7he Life of the Mind 
(Arendt, 1984), and two articles included in BeAveen past and Future, where 
judgment and opinion are treated in relation to culture and taste ('Tbe Crisis in 
Culture') and with respect to the question of truth ('Truth and Politics') (Arendt, 
1968b: 197-226; 227-264). Thus, in order to reconstruct her theory of judgment 
we will have to follow and make use of these writings in place of the systematic 
treatment that she was not able to complete. Moreover, these writings do not 
present a unified theory ofjudgment, but rather, two distinct models, one based on 
256 
the standpoint of the actor, the other on the standpoint of the spectator, which are 
somewhat at odds with each other. As Ronald Beiner has noted, Arendt's writings 
on the theme of judgment can be seen to fall into two distinct phases, an early one 
in which judgment is the faculty of political actors acting in the public sphere, and 
a later one in which it is the privilege of non-participating spectators: 
In her earlier writings (for example, in 'Freedom and Politics', 'The Crisis in 
Culture', and 'Truth and Politics') Arendt had introduced the notion of 
judgment to give further grounding to her conception of political action as a 
plarality of actors acting in concert in a public space ... In the 
later formulation, 
which begins to emerge in the Kant Lectures as well as in both 'Thinking and 
Moral Considerations' and the Thinking volume, she approaches judging from a 
quite different, and much more ambitious, point of view (Beiner, 1982: 93). 
In the later formation, judgment is located in the sphere of the vita contemplativa, 
it is the faculty of the non-participation spectators, primarily poets and historians, 
who seek to understand the meaning of the past and to reconcile us to what has 
happened. ' Here, Arendt is no longer concerned with judging as a political life as 
' Arendt also endows judgment with the capacity to reclaim human dignity against those theorists 
that would posit a world-bistorical process whose only criterion is "success". In the Postscripturn 
to Thinking she claims that: 
"Ifjudgment is our faculty for dealing with the past the historian is the inquiring man who by 
relating it sits in judgment over it. If that is so, we may reclaim our human dignity, win it back, as 
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such, as the faculty which is exercised by actors, but with judgment as a 
component in the life of the mind, the faculty which is exercised by the privileged 
spectators (cf. Bernstein, 1986). 
Furthermore, Arendt did not clarify two of its philosophical sources, Aristotle and 
Kant. As Benhabib has observed: 
Arendt's reflection on judgement do not only vacillate between judgment as a 
moral faculty, guiding action, versus judgment as a retrospective faculty, 
guiding the spectator or the storyteller. There is an even deeper philosophical 
perplexity about the status of judgment in her work. This concerns her attempt 
to bring together the Aristotelian conception of judgment as an aspect of 
phronesis with the Kantian understanding of judgment as the faculty of 
"enlarged thought" or "representative thinking7 (Benhabib, 1992b: 123). 
This attempt appears puzzling insofar as the two conceptions seem to stand in 
tensions to each other, the Aristotelian toward a concern with the particular, the 
Kantian toward a concern with universality. 
It would appear, therefore, that Arendt's theory of judgement not only 
incorporates two models, the actor's -judging in order to act - and the spectator's 
it were, from the pseudo-divinity named History of the modem age, without denying history's 
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- judging in order to collect meaning from the past - but that the philosophical 
sources it draws upon are somewhat at odds with each other. I shall follow, then 
step back, and relate them to each other, and will attempt to show that the two 
models articulate two functions of judgment, but that the tension between them is 
not a "flagrant contradiction" (Bernstein, 1968: 23 1), and can be read in terms of 
the underlying continuity. 
Judgment and the Vita Contemplativa 
Arendt's concern with judgment as the faculty of retrospective assessment 
originated in her attempt to understand the twin political tragedies of the twentieth 
century, Nazism and Stalinism. Faced with the horrors of the extermination camps 
and the Gulag, Arendt tried to understand these phenomena in their own terms, 
neither deducing them from precedents nor placing them in some overarching 
scheme of historical necessity "Understandingý', she wrote in The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, 
does not mean denying the outrageous, deducing the unprecedented from 
precedents, or explaining phenomena by such analogies and generalities that 
the impact of reality and the shock of experience are no longer felt. It means, 
importance but denying its right to being the ultimate judge" (Arendt, 197 1, Thinking: 216). 
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rather examining and bearing consciously the burden which our century has 
placed on us - neither denying its existence nor submitting meekly to its weight. 
Comprehension, in short, means the unpremeditated, attentive facing up to, and 
resisting of, reality - whatever it may be (Arendt, 195 1: viii). 
This need to understand these traumatic events is something to which Arendt 
returned in her Partisan Review essay of 1953, 'Understanding and Politics. 
Understanding, she wrote, "is an unending activity by which ... we come to terms 
with, reconcile ourselves to reality, that is, try to be at home in the world" (Arendt, 
1994: 307-308). However, faced with the horrors of totalitarianism, we suddenly 
discover the fact that "we have lost our tools of understanding. Our quest for 
meaning is at the same time prompted and frustrated by our inability to originate 
meaning7 (Arendt, 1994: 313). Totalitarianism has in fact "exploded our 
categories of political thought and our standards for moral judgment" (Arendt, 
1994: 3 10). 4 We cannot make sense of this evil phenomenon by means of such 
categories as tyranny, despotism, or authoritarianism, or by means of such 
conventional moral standards as vice, depravity, or sinfulness. ' Our inherited 
4 Cf. "Totalitarian domination as an established fact, which in its unprecedentedness cannot be 
comprehended through the usual categories of political thought and whose "crimee' cannot be 
judged by traditional moral standards or punished within the legal framework of our civilization, 
has broken the continuity of Occidental history. The break in our tradition is now an accomplished 
facf' (Arendt, 1968b: 26). 
' Indeed, as Arendt noted in her review of 7he Black Book. The Nazi Crime Against the Jewish 
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framework for judgment fails us "as soon as we try to apply it honestly to the 
central political experiences of our own time" (Arendt, 1994: 309). Even our 
ordinary common-sense judgment has become ineffective, since, "we are living in 
a topsy-turvy world, a world where we cannot find our way by abiding by the 
rules of what once was common sense" (Arendt, 1994: 314). 
The crisis in understanding is therefore identified with a crisis in judgment, 
insofar as understanding for Arendt is "so closely related to and interrelated with 
judging that one must describe both as the subsumption of something particular 
under a universal rule" (Arendt, 1994: 313). Once these rules have lost their 
validity we are no longer able to understand and to judge the particulars, that is, 
we are no longer able to subsume them under our accepted categories of moral 
and political thought. Arendt, however, does not believe that the loss of these 
categories has brought to an end our capacity to judge; on the contrary, since 
human beings are distinguished by their capacity to begin anew, ' they are able to 
fashion new categories and to formulate new standards of judgment. Thus: 
In the light of these reflections, our endeavoring to understand something which 
People, significantly entitled 'The Image of Hell': "The Attempt of the Nazis to fabricate a 
wickedness beyond vice did nothing more flian establish an innocence beyond virtue. Such 
innocence and such wickedness have no bearing on the reality where politics exists" (Arendt, 
1994: 199). 
6 Here, Arendt invokes the principle of natality, expressed in the Augustinian saying "that there 
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has ruined our categories of thought and our standards of judgment appears less 
frightening. Even though we have lost yardsticks by which to measure, and 
rules under which to subsume the particular, a being whose essence is 
beginning may have enough of origin within himself to understand without 
preconceived categories and to judge without the set of customary rules which 
is morality (Arendt, 1994: 321, my emphasis). 
For Arendt, therefore, the enormity and unprecedentedness of totalitarianism have 
not destroyed, strictly speaking, our ability to judge; rather, they have destroyed 
our accepted standards of judgment and our conventional categories of 
interpretation and assessment, whether they are moral or political. And in this 
situation the only recourse is to appeal to the imagination, which allows us to 
view things in their proper perspective and to judge them without the benefits of a 
pregiven rule or universal. As Arendt puts it: 
Imagination alone enables us to see things in their proper perspective ... to put 
that which is too close at a certain distance so that we can see and understand it 
without bias and prejudice ... to bridge abysses of remoteness until we can see 
and understand everything that is too far away from us as though it were our 
might be a beginning, man was created before whom nobody was" (Arendt, 1994: 321). 
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own affair. This distancing of some things and bridging the abysses to others is 
part of the dialogue of understanding ( Arendt, 1994: 323). 
The imagination therefore enables us to create the distance which is necessary for 
an impartial judgment, while at the same time allowing for the closeness that 
makes understanding possible. In this way, Arendt notes, it makes possible our 
reconciliation with reality, even with the tragic reality of the twentieth century: 
Without this kind of imagination, which actually is understanding, we would 
never be able to take our bearings in the world. It is the only inner compass we 
have 
... If we want to be at home on this earth, even at the price of being at 
home in this century, we must try to take part in the interminable dialogue with 
the essence of totalitarianism (Arendt, 1994: 323). 
Arendt's participation at the trial of Eichmann in the early 1960s made her once 
more aware of this need to come to terms with a reality that initially defied human 
comprehension. How could such an ordinary, law-abiding, and all-too-human 
individual have committed such atrocities? In her encounter with the person of 
Eichmann Arendt had first to show the intelligibility of his actions, the fact that 
they stemmed from a lack of thought and an absence of judgment, so that 
ultimately we could come to terms with their enormity, with their absolutely 
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unprecedented nature. Once Eichmann's deeds were rendered intelligible they 
could be judged, and judged to be not only monstrous but "banal". 
The impact of the Eichmann trial forced Arendt to raise another problem 
concerning judgment, namely, whether we are entitled to presuppose an 
independent human faculty, unsupported by law and public opinion. The conduct 
of Eichmann was in fact typical of all those individuals who, during the Nazi 
period, had abstained from judgment, who had blindly followed the orders of their 
leaders, and in so doing, committed the most unspeakable atrocities. Eichmann's 
guilt resided in his banal thoughtlessness, in his failure to engage in responsible 
judgment when confronted with Hitler's orders to exterminate the Jews. Those 
few individuals who refused to carry out the orders of their superiors were thus 
left cntirely to their own resources, that is, had to be capable "of telling right from 
wrong even when all they [had] to guide them [was] their own judgment, which, 
moreover, happen[ed] to be completely at odds with what they must [have 
regarded] as the unanimous opinions of all those around them" (Arendt, 1965: 
294-295). 
In this respect, Arendt notes: 
Those few who were still able to tell right from wrong went really only by their 
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own judgment, and they did so freely; there were no rules to be abided by, 
under which the particular cases with which they were confronted could be 
subsumed. They had to decide each instance as it arose, because no rules 
existed for the unprecedented (Arendt, 1965: 295). 
Judgment and The Wind of Thought 
Arendt returned to this issue in The Life of the Mind, a work which was meant to 
include the three faculties of thinking, willing, and judging. In the introduction to 
the first volume she declared that the immediate impulse to write it came from 
attending the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem (Arendt, 1971,7hinking: 3), while the 
second, equally important motive, was to provide an account of our mental 
activities that was missing from her previous work on the vita activa (this was in 
fact the title she had chosen for German edition of The Human Condition). It was 
Eichmann's absence of thinking, his "thoughtlessness", that struck her most, 
because it was responsible in her view for his inability to judge in those 
circumstances where judgment was most needed. "It was this absence of thinking", 
she wrote, "that awakened my interest. Is evil-doing (the sins of omission, as well 
as the sins of commission) possible in default of not just "base motives"... but of 
any motives whatever, of any particular prompting of interest or volition? Is 
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wickedness ... not a necessary condition for evil doing? Might the problem of good 
and evil, our faculty for telling right from wrong, be connected with our faculty of 
thought? " (Arendt, 1971, Thinking: 4-5) 
The same question recurs in her essay of 1971, 'Thinking and Moral 
Considerations', written during the same period she was composing the volume 
on 7hinking, where she asked: "Is our ability to judge, to tell right from wrong, 
beautiful from ugly, dependent upon our faculty of thought? Do the inability to 
think and a disastrous failure of what we commonly call conscience coincide? " 
(Arendt, 1984: 8) 
Arendt attempted a reply by connecting the activity of thinking to that of judging 
in a twofold manner. First, thinking - the silent dialogue of me and myself - 
dissolves our fixed habits of thought and the accepted rules of conduct, and thus 
prepares the way for the activity of judging particulars without the aid of pre- 
established universals. It is not that thinking provides judgment with new rules for 
subsuming the particular under the universal. Rather, it loosens the grip of the 
universal over the particular, thereby releasing judgment from ossified categories 
of thought and conventional standards of behavior. Indeed, thinking "does not 
create values, it will not find out, once and for all, what "the good" is, and it does 
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not confirm but rather dissolves accepted rules of conduct. Its political and moral 
significance comes out only in those rare moments in history when "Things fall 
apart; the center cannot hold; Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world", when "The 
best lack all conviction, while the worst are full of passionate intensity.... (Arendt, 
1984: 36). ' 
It is in times of historical crisis that thinking ceases to be a marginal affair, 
because by undermining all established criteria and values, it prepares the 
individual to judge for him or herself instead of being carried away by the actions 
and opinions of the majority. As Arendt puts it: 
When everybody is swept away unthinkably by what everybody else does and 
believes in, those who think are drawn out of hiding because their refusal to 
join is conspicuous and thereby becomes a kind of action. The purging element 
in thinking, Socrates' midwifery, that brings out the implications of 
unexamined opinions and thereby destroys them - values, doctrines, theories, 
and even convictions - is political by implication. For this destruction has a 
liberating effect on another human faculty, the faculty of judgment, which one 
may call, with some justification, the most political of man's mental abilities. It 
The last lines are from W. B. Yeats, who was one of Arendt's favorite modem poets. 
267 
is the faculty to judge particulars without subsuming them under general rules 
which can be taught and learned until they grow into habits that can be replaced 
by other habits and rules (Arendt, 1984: 36. Cf Gray, 1977: 47). 
The second way in which Arendt connected the activity of thinking with that of 
judging is by showing that thinking produces conscience as a by-product. This 
conscience, unlike the voice of God, gives no positive prescriptions; it only tells 
us what not to do, what to avoid in our actions and dealing with others, as well as 
what to repent of. Arendt notes in this context that Socrates' dictum "It is better to 
suffer wrong than to do wrong", and his proposition that "It would be better for 
me that my lyre or a chorus I directed should be out of tune and loud with discord, 
and that multitudes of men should disagree with me, rather than that 1, being one, 
should be out of harmony with myself and contract me", derive their validity from 
the idea that there is a silent partner within ourselves (Arendt, 1984: 29-30,35). 
What we fear most is the anticipation of the presence of this partner, i. e., our 
conscience. Thus, as Arendt puts it: 
A person who does not know that silent intercourse (in which we examine what 
we are and what we do) will not mind contradicting himself, and this means he 
will never be either able or willing to account for what he says or does; nor will 
268 
he mind committing any crime, since he can count on its being forgotten the 
next moment. Bad people ... are not "full of regrets" (Arendt, 1971, Thinking: 
191). 
She goes on to note that thinking "is not a prerogative of the few but an ever- 
present faculty in everybody; by the same token, inability to think is not a failing 
of the many who lack brain power, but an ever-present possibility for everybody" 
(Arendt, 1971,7hinking: 191). For those who do engage in thinking, however, 
conscience emerges as an inevitable by-product, since "the self .. must take care 
not to do anything that would make it impossible for the two-in-one to be friends 
and live in harmony ... Its criterion for action will not be the usual rules, 
recognized by multitudes and agreed upon by society, but whether I shall be able 
to live with myself in peace when the time has come to think about my deeds and 
worde'(Arendt, 1971, Ainking: 191). 
Conscience as the side-effect of thinking has its counterpart in judgment as the by- 
product of the liberating activity of thought. If conscience represents the inner 
check by which we evaluate our actions, judgment represents the outer 
manifestation of our capacity to think critically. Both faculties relate to the 
question of right and wrong, but while conscience direct attention to the self, 
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judgment directs attention to the world (Cf Bernauer, 1987: 43-50). In this respect, 
judgment makes possible what Arendt calls "the manifestation of the wind of 
thought" in the sphere of appearance. As Arendt put it: 
If thinking - the two-in-one of the soundless dialogue - actualizes the 
difference within our identity as given in consciousness, and thereby results in 
conscience as its by-product, then judging, the by-product of the liberating 
effect of thinking, realizes thinking, makes it manifest in the world of 
appearances, where I am never alone and always too busy to be able to think. 
The Manifestation of the wind of thought is not knowledge; it is the ability to 
tell right from wrong, beautiful from ugly (Arendt, 1971, Thinking: 193). 
Judgment and Arendt's Kant 
The previous account has explored the way in which Arendt attempted to connect 
the activity of thinking to our capacity to judge. This connection of critical or 
Socratic thinking and judging seems to operate in crisis, in those moments where 
individuals, faced with the collapse of traditional standards, must come up with 
new ones and judge according to their own autonomous values. There is, however, 
a second view of judgment which does not restrict it to moments of crisis, but 
which identifies it with the capacity to think representatively, that is, from the 
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standpoint of everyone else. Arendt called this capacity to think representatively 
an "enlarged mentality", adopting the same terms that Kant employed in his Third 
Critique to characterize aesthetic judgment. It is to this work that we must now 
turn our attention, since Arendt based her theory of political judgment on Kant's 
aesthetics rather than on his moral philosophy. At first sight this might seem a 
puzzling choice, since Kant himself based his moral and political philosophy on 
practical reason and not on our aesthetic faculties. Arendt, however, claimed that 
the Critique ofJudgment contained Kant's unwritten political philosophy, and that 
the first part of it, the 'Critique of Aesthetic Judgment', was the most fruitful basis 
on which to build a theory of political judgment, since it dealt with the world of 
appearances from the point of view of the judging spectator and took as its 
starting point the faculty of taste, understood as a faculty of concrete and 
embodied subjects (see Arendt, 1968b: 219-220). "The Critique of Judgement", 
she argued, "is the only of [Kant's] great writings where his point of departure is 
the World and the senses and capabilities which made men (in the plural) fit to be 
inhabitants of it. This is perhaps not yet political philosophy, but it certainly is its 
condition sine qua non. If it could be found that in the capacities and regulative 
traffic and intercourse between men who are bound to each other by the common 
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possession of a world (the earth) there exists an a priori principle, then it would be 
proved that man is essentially a political being" (Arendt in Beiner, 1983: 15). 
For Arendt the capacity to judge is a specifically political ability insofar as it 
enables individuals to orient themselves in the public realm and to judge the 
phenomena from a standpoint that is relatively detached and impartial. She credits 
Kant with having dislodged the prejudice that judgements of taste lie altogether 
outside the political realm, since they supposedly concern only aesthetic matters. 
She believes, in fact, that by linking taste to the wider manner of thinking which 
Kant called an "enlarged mentality" the way was opened to a revaluation of 
judgment as a specific political ability, namely, as the ability to think in the place 
of everybody else. As she put it: 
In order to see the faculty of judgment in its proper perspective and to 
understand that it implies a political rather than a merely theoretical activity, we 
must shortly recall what is usually considered to be Kant's political philosophy, 
namely, the Critique of Practical Reason, which deals with the lawgiving 
faculty of reason. The principle of lawgiving, as laid down in the "categorical 
imperative" - "always act in such a manner that the principle of your action can 
become a general law" - is based upon the necessity for rational thought to 
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agree with itself .. In the 
Critique of Judgment, however, Kant insisted upon a 
different way of thinking, for which it would not be enough to be in agreement 
with one's own self, but which consisted of being able to "think in the place of 
everybody else7' and which he therefore called an "enlarged mentality" (Arendt, 
1968b: 219-220). 
Moreover, as Arendt noted in her Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, it is 
only in Kant's Critique of Judgment that we find room for the idea that judgment 
is not the faculty of noumenal selves legislating for mankind as a whole, but the 
faculty of concrete subjects operating in a worldly space of appearances. "In 
neither of the two parts [of the Critique of Judgment)", she writes, "does Kant 
speak of man as an intelligible or a cognitive being ... The 
first part [Critique of 
Aesthetic Judgment] speaks of men in the plural, as they really are and live in 
societies; the second part [Critique of Teleological Judgment] speaks of the human 
species". Thus, "the most decisive difference between the Critique of Practical 
Reason and the Critique of Judgment is that the moral laws of the former are valid 
for all intelligible beings, whereas the rules of the latter are strictly limited in their 
validity to human beings on earth" (Arendt, 1982: 13). 
Lastly, it is only in Kant's Critique of Judgment that we find a conception of 
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judgment as the ability to deal with particulars in their particularity, that is, 
without subsuming them under a pre-given universal, but actively searching the 
universal out of the particular! Kant formulated this distinction as that between 
determinant and reflective judgments. For him judgment in general is the faculty 
of thinking the particular as contained under the universal. If the universal (the 
rule, principle, or law) is given, then the judgment which subsumes the particular 
is determinant. If, however, only the particular is given and the universal has to be 
found for it, then the judgment is reflective (Kant, 1952: 18). For Kant 
determinant judgments were cognitive, while reflective judgments were non- 
cognitive. Kant then distinguished two kinds of reflective judgment, aesthetic and 
teleological: the former is dealt with in the 'Critique of Aesthetic Judgment' and 
concem objects to which we attribute the property of beauty, the latter is dealt 
with in the 'Critique of Teleological Judgment' and concern the attribution of 
finality to nature. In neither type of judgment, the universal is given in advance or 
general rule is provided under which to subsume the particular. For Kant, 
therefore, reflective judgment is seen as the capacity to ascend from the particular 
' Arendt stresses that Us capacity to judge the particular qua particular is not to be found in 
Kant's moral pMlosophy. As she puts it: 
"For judgment of the particular - TWs is beautiful, This is ugly; TWs is right, This is wrong - has 
no place in Kant's moral pWlosophy. Judgment is not practical reason; practical reason "reasons" 
and tells me what to do and what no to do; it lays down the law and is identical with the will, and 
the will commands; it speaks in imperatives. Judgment, on the contrary, arises from "a merely 
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to the universal without the mediation of determinant concepts or of general rules 
given in advance; it is reasoning about particulars in their relation to the universal 
rather than reasoning about universals in their relation to the particular. In the case 
of aesthetic judgment this means that I can understand and apply the universal 
predicate of beauty only through experiencing a particular object that exemplifies 
it. Thus, upon encountering a flower, a unique landscape, or a particular painting, 
I am able to say that it is an example of beauty, that it possesses "exemplary 
validity". 
It is important to note in this context that this notion of examples, or of the 
exemplary validity strikes Arendt as the fruitful solution to the problem of 
mediating the particular and the universal. "Examples", she says quoting Kant, 
cc are the go-cart of judgmente' (Arendt, 1982: 76). They permit us to discover the 
universal in and through the particular, insofar as they embody a universal 
meaning while relating their particularity. Thus, "one may encounter or think of 
some table that one judges to be the best possible table and take this table as the 
example of how tables actually should be: the exemplary table C'example" comes 
from eximere, "to single out some particular"). This exemplar is and remains a 
contemplative pleasure or inactive delight7 (Arendt, 1982: 15). 
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particular that in its very particularity reveals the generality that otherwise could 
not be defined" (Arendt, 1982: 77). 
For Arendt this notion of exemplary validity is not restricted to aesthetic objects 
or to individuals who exemplified certain virtues (she uses the figure of Achilles 
as an example of courage). Rather, she wants to extend this notion to events in the 
past that carry a meaning beyond their sheer happening. It is here that aesthetic 
judgment joins with the retrospective judgment of the historian or spectator. The 
American and French Revolutions, the Paris Commune, the Russian Soviets, the 
German Revolutionary Councils of 1918-1919, the Hungarian uprising of 1956, 
all these events possess the kind of exemplary validity that makes them of general 
significance, while still retaining their own specificity and uniqueness. Thus, by 
attending to these events in their particularity the historian or judging spectator is 
able to illuminate their general significance. 
It is important to note that Arendt does not value the fact that Kant begins with the 
moral law and justifies republican government in terms of it. This is why Arendt 
dismisses Kant's political writings (Terpetual Peace', 'What is Enlightenment? ' 
etc. ), and seeks an "unwritten political philosophy" in the Third Critique. 
However, Arendt returns 'What is Enlightenment? ' and refers to Kant's attitude to 
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the French Revolution, since Kant, in this essay, praised this event for arousing a 
universal yet disinterested sympathy on the part of the spectators, although from 
the standpoint of the actors it was an illegitimate act. "We are here concerned only 
with the attitude of the outlookere', Kant writes, "as it reveals itself in public 
while the drama of great political changes is taking place; for they openly express 
universal yet disinterested sympathy for one set of protagonists against their 
adversaries, even at the risk that their partiality could be of great disadvantage to 
themselv&' (Kant, 1970b: 182). 
The sympathy that the French Revolution evoked in the spectators indicates for 
Kant a "moral disposition7' shared by mankind. Thus, even if unsuccessful, the 
French Revolution "can never be forgotten, since it has revealed in human nature 
an aptitude and power for improvement of a kind which no politician could have 
thought up by examining the course of events in the past" (Kant, 1970b: 184). 
Indeed, "the occurrence in question is too momentous, too intimately interwoven 
with the interests of humanity, and too widespread in its influence upon all parts 
of the world for nations not to be reminded of it when favorable circumstances 
present themselves, and to rise up and make renewed attempts of the same kind as 
before" (Kant, 1970b: 185). 
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Arendt interprets this passage as an affirmation that the importance of the French 
Revolution lies for Kant exclusively in the opinions of the spectators rather than 
in the deeds of the actors. The spectator, because they are not involved, can 
perceive the ultimate meaning of the event, the meaning that the actors, blinded 
by their partiality and their lack of disinterestedness, are not aware of 
Only the spectator occupies a position that enables him to see the whole; the 
actor, because he is part of the play, must enact his part - he is partial by 
definition. The spectator is impartial by definition - no part is assigned to him 
(Arendt, 1982: 55). 
Hence, she concludes, "withdrawal from direct involvement to a standpoint 
outside the game is a condition sine qua non of all judgment7' (Arendt, 1982: 55, 
my emphasis). Furthermore, 
what the actor is concerned with is doxa, fame - that is, the opinion of 
others ... For the actor, the decisive question is thus how he appears to 
others ... the actor is dependent on the opinion of the spectator; he is not 
autonomous (in Kant's language) ... The standard is the spectator. And this 
standard is autonomous (Arendt, 1982: 55, my emphasis). 
By viewing judgment as the capacity to be impartial and disinterested, Arendt 
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locates it on the side of the spectators rather than that of the actors. Only the 
spectators can produce judgments which are free, autonomous, disinterested, and 
impartial. They can thus understand the meaning of events better than actors: 
What counted in the French Revolution ... a phenomenon not to 
be forgotten, 
were not the deeds and misdeeds of the actors but the opinions, the enthusiastic 
approbation, of spectators, of persons who themselves were not involved 
(Arendt, 1982: 65). 
Therefore, "what constituted the appropriate public realm for this particular event 
were not the actors but the acclaiming spectators" (Arendt, 1982: 61). 
It would be a mistake, however, to take these passages as indicating an absolute 
separation of the actors from the spectators. Arendt in fact seeks to reconcile their 
different perspectives by noting that the "critic and spectator sits in every actor 
and fabricator; without this critical, judging faculty the doer or maker would be so 
isolated from the spectator that he would not even be perceived" (Arendt, 1982: 
63). 
For Arendt it is the spectators who have the privilege to judge impartially and 
disinterestedly. It is not simply because they are detached from the doings of 
actors, but also because in their judgment the spectators have to appeal to two 
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crucial faculties, imagination and common sense. 
Imagination is the faculty of representing in one's mind that which is already 
appeared to one's senses. Through the imagination one can represent objects that 
are no longer present and thus establish the distance necessary for an impartial 
judgment. Once this distancing has occuffed, one is in a position to retlect upon 
these representations from a number of different perspectives, and thereby to 
reach a judgment about the proper value of an object. As Arendt says: 
Only what touches, affects, one in representation, when one can no longer be 
affected by immediate presence ... can 
be judged to be right or wrong, important 
or irrelevant, beautiful or ugly, or something in between. One then speaks of 
judgment and no longer of taste because, though it still affects one like a matter 
of taste, one now has, by means of representation, established the proper 
distance, the remoteness or uninvolvedness or disinterestedness, that is requisite 
for approbation and disapprobation, for evaluating something as its proper 
worth. By removing the object, one has established the conditions for 
impartiality (Arendt, 1982: 67). 
The faculty of judgment thus depends upon two mental operations: there is the 
operation of the imagination, in which one represents objects that are removed 
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from immediate sense perception and therefore no longer affect one directly, and 
then there is the operation of reflection, in which one judges these representations. 
This twofold operation establishes the most important condition for judgment, the 
condition of impartiality, or of "disinterestedness". As Arendt puts it: 
By closing one's eyes one becomes an impartial, not a directly affected, 
spectator of visible things ... Also: 
by making what one's external senses 
perceived into an object for one's inner sense ... one 
is in a position to "see" by 
the eyes of the mind, i. e., to see the whole that gives meaning to the particulars. 
The advantage the spectator has is that he sees the play as a whole, while each 
of the actors knows only his part or, if he should judge from the perspective of 
acting, only the part of the whole that concerns him (Arendt, 1982: 68-69, see 
also Arendt, 1971, Ihinking: 94-96). 
The other faculty that spectators have to appeal is common sense or sensus 
communis. Kant himself declared that "In matters of taste we must renounce 
ourselves in favor of others ... In taste egoism is overcome" (Kant in Arendt, 1982: 
67). By this he meant that for our judgments to be valid we must transcend our 
private or subjective conditions in favor of public and intersubjective ones, and 
we are able to do this by appealing to our sensus communis. In this respect, 
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Arendt notes: 
Judgment, and especially judgments of taste, always reflects upon others and 
their taste, takes their possible judgments into account. This is necessary 
because I am human and cannot live outside the company of men. I judge as a 
member of this community and not as a member of a supersensible world 
(Arendt, 1982: 67). 
The term sensus communis is used by Kant to indicate not merely the common 
sense we expect everybody to have, but a special sense that fits us into a human 
community. It is a specifically humane sense because communication, i. e., speech, 
depends upon it. Arendt remarks that in Kant this community sense or sensus 
communis is contrasted to the sensus privatus that every individual, in his or her 
singularity, possesses. Kant's own definition of sensus communis is given in 
paragraph 40 of the Critique of Judgment, entitled 'Taste as a kind of sensus 
communis'. Here, after having distinguished it from mere common sense, he 
writes that: 
By the name sensus communis is to be understood the idea of a public sense, 
i. e., a critical faculty which in its reflective act takes account (a priori) of the 
mode of representation of everyone else ... This is accomplished 
by weighing 
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the judgment, not so much with actual, as rather with the merely possible, 
judgment s of others, and by putting ourselves in the position of everyone else, 
as the result of a mere abstraction from the limitations which contingently 
affect our own estimate (Kant, 1952: 15 1). 
Kant then offers three maxims of "common human understanding": (1) think for 
oneself (the maxim of unprejudiced thought); (2) think from the standpoint of 
everyone else (the maxim of enlarged thought); (3) always think consistently, be 
in agreement with oneself (the maxim of consistent thought). Arendt notes that 
these are not maxim of cognition, strictly speaking, since "truth compels, one 
doesn't need any "maxims". Maxims apply and are needed only for matters of 
opinion and in judgmente' (Arendt, 1982; 71). In the case of second maxim, that 
of enlarged thought, it indicates for Arendt one's quality of thought "in the 
woeidly mattere' (Arendt, 1982: 7 1). Or as Kant put it: 
However small the range and degree to which a man's natural endowments 
extend, still [it] indicates a man of enlarged mind if he detached himself from 
the subjective personal conditions of his judgment, which cramp the minds of 
so many others, and reflects upon his own judgment from a universal [general] 
standpoint (which he can only determined by shifting his ground to the 
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standpoint of others) (Kant, 1952: 153). ' 
Judgment and the Vita Activa 
As I remarked at the beginning of this chapter, Arendt presented a model of 
judgment in the essays 'The Crisis in Culture' and 'Truth and Politics' which 
could be characterized as far more political than the one presented so far. In these 
essays, judgment is viewed as a specifically political ability, namely, as "the 
ability to see things not only from one's own point of view but in the perspective 
of all those who happen to be presenf', and as being "one of the fundamental 
abilities of man as a political being insofar as it enables him to orient himself in 
the public realm, in the common world" (Arendt, 1968b: 221). Indeed, in this 
model Arendt identifies judgment with phronesis on the grounds that both are 
capabilities of political actors, and that both are rooted in sensus communis. She 
says that: 
The Greeks called this ability [to judge] phronesis, or insight, and they 
considered it the principal virtue or excellence of the statesman in distinction 
' It should be noted that Arendt consistently substitutes "general" where the standard translations 
have "universal". One important reason for this change is suggested in Arendt's essay 'The Crisis 
in Culture' (1 968b: 22 1), where she says that "judgment is endowed with a certain specific validity 
but is never universally valid. Its claims to validity can never extend further than the others in 
whose place the judging person has put himself for his considerations. Judgment, Kant says, is 
valid "for every single judging persorf', but the emphasis in the sentence is on 'Judging7; it is not 
valid for those who do not judge or for those who are not members of the public realm where the 
objects ofjudgment appear". Thus Arendt's choice of terms in the Kant lectures is quite important 
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from the wisdom of the philosopher. The difference between this judging 
insight and speculative thought lies in that the former has its roots in what we 
usually call common sense, which the latter constantly transcends. Common 
sense ... discloses to us the nature of the world insofar as it is a common world; 
we owe to it the fact that our strictly private and "subjective" five senses and 
their sensory data can adjust themselves to a nonsubjective and "objective" 
world which we have in common and share with others. Judging is one, if not 
the most, important activity in which this sharing-the-world-with-others comes 
pass (Arendt, 1968b: 221). 
Moreover, in discussing the non-coercive character of judgment, the fact that it 
can only appeal to but never force the agreement of others, she claims that "this 
64wooing7 or persuading corresponds closely to what the Greeks called peitein, the 
convincing and persuading speech which they regarded as the typically political 
form of people talking with one another" (Arendt, 1968b: 222). She then goes on 
to claim that: 
Culture and politics ... belong together because it is not knowledge or truth 
which is at stake, but rather judgment and decision, the judicious exchange of 
in relation to her reading (See Beiner, 1982: 163). 
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opinion about the sphere of public life and the common world, and the decision 
what manner of action is to be taken in it, as well as to how it is to look 
henceforth, what kind of things are to appear in it (Arendt, 1968b: 223). 
Now, all these statements would seem to indicate that for Arendt judgment is the 
ability most closely associated with political action. The identification of 
judgment with phronesis would seem to confirm this, since what is required in 
matters affecting the political community is precisely that form of practical 
reasoning that Aristotle sought to discriminate from both episteme and sophia, as 
well as from techne. Arendt's treatment of political judgment, however, constantly 
make reference to Kant"s idea, in particular those discussed in the previous 
section under the heading of aesthetic judgment. She claims that both aesthetic 
and political judgment are concerned with particulars, that they can only claim a 
subjective universal validity, since they are reflective and not determinant, and 
that they rest ultimately on the potential agreement with others. Interestingly, 
Arendt also claims that Kant was the first philosopher to discover the importance 
ofjudgment, and underlines the fact that: 
What ... 
is quite new and even startlingly new in Kant's propositions in the 
Critique of Judgment is that he discovered this phenomenon in all its grandeur 
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precisely when he was examining the phenomenon of taste and hence the only 
kind of judgments which, since they concern merely aesthetic matters, have 
always been supposed to lie outside the political realm as well as the domain of 
reason (Arendt, 1968b: 221). " 
What becomes clear, therefore, is that in her discussion of judgment from the 
standpoint of political action Arendt appeals not only to Aristotle's ideas but also 
to those of Kant. Arendt emphasized to a great extent the representative nature of 
judgment, the fact that it always has to take into account the opinions of others, 
and that as a political faculty it can only be exercised and tested in public, in the 
free and open exchange of opinions in the public sphere. The emphasis is 
particularly evident in her treatment of Kant's notion of an "enlarged mentality', 
which he saw as the ability to think from the standpoint of everyone else. Arendt 
elaborates this notion as follows: 
The power of judgment rests on a potential agreement with others, and the 
thinking process which is active in judging something is not, like the thought 
process of pure reasoning, a dialogue between me and myself, but finds itself 
10 Cf. "Kant was the first and has remained the last, of the great philosophers to deal with 
judgment as one of the basic mental activitics" (Arendt, 197 1, Thinking: 95); "Not till Kant's 
Critique ofJudgment did this faculty become a major topic of a major thinkce' (Arendt, 197 1, 
Thinking: 215). 
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always and primarily, even if I am quite alone in making up my mind, in an 
anticipated communication with others with whom I know I must finally come 
to some agreement. From this potential agreement judgment derives its specific 
validity This means, on the one hand, that such judgment must liberate itself 
from the "subjective private conditions", that is, from the idiosyncrasies which 
naturally determine the outlook of each individual in his privacy and are 
legitimate as long as they are only privately held opinions, but which are not fit 
to enter the market place, and lack all validity in the public realm. And this 
enlarged way of thinking, which as judgment knows how to transcend its own 
individual limitations, on the other hand, cannot function in strict isolation or 
solitude; it needs the presence of others in whose place it must think, whose 
perspectives it must take into consideration, and without whom it never has the 
opportunity to operate at all. As logic, to be sound, depends on the presence of 
the self, so judgment, to be valid, depends on the presence of others (Arendt, 
1968b: 220-221). 
For Arendt, therefore, the validity of political judgment depends on our ability to 
think "representatively", that is, from the standpoint of everyone else, so that we 
are able to look at the world from a number of different perspectives. In this 
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respect the process of opinion formation is never a solitary activity; rather, it 
requires a genuine encounter with different opinions so that a particular issue may 
be examined from every possible standpoint until, as she puts it, "it is flooded and 
made transparent by the full light of human comprehension7' (Arendt, 1968b: 242). 
The capacity to enlarge one's perspective, is indeed crucial to the formation of 
opinions that can claim more than subjective validity; individuals may hold 
personal opinions on many subject matters, but they can form representative 
opinions only by enlarging their standpoint. As Arendt says: 
Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given 
issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints 
of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation 
does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and 
hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question 
neither of empathy ... nor of counting noses and joining a majority, but of being 
and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's 
standpoints I have present in my mind while I am pondering a given issue, and 
the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the 
stronger will be my capacity for representative thinking and the more valid my 
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final conclusions, my opinion (Arendt, 1968b: 241). 
Truth, Opinion and Judgment 
The representative character of judgment and opinion has important implications 
for the question of validity Arendt always stressed that the formation of valid 
opinions requires a public space where individuals can test and purify their views 
through a process of mutual debate and enlightenment. She was, however, quite 
opposed to the idea that opinions should be measured by the standard of truth, or 
that debate should be conducted according to strict scientific standards of validity. 
In her view, truth belongs to the realm of cognition, the realm of logic, 
mathematics, and the strict sciences, and carries always an element of coercion, 
since it precludes debate and must be accepted by every individual in possession 
of his or her rational faculties. Against the plurality of opinions, truth has a 
despotic character: it compels universal assent, leaves the mind little freedom of 
movement, eliminates the diversity of views and reduces the richness of human 
discourse. In this respect, truth is anti-political, since by eliminating debate and 
diversity it eliminates the very principles of political life. As Arendt writes: 
The trouble is that factual truth, like all other truth, peremptorily claims to be 
acknowledged and precludes debate, and debate constitutes the very essence of 
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political life. The modes of thought and communication that deal with truth, if 
seen from the political perspective, are necessarily domineering; they don't take 
account other people's opinions, and taking these into account is the hallmark 
of all strictly political thinking (Arendt, 1968b: 241). 
For Arendt, a truth "whose validity needs no support from the side of opinion 
strikes at the very roots of all politics and all governments' (Arendt, 1968b: 233). 
She cites the famous statement of Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence 
that says "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, 
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights", and argues 
that by saying "We hold these truths to be self-evident" Jefferson acknowledged 
that these truths were not self-evident, that they stood in need of agreement and 
consent, and therefore that the statement "All men are created equar' was a matter 
of opinion and not of truth. "That all men are created equal", Arendt writes, "is 
not self-evident nor can it be proved. We hold this opinion because freedom is 
possible only among equals, and we believe that the joys and gratifications of free 
company are to be preferred to the doubtful pleasures of holding 
domination ... these are matters of opinion and not of truth" (Arendt, 1968b: 247). 
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Arendt also quotes the remark by Lessing - "Let each man say what he deems 
truth, and let truth itself be condemned unto God" - and interprets it as saying 
"Let us thank God that we don't know the truth". For Arendt this expressed the 
insight that "for men living in company, the inexhaustible richness of human 
discourse is infinitely more significant and meaningful than any One Truth could 
ever be" (Arendt, 1968b: 233-234). "Lessing's greatnessý', Arendt writes, "does 
not merely consist in a theoretical insight that there cannot be one single truth 
within the human world, but in his gladness that it does not exist and that, 
therefore, the unending discourse among men will never cease so long as there 
are men at all. A single absolute truth, could there have been one ... would have 
spelled the end of humanity" (Arendt, 1968a: 27, my emphasis). 
The appeal to Lessing is meant to vindicate the power and dignity of opinion 
against those thinkers, from Plato to Hobbes, who saw it as mere illusion, as a 
confused or inadequate grasp of the truth. For Arendt opinion is not a defective 
form of knowledge that should be transcended or left behind as soon as one is in 
possession of the truth. Rather, it is a distinct form of knowledge which requires 
the use of imagination and the capacity to think "representatively". it is important 
to stress in this context that Arendt does not want to dismiss the philosophers' 
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attempt to find universal or absolute standards of knowledge and cognition, but to 
check their desire to impose those standards upon the sphere of human affairs, 
since they would eliminate its plurality and essential relativity, that is, the fact that 
it is composed of a plurality of individuals who view it from different perspectives 
which are all relative to each other. " The imposition of such a standard would 
mean that individuals would no longer be required to exercise their judgment, 
develop their imagination, or cultivate an "enlarged mentality", since they would 
no Icnger need to deliberate in common. Strict demonstration, rather than debate 
and argumentation, would then become the only legitimate form of discourse. " 
Now we must be careful not to impute to Arendt the view that truth has no 
legitimate role to play in politics or in the sphere of human affairs. She does 
indeed assert that "All truths - not only the various kinds of rational truth but also 
factual truth - are opposed to opinion in their mode of asserting validity" (Arendt, 
1968b: 239), since they all carry an element of compulsion. However, she is only 
preoccupied with the negative consequences of the former (i. e., rational truth) 
" Arendt reproaches Kant for having proposed an absolute standard for morality in the form of the 
categorical imperative. This standard for Arendt is inhumane, because it "is postulated as absolute 
and in its absoluteness introduces into the interhuman realm - which by its nature consists of 
relationships - something that runs counter to its fundamental relativity" (Arendt, 1968a: 27). 12 It is important to note that for Arendt persuasion is the only truly political form of speech. It is 
that form of speech designed to "woo the consent of everyone else in the hope of coming to an 
agreement with him eventually" (Arendt, 1968b: 222). Because of this it is very different from 
demonstration or logical proof, which rests on compelling arguments that require the assent of 
every rational being. 
293 
when applied to the sphere of politics, while she defends the importance of factual 
truth for the preservation of an accurate account of the past and for the very 
existence of political communities. "Factual trutW', she writes, "is always related 
to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; 
it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony ... It 
is political by 
nature" (Arendt, 1968b: 238). It follows, therefore, that: 
Facts and opinions, though they must be kept apart, are not antagonistic to each 
other; they belong to the same realm. Facts inform opinions, and opinions, 
inspired by different interests and passions, can differ widely and still be 
legitimate as long as they respect factual truth. Freedom of opinion is a farce 
unless factual information is guaranteed and the facts themselves are not in 
dispute. In other words, factual truth informs political thought just as rational 
truth informs philosophical speculation (Arendt, 1968b: 238). " 
The relationship between facts and opinions is thus one of mutual entailment: if 
opinion were not based on correct information and the free access to all relevant 
facts they could scarcely claim any validity. And if they were to be based on 
13 Arendt is fidly aware that facts are theory-laden and that historical inquiry is always framed by 
interpretive categories. Nevertheless, she believes that facts cannot be changed at all and that the 
historian must always respect the line separating the interpretation of facts from their manipulation 
or distortion. See her comments on this issue, Arendt, 1968b: 238-239. 
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fantasy, self-deception, or deliberate falsehood, then no possibility for genuine 
debate and argumentation could be sustained. Both factual truth and the general 
habit of truth telling are therefore basic to the formation of sound opinion and to 
the flourishing of political debate. 14 Moreover, if the record of the past were to be 
destroyed by organized lying, or be distorted by an attempt to rewrite history (as 
the case of Stalinist historiography was), political life would be deprived of one of 
its essential and stabilizing elements. As Arendt writes: 
The liar, who may get away with any number of single falsehoods, will find it 
impossible to get away lying on principle. This is one of the lessons that could 
be learned from the totalitarian experiments and the totalitarian rulers' 
frightening confidence in the power of lying - in their ability, for instance, to 
write history again and again to adapt the past to the "political line7' of the 
present moment or to eliminate data that did not fit their ideology ... The results 
of such experiments when undertaken by those in possession of the means of 
violence and terrible enough, but lasting deception is not among them. There 
always comes a point beyond which lying becomes counterproductive. This 
14 Indeed, they arc the basic preconditions for the establishment of self-identity and of an adequate 
sense of reality. As Arendt observes: 
"The result of a consistent and total substitution of lies for factual truth is not that the lies will now 
be accepted as truth, and the truth be defamed as lies, but that the sense by which we take our 
bearings in the real world - and the category of truth vs. falsehood is among the mental means to 
this end - is being dcstroyed7' (Arendt, 1968b: 257). 
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point is reached when the audience to which the lies are addressed is forced to 
disregard altogether the distinguishing line between truth and falsehood in order 
to be able to survive... truth that can be relied on disappears entirely from 
public life, and with it the chief stabilizing factor in the ever-changing affairs of 
men (Arendt, 1972: 7. Cf Arendt, 1968b: 257-258). 
In this respect, Arendt notes: 
Not the past - and all factual truth, of course, concern the past - or the present, 
insofar as it is the outcome of the past, but the future is open to action. If the 
past and present are treated as part of the future - that is, changed back into 
their former state of potentiality - the political realm is deprived not only of its 
main stabilizing force but of the starting point from which to change, to begin 
something new (Arendt, 1968b: 258). 
In sum, both factual truth and the practice of truth-telling are essential to political 
life. The antagonism for Arendt is between rational truth and opinion, since the 
former does not allow for debate and dissent, while the latter thrives on it. Against 
Plato and Hobbes, who denigrated the role of opinion in political matters, Arendt 
reasserts the value and importance of political discourse, and thus of a politics that 
acknowledges difference and the plurality of opinions. 
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3. Conclusion 
Is there a "flagrant contradictioif ' (Bernstein, 1986: 23 1) in Arendt's thought on 
judgment? I think not. Of course, the faculty of judgment looks different 
depending on whether we take the perspective of the actor or the spectator. But it 
is simply not the case that Arendt recommended "common sense", persuasion, 
and consensus for those in the game, and critical thinking, impartiality, and 
autonomy for those who were out of it. Arendt's historical understanding does not 
permit such clear dichotomies. If we step back and relate the account of 
representative thinking in 'The Crisis in Culture', and 'Truth and Politics' to 
Arendt's account of critical or Socratic thinking in 'Philosophy and Politics', 
'Thinking and Moral Considerations', and her Kant lectures, we see the 
underlying continuity in her thought on judgment. " 
One reason why critics like Bernstein (1986) and Beiner (1982) see an irreducible 
gap between Arendt's early, actor-centered account of judgment and her later, 
critical or historical one is that they fail to take sufficient account of Arendt's 
narrative about the destruction, loss, or decline of the public realm in the modern 
age. This narrative, developed in detail in Ae Human Condition, makes any 
To be fair, Bernstein points in the direction of "independent thought" in his essay, but tends to 
restrict its hcrmeneutical importance to thinking about Arendt's own activity as a writer and 
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appeal to community-based judgment, whether Aristotelian phronesis or Kant's 
judgments of taste, highly complex. 
Furthermore, when we put Arendt's various statements about judgment in the 
context of the "crisis in judgment" implied by the narrative in 7he Human 
Condition, they are revealed to be highly conditional. " From the very beginning - 
indeed as far back as Me Origins of Totalitarianism - Arendt emphasized the 
dissolution of modem Europe's moral groundwork, the "break in our traditiorf' 
and the "loss of common sense7'. Phronesis, representative thinking, and an 
44enlarged mentality", their basic conditions of possibility have been destroyed by 
"the moral and spiritual breakdown of occidental society" (Arendt 1994: 315), on 
the one hand, and the rise of mass culture, on the other. 
Arendt writes about judgment in a historical situation parallel to the one Socrates 
confronted in Athens. There, too, traditional morality had fragmented to yield a 
morality of success. The way out of this situation, for Arendt as well as Socrates, 
is no return to a shattered tradition, nor a simple call to action, but a radical 
questioning of all the old "yardsticks" for action and judgment. What is called for 
political thinker. See Bernstein, 1986: 234. 
16 Arendt also explicitly addresses this crisis in the essay 'Understanding and Politics' and 'The 
Crisis in Culture'. In the former essay, Arendt emphasizes the difficulties confronting 
understanding andjudgment in the wake of the "growth of meaningless" and the "loss of comnion 
sense' (Arendt, 1994: 3 1); In the latter essay, she underlines the "inability to judge' of mass man 
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in such situations is not activism, but independent judgment, "thinking without a 
bannister" ( Arendt, 1979: 336). It is important to remember, in this regard, that 
Arendt wrote 7he Human Condition, her consideration of the vita activa, not in 
order to stimulate activism, but in order to help us "think what we are doing7 
(Arendt, 1958: 5). 
It is because of the modem crisis in judgment, of the staggering growth of 
stupidity and the inability to judge, that Arendt explicitly turns to Socrates as a 
model in 'Philosophy and Politics', 'Thinking and Moral Consideration', and in 
the Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy. In these texts, she poses Socrates as a 
model of "critical thinking", a model which captures the negative and public 
dimensions of how thinking prepares for independent, impartial judgment. 
In all three texts, Arendt emphasizes the purifying quality of Socratic thinking. 
Socrates did not teach anything; rather, he exposed unexamined prejudgments to 
the "wind of thought", dissolving prejudices but putting no "trutW' in their place 
(Arendt, 1990: 81; 1984: 23; 1982: 37-39). Hence "critical thinking7 is an 
essentially destructive activity. It has a "destructive, undermining effect on all 
established criteria, values, measurements for good and evil, in short on those 
(ArcndL 1968b; 199). 
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customs and rules of conduct we treat of in morals and ethics" (Arendt, 1984: 24). 
The Socratic dialogue can hardly be characterized as deliberation aiming at 
decision and action. Socratic thinking is a public exercise of reason, yet this kind 
of thinking prepares for judgment by suspending all "fixed habits of thought, 
ossified rules and standarde. As Arendt put it at a conference on her work in 
1973: 
I think that this 'thinking"... - thinking in the Socratic sense - is a maieutic 
function, a midwifery. That is, you bring out all your opinions, prejudices, what 
have you; and you know that never, in any of the [Platonic] dialogues, did 
Socrates ever discover any child [of the mind] who was not a wind-egg. That 
you remain in a way empty after thinking ... And once you are empty, then, in a 
way which is difficult to say, you are prepared to judge. That is, without 
having any book of rules under which you can subsume a particular case, you 
have got to say "this is good", "this is bad", "this is wrong7, "this is beautiful", 
and "this is ugly''... we are now prepared to meet the phenomena, so to speak, 
head on, without any preconceived system (Arendt in Young-Bruel, 1982: 452, 
my emphasis). 
It is the negative preparation that thinking provides for judgment which Arendt 
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valued above all. Judgment of a particular phenomenon or event can be the "by- 
product" of thinking, not because it is in any sense the direct result of thought, but 
rather because thinking clears the space which makes it possible (Arendt, 1984: 
36). The testing and examination of opinions that is the heart of critical thinking 
as practiced by Socrates, and articulated by Kant, creates the mental space 
necessary for independent, impartial judgment (Arendt, 1982: 38-39). 
In fact, as the Kant lectures make clear, "representative thinking" and "enlarged 
mentality" are not just models for public deliberation. They are, rather, the 
necessary vehicles of critical thinking. They proceed imaginatively, drawing on 
the possible standpoints and opinions of others in order to "abstract from the 
limitations which contingently attach to our own judgment" (Kant in Arendt, 
1982: 43). As Arendt puts it in the Lectures: 
The "enlargement of the mind" plays a crucial role in the Critique ofJudgment. 
It is accomplished by "comparing our judgment with the possible rather than 
the actual judgments of others, and by putting ourselves in the place of any 
other man". The faculty that makes this possible is called imagination ... Critical 
thinking is possible only where the standpoints of all others are open to 
inspection. Hence, critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut 
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itself off from "all others". To be sure, it still goes on in isolation, but by the 
force of imagination it makes the others present and thus moves in a space that 
is potentially public, open to all sides ... To think with an enlarged mentality 
means that one trains one's imagination to go visiting (Arendt, 1982: 42-43). 
Dialogue in the agora, or the public use of one's reason, are good ways of 
44 enlarging" one's mentality, of "training one's imagination to go visiting7. But 
neither representative nor "enlarged" thought have decision or action as their 
raison dWre. The "abstraction from contingent limitatione' enables the 
attainment of a "general standpoinf, which Arendt characterizes as "a view point 
from which to look upon, to watch, to form judgment, or as Kant himself says, to 
reflect upon human affaire' (Arendt, 1982: 44). " It "does not tell one how to act"; 
rather, it enables one to judge, impartially, independently 
What links Socratic dialectic and Kantian enlarged thought for Arendt is the way 
both yield not the truth, but a more impartial, and hence more valid, each 
individual's doxa, his or her "it appears to me" (Arendt, 1990: 80-81; 1968b: 241- 
242; 1982: 37-40). If we view Arendt's thoughts on judgment in terms of a 
broader perspectivism, the standpoints of the actor and the spectator emerge not as 
17 1 disagree mith those u ho Niew Arendt's notion of representative thinking as similar to empathy. 
See, for example, Disch, 1994. 
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two radically different kinds of judgment (engaged and political vs. detached and 
historical), but rather as two poles of independent judgment. To be sure, the 
"general standpoint" of the impartial judge is different from the seemingly more 
%igorous standpoint of the citizen's dora, "it appears to me. Yet, as Kant's great 
enemy Nietzsche reminds us, "the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, 
the more cyM different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete 
will our -concept- of this thing. our -objectivity", be (Nietzsche, 1989: 12). 
Impartial judgment, as conceived by Arendt, remains pcrspcctival in charactcr, it 
is opinion in its highest form. 
Now, I u-ant to conclude by bricfly considering the political implications of her 
controversial thesis about the "banality of evil" as a example of judgment. In the 
fifleenth ch3pter of Dclunmui hi Jenmlem, Arendt closes her description of 
Eichmann uith these words, "the fearsome, word-and-thought-defying banalioý of 
evir (Arendt, 1965: 252). Twenty years later she urrote that by the "banality of 
e%il" she meant "no theory or doctrine, but something quite factual, the 
phenomenon of e%ril dec(N committed on a gigantic scale, which could not be 
traced to any particularity of %%ickcdness, pathology, or ideological conviction in 
the doer. %%hosc only personal distinction was a perhaps extraordinary 
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shallowness7 (t%rcndt, 1984: 7). 
While the furor surrounding the Eichmann book was largely the result of Arendt's 
bricf discussion of the complicity of somc Jc%kish ghctto leadcrs with Nazis, hcr 
concept of the banality evil was also controversial. Many found her description of 
a thoughtlm patently undemonic Eichmann too much. The gap between the 
crimes and the man seemed somehow to diminish the horrors and the guilt (sec 
Young-Bruchl, 1982- 347-355). 
Both the novel, paradoxical quality of Arendt's concept and the outraged response 
to her judgment are of interest here. "The Banality of evil" is, first of all, a perfect 
example of detached judgment, the judgment of the spectator. A particular - 
Eichmann - is not subsumed under ready-to-hand ideas about the nature of evil; 
rather, Arendt practiced a form of reflective judgment, ascending from the 
particular (Eichmann in the flesh) to a concept. This concept, "the banality of 
e%il". enabled her to disclose not only the specific nature of Eichmann's evil, but 
also the increasingly uidespread phenomenon of evil detached from wickedness, 
mil committed by the most ordinary or "normal" of men, men who were neither 
ideological fanatics nor beasts in human form (Arendt, 1965: 25-26; 48-52). The 
precondition or this disclosure was the purging of a traditional theoretical and 
304 
philosophical ways of thinking about c%il as a phenomenon with deep roots in the 
sinrul chmcter or the docr. Only then, when the concept or evil had been 
unfrozen. the recognition and naming of a ne%v phenomenon could occur. It is 
important to note th. 2t, as a judgment of a particular, the "banality of evil" is not 
intended as a global redefinition of the nature of evil tout court. 
Wc must not forget, however, that this very judgment evoked the most outraged 
responses. Follo%ing Kant's dictum, Arendt had resisted enormous pressure and 
m3de her judgment public (see Young-Bruchl, 1982: 347-348). The price of 
'&publicitý" was not "testing and purification", but %irtual excommunication. Her 
judgment revealed her moral sense, her moral "tastc7, yet this was not the case of 
"wooing the consent" of others (Arendt, 1968b: 222). The philosophical and 
moral challenge implicit in Arendt's judgment was too much. Her independence 
of mind was regarded, in Gershom Scholem's word, as a "perversity" (Scholem in 
Arcndt, 1978: 243), the rdection of a lack of "Ahabadi Israel, love of the Jewish 
People (Scholem in Arend% 1978: 241). 
Indeed, in making her judgment, Arendt self-consciously took the standpoint of 
the outsider a nonparticipant in the triaL to be sure, but also an outsider when it 
came to the immediate political stakes of the process. In her view, it was far more 
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important to focus attention on "thc central moral, legal, and political phenomena 
of our century" than to align herself in solidarity Aith the narrative and the tactics 
of the prosecution in the case. But, like Socrates, Arendt was not vcry good at the 
perunsivc speech that convinces the =ny To this day, Eichmaim in Jerusalem 
renuins her most controvcrsial book. 
Just as Socrates' public performance of thinking led him to be charged with 
"corrupting the yout1r. so Arendt's public judgment was seen as a betrayal of her 
people. This is the risk run by anyonewho dares to truly think and judge in public, 
a risk %hich is glossed over by the neo-Aristotelian presentation of judgment as a 
form of deliberation, as well as by the liberal Kantian formula of "the public use 
or one's reasoe (Kant in Arendt, 1982: 39). The more genuine judgment is, the 
less it respects the pregiven "yardsticW (Arendt, 1994: 321) that are appealed to 
by 'common sens-c". Independent judgment "brushes history against the grain7 
(Benjamin, 1999: 261). As a creative acti%ity, -, %hich Arendt shared emphasis with 
Kant on the role of im3gin3tion in judgmcnt, it %%ill most likely be misunderstood 
and resentcd. 
This is not to s3y the truly indpendent judge must become a mart)T like Socrates. 
it uill be difficult to avoid becoming something of a pariah, especially 
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ir one has the courage to make one's judgments public. Indeed, for Arendt, 
looking at things from "the pariah's point of view" was a lifetime vocation. 
Arendt's o%%m understanding of the pariah perspective is best expressed in her 
Ictter to Scholem: 
%%Iut confuses you is that my argument and my approach are different from 
%hat )vu are used to; in other words, the trouble is that I am independent. By 
this I me3n, on the one hand, that I do not belong to any organization and 
always speak only for myself, and on the other hand, that I have great 
confidence in Lessing's selbsidenl-en [to think for oneselo for which, I think, 
no ideology, no public opinion, and no "convictions" can ever be a substitute. 
Wi3tever objections you may have to the results, you won't understand them 
unless you realize they are really my o%%m and nobody else's (Arendt, 1978: 
250). 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
Reflections on Foucault and Arendt's Work and Life: From the 
Pariah's Point of View 
Now, I want to conclude with a reflection between their life and work, between 
their political commitments and theoretical detachment, reviewing the overall 
theoretical tensions in the point of pariah they distinctively hold. 
1. Modernism/ Postmodernism, Kant/ Nietzsche 
It is - my contention that Foucault and Arendt are situated within a tradition of 
critical theory running from Kant to Nietzsche. The opposition between 
modernism and postmodernism, between its philosophical sources, Kant and 
Nietzsche, has been widely overstated, for example, in the polemical stance taken 
by Habermas in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1987). 1 think that 
this way of mapping does Foucault and Arendt an injustice. 
While Foucault and Arendt have prefigured and influenced postmodern theory, 
they cannot be wholly assimilated to that rubric. They are subtle, sophisticated, 
and complex thinkers who draw from multiple sources and problematics while 
aligning themselves with no single one. If there are privileged figures in their 
work, they are critics of reason and Western thought such as Nietzsche. Nietzsche 
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provided Foucault and Arendt with the impetus and ideas to attack Hegelian and 
Marxist philosophies. While Foucault and Arendt give Nietzsche a political 
democratic twist, they did accept Nietzsche's claims that systematizing methods 
produce reductive social and historical analyses, and that knowledge is 
perspectival in nature, requiring multiple viewpoints to interpret a heterogeneous, 
fragile, and hazardous reality 
Foucault and Arendt do not appreciate Kant's official philosophy, i. e., an 
analytical philosophy of truth, a philosophy derived, in deductive fashion, from an 
absolute. Yet in their later work, they appropriate Kant's reflection on the 
Enlightenment and revolution (Foucault) and his aesthetic judgment (Arendt). 
Arendt bases her theory of political judgment on Kant's aesthetics rather than on 
his moral philosophy It is an interesting choice, since Kant himself bases his 
moral and political philosophy on practical reason and not on our aesthetic 
faculties. Arendt, however, claims that Kant's practical and political writings fail 
to address the question of action in the realm of plurality and appearance, and that 
the Critique of Judgment contains what she calls Kant's "unwritten political 
philosophy" (Arendt, 1982: 61). She does not deny that Kant begins with the 
moral law and justifies republican government in terms of it. But her point is that 
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Kant's politics of truth brackets the realm of opinion, plurality, and appearance 
from the outset, and so denatures the political. In order to appropriate Kant for 
politics of opinion, Arendt turns to the third Critic, while ignoring the systematic 
intent that governs his political writings, his politics of truth. 
Like Arendt, Foucault also acknowledges that Kant has founded the two 
philosophical traditions, one, the analytical philosophy of truth, the other, the 
critical ontology of the present and of ourselves. Regarding himself as a critic and 
an ontologist, Foucault sees in Kant's reflection on the Enlightenment and 
revolution the origin of a critical ontology leading through Hegel, Nietzsche, and 
Weber, to Horkheimer and Adomo. 
Foucault holds that our modernity begins with Kant's attempt to make reason 
critical, i. e., to establish the limits and legitimate use of reason. But Kant's 
attempt to show that this critical use of reason is its true universal nature is not 
what is original and important for Foucault. Foucault does not deny that Kant is 
attempting to preserve the normative role of reason in the face of the collapse of 
metaphysics. But Rather than seeing Kant as announcing a universal solution, 
Foucault uses Kant's essays as a diagnostic of a particular historical conjuncture. 
What Foucault finds distinctive and insightful in Kant's essays is a philosopher 
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qua philosopher realizing for the first time that his thinking is an attempt to 
respond to his historical situation. 
Although Foucault and Arendt end up by affirming Nietzsche, I find it useful as 
an initial approximation to view Foucault and Arendt as an idiosyncratic synthesis 
of their two predecessors, Kant and Nietzsche. Viewing them from this 
perspective, that is, seeing them as lying both "betweerf' and "beyond" Nietzsche 
and Kant, enables us to understand more clearly the tensions and complexity of 
their work. 
Along with the selectivity of their interpretation of Kant, they also embrace 
postmodernity not as an absolute given but as an attitude in a historical 
conjuncture. By "attitude", Foucault means a way of thinking and acting, the 
consciousness of the discontinuity of time, of a break with tradition, a feeling of 
novelty This is the same with Arendt. Rather than seeking to distinguish the 
modern era from the premodern or postmodern, they try to find out how the 
attitude of modernity has found itself struggling with attitudes of 
"countermodemity" (Foucault, 1984: 39). Arendt's turn to Socrates and 
Foucault's turn to Kant should be understood in this light. Foucault writes about 
knowledge, power and the self, and Arendt writes about action, thinking and 
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judgment in a modernity-crisis when a taken-for granted understanding of reality 
as well as the conventional categories of interpretation ceases to function as a 
shared background. In other words, the breakdown of the traditional virtues in 
Athens at the time of Socrates, the end of metaphysics at the time of Kant are 
parallel to the one Foucault and Arendt confronted after Auschwitz and Gulag. In 
this sense, for Foucault and Arendt, postmodernity is not a terminus of critical 
inquiry but an inescapable element of our historical experience. 
Considering their way of accepting postmodernity not as an absolute given but as 
an attitude as well as the selectivity and idiosyncrasy of their interpretation of 
Kant, the mapping of modernism/ postmodernism, and of Kant/ Nietzsche is 
inadequate to read Foucault and Arendt. This invites a new reading, placing them 
within a tradition of critical theory running from Kant to Nietzsche. Critical 
thought, which is experiment as well as problematization (Foucault, 1992; orig. 
1984: 8-92 13; Arendt, 1968b: 14-15), must live within a field of tension. In this 
light, I argue that these tensions between premodern, modem, and postmodern 
perspectives as well as between Kant and Nietzsche provide the elements for the 
uniqueness and coherence of their work, and that viewing these tensions as a 
source of contradiction fundamentally distorts their intentions. 
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2. The Political and the Personal: Tensions and Continuity 
Arendt insisted that "thinking and acting are not the same", that "they occupy two 
entirely different existential POsitione' (Arendt, 1979: 304-305). This distinction 
between thinking and acting underlies her phenomenology of human activities, 
providing the basic architecture for her consideration of the active life in Me 
Human Condilion and the mental activities in Ihe Life of the Mind. Arendt 
believed that action took place in the world, with others, while thinking involved a 
withdrawal from the world into the solitude of an internal "dialogue ... 
between me 
and myself' (Arendt, 1971: 185). This formulation of the gap between thinking 
and acting has frustrated many theorists who want to link theory and practice, and 
has driven her sympathetic critics to her fragmentary and unfinished work on 
judgment (Habermas, 1983; Benhabib, 1992b; Gray; 1979; Miller. 1979; 
Bernstein, 1986; Beiner, 1982; 1983). Their paths are diverse, but their hope has 
been that her analysis of this faculty would provide the missing link between the 
life of the citizen and the life of the mind. Arendt encouraged such hopes by 
referring the faculty of judgment as "the most political of man's mental abilitiee' 
and "the political faculty par excellence" (Arendt, 1984; 36). Furthermore, her 
description of political or representative thinking in several essays from the 1960s, 
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certainly seems to show the faculty of judgment as a kind of bridge between 
thought and action. Yet Arendt remained adamant about keeping them distinct. 
She continued to insist upon the distinction between thinking and its "by-product" 
judgment, as well as distinction between judgment and action (Cf Arendt, 1971: 
69,70; 1984: 37). 
On the surface of Arendt's work, there is the shift from the vita activa to the vita 
contemplativa, and there are two different accounts of judgment, which 
correspond to two distinct phase of her thought. As Beiner suggests, it is quite 
plausible to speak of not one, but two theories of judgment in Arendt (Beiner, 
1982: 91). The first, earlier theory considers judgment from the perspective of vita 
activa; the second, later theory considers it from the standpoint of the life of the 
mind. Thus as we move from Arendt's essays of the 1960s to her writings of the 
1970s, the emphasis in her account of judgment "shifts from the representative 
thought and enlarged mentality of political agents to the spectatorship and 
retrospective judgment of historians and storytellers" (Beiner, 1984: 9 1). 
Is there a "flagrant contradiction" (Bernstein, 1986: 23 1) in Arendt's thought on 
judgment? I think not. Of course, the faculty of judgment looks different 
depending on whether we take the perspective of the actor or the spectator. But it 
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is simply not the case that Arendt recommended common sense, persuasion, and 
consensus for those in the game, and critical thinking, and autonomy for those 
who were out of it. If we step back and examine the earlier work and the later 
work in context, and relate them to Arendt's account of critical thinking, we see 
the underlying continuity in her thought on judgment. 
It is because of the modem crisis in judgment, of the growth of inability to judge, 
that Arendt explicitly turns to Socrates as a model. She poses Socrates as a model 
of critical thinking or Selbsidenken [self-thinking], since he exposed unexamined 
prejudgment to the wind of thought, while putting no truth in their place. Hence 
critical thinking is an essentially destructive activity. The Socratic dialogue can 
hardly be characterized as deliberation aiming at decision and action. Socratic 
thinking is a public use of reason, yet this kind of thinking prepares for judgment 
by suspending all fixed habits of thought, ossified rule and standards. 
The testing and examination of opinions that is the heart of critical thinking is 
practiced not only by Socrates, but also by Kant. In fact, as the Kant lectures make 
clear, "representative thinking" and "enlarged mentality" are not just models of 
ubl,, p ic deliberation. They are, rather, the necessary vehicles of critical thinking. 
They proceed imaginatively, drawing on the possible standpoints and opinions of 
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others in order to "abstract from the limitations which contingently attach to our 
own judgment' (Kant in Arendt, 1982: 43). 
What links Socratic dialectic and Kantian enlarged thought for Arendt is the way 
both yield not the truth, or an Archimedean standpoint, but a more impartial, and 
hence valid, each individual's doxa, his or her "it appears to me" (Arendt, 1990: 
80-8 1; 1968b: 241-242; 1982: 3 7-40). If we view Arendt's thoughts on judgment 
in terms of a broader perspectivism, the standpoint of the actor and the spectator 
emerge not as two radically different kinds of judgment (engaged and political vs. 
detached and historical), but rather as two poles of spontaneous, independent 
judgment. To be sure, the "general standpoint" of the impartial judge is different 
from the seemingly more vigorous standpoint of the citizen. Yet, the 
representative thinking made possible by disinterested judgment is crucially 
dependent upon perspective. As Nietzsche reminds us, its objectivity arises from 
being able to use "more" and "different" eyes to judge and to interpret a thing 
(Nietzsche, 1989: 12; cf Arendt, 1968b: 241). 
The shift from the political to the private is also found in Foucault's thought. On 
the surface of Foucault's work, there is the third major shift, from the 
archaeological focus on systems of knowledge in the 1960s, to the genealogical 
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focus on modalities of power in the 1970s, to the focus on technologies of the self, 
ethics, and freedom in the 1980s. It could be said that in his earlier work, Foucault 
privileged political issues relating to the theme of power, but in his later work he 
states that "'what interests me is much more morals than politics or, in any case, 
politics as an ethics" (1984: 375), and that "it is not power, but the subject, which 
is the general theme of my research7' (1983a: 209). 
As Dews (1987) has noted Foucault rejects the Enlightenment model which links 
consciousness, self-reflection, and freedom, and instead follows Nietzsche's claim 
in The Genealogy ofMorals that self-knowledge, particularly in the form of moral 
consciousness, is a strategy and effect of power by which one internalizes social 
control. However, in his later work, he focuses on the new project and revalues 
previous positions. One important shift in Foucault's later work involves a 
revaluation of the Enlightenment in terms of its positive contributions to a critique 
of the present era and his identification of his own work with a trajectory of 
critical theory running from Kant to Nietzsche to the Frankfurt School. The 
secoad major difference involves a qualified turn to a problematic of the creative 
subject, which was previously rejected as a humanist fiction, along with the use of 
the vocabulary of freedom, liberty, and autonomy, previously eschewed by the 
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theorist of the death of man. 
Is there a flagrant contradiction in Foucault's thought? I think not. I do not want to 
deny the shift in emphasis. But this does not mean that Foucault abandons his past 
concepts and methods, for all three axes of his studies - the axis of knowledge, 
the axis of power, the axis of ethics (Foucault, 1984: 48) - overlap in his later 
works on techniques of self (see Foucault, 1984: 47-49; 1992; orig. 1984: 11-13). 
The archaeology of problernatizations intersects with a genealogy of the ethical 
practices of the self. Nor is it that the turn to analysis of techniques of the self 
represents a rejection of his earlier political positions, since ethics for Foucault 
suggests the struggle of individuals against the forces that dominate, subjugate, 
and subjectify them. 
Foucault still rejects essentialist liberation models that assume the self is an inner 
essence waiting to be liberated from its repression or alienation. He contrasts 
liberation with liberty, and defines the later as an ongoing ethical practice of self- 
mastery and care of the self. He sees liberty as "the ontological condition of 
ethice' and ethics as "the deliberate form assumed by liberty' (1988a: 4). 
Similarly, the return of the subject in Foucault is not a return to a pre- 
archaeological - i. e., humanist or phenomenological - concept of the subject 
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endowed with an inner essence that stands apart from the social. The subject is 
still discursively and socially conditioned for Foucault, and still theorized as 
situated within power relation. The difference is that individuals also have the 
power to define their own identity, to master their body and desires, and to forge a 
practice of freedom through techniques of the self. What Foucault suggests, 
therefore, is a tensional relationship between an active and creative agent and a 
constraining social field. 
3. Pessimistic Faith in Action and Resistance 
The cumulative effect of Foucault's archaeologies and genealogies is perhaps 
enervating. For, in his description, power is diffused throughout the social field 
and individuals have been caught within a complex grid of disciplinary, 
normalizing, panoptic powers. There are no spaces of primary liberty in society, 
power is everywhere. As he says, "What I am attentive to is the fact that every 
human relation is to some degree a power relation. We move in a world of 
perpetual strategic relations" (Foucault, 1988e: 168). 
Despite this intense vision of oppression, it is a mistake to see Foucault as a 
fatalist with respect to social and political change for his work can be read another 
way. Indeed, Foucault's own interventions into political struggles and debates 
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would make little sense if he felt that the deadlock of power was unbreakable. 
Foucault's optimism issues from his belief in the contingency and vulnerability of 
power: "There's an optimism that consists in saying that things couldn't be better. 
My optimism would consist rather in saying that so many things can be changed, 
fragile as they are, bound up more with circumstances than necessities, more 
arbitrary than self-evident, more a matter of complex, but temporary, historical 
circumstances than with inevitable anthropological constraints" (Foucault, 1988e: 
156). 
Misinterpretations of Foucault turn on a conflation between power as omnipresent 
and as omnipotent. While power is everywhere, it is indissociable from 
contestation and struggle: "I am just saying: as soon as there is power relation, 
there is a possibility of resistance. We can never be ensnared by power: we can 
always modify its grip in determinate conditions and according to a precise 
strategy" (Foucault, 1988e: 123). The common argument that Foucault presents 
subjects as helpless and passive victims of power fails to observe his emphasis on 
the contingency and vulnerability of power and the places in his work where he 
describes actual resistance to it (see Foucault, 1991a; orig. 1975: 273ff.; 1990a; 
orig. 1976: 101). 
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The pervasive effect of Arendt's fragmentary historiography is also enervating. 
Me Human Condition is a narrative about the decline of action and the public 
realm throughout the modem age. "The purpose of the historical analysis", she 
tells us, "is to trace back modem world alienation, its twofold flight from the earth 
into the universe and from the world into the self' (Arendt, 1958: 6). The story 
she unfolds is not an optimistic one. The modem "rise of the social" promotes the 
absorption of the public realm by household concerns, while homo faber's 
utilitarianism result in "the instrumentalization of the whole world and the earth" 
(Arendt, 1958: 157). In addition, the developments of modem science provoke the 
tendency to view the earth, which Arendt calls "the very quintessence of the 
human conditiOrf '(Arendt, 195 8: 2), as merely one more object, and technological 
automation leads to the transformation of work into a form of labor. The overall 
result is pervasive and radical world alienation. Worldlessness, a loss of the world, 
is "always a form of barbarisnf' (Arendt, 1968a: 13), and the forces released by 
modernity are, according to Arendt, directly responsible for this state of affairs. In 
other words, the forces of capitalist expropriation and accumulation of wealth, of 
modern science, and of technology have contributed intensively to the 
undermining the world, then eventually to an alienation from the world. 
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Misinterpretations of Arendt base on the unquestioned assumptions that she stands 
for the recovery of a single, institutionalized public sphere. Rather, her 
pronouncement about the end of the common world in the modem age implies 
that the prospect for a comprehensive public sphere is obscure and dark. Indeed, 
from the standpoint of her critique of modernity, action in the strict sense is no 
longer possible. It is precisely the impossibility of a genuine public sphere in 
postmodernity that leads Arendt to stress "the unending discourse" (Arendt, 
1968a: 27) over consensus, resistance over docility, and the "defeated causes" of 
the "revolutionary spirit" over the normalizing politics of representative 
democracy. Her faith in action and her pessimistic prospects for a public sphere 
reflects a continuing wonder at the fact that political action persists in the various 
"defeated causes". 
Foucault's historical analysis as well as that of Arendt manifests grim pessimism 
and despair penetrating history. As Foucault puts it, "the fear of ridicule or the 
bitterness of history prevents most of us from putting side by side: revolution and 
happiness 
... or 
indeed, revolution and pleasure' (Foucault, 1990a; orig. 1976: 7). 
Arendt is also aware of how the energies of modernity, which initially open the 
possibility of a groundless politics, end in intensifying the paradox of revolution 
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and political action. ' In other words, the moment in which a space of freedom 
emerges is also a beginning of its disappearance. The combination of modem 
world alienation with the late-modem escalation of the automatism makes the 
appearance of freedom "miracles" (Arendt, 1968: 168). 
The image of fragile "island of freedonf' surrounded by a sea of automatic 
process (Arendt, 1968b: 168) is parallel to Foucault's conviction that phenomenon 
of revolt is itself inherently mysterious and inscrutable. As he puts it, "the man 
who rebels is finally inexplicable; it takes a wrenching away that interrupt the 
flow of history, and its long chains of reasons ... people do revolt; that 
is a fact. 
And that is how subjectivity (not that of great men, but that of anyone) is brought 
into history, breathing life into it ... A question of ethics? Perhaps. A question of 
reality, without a doubf' (Foucault, 2000: 449,452). 
The despair arises from the "bitterness of historý', but if there is no resistance to 
that bitterness, the one-dimensional despair leads only to political depression and 
theoretical closure. Similarly, if the hope is not grounded firmly in that same 
' "If foundation was the aim and the end of revolution, then the revolutionary spirit was not merely 
the spirit of beginning something new but of starting something permanent and enduring; a lasting 
institution, embodying this spirit and encouraging it to new achievements, would be self-defeating. 
From which it unfortunately seems to follow that nothing threatens the very achievements of 
revolution more dangerously and more acutely than the spirit which has brought them about. 
Should freedom in its most exalted sense as freedom to act be the price to be paid for foundation? " 
(Arendt, 1963: 232). 
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bitterness of history, it becomes just a one-dimensional and silly expression of 
optimism. As Arendt argues, "progress and doom are two sides of the same 
medal" and "both are articles of superstitions, not of faitW' (Arendt, 195 1: vii). 
For some, this state of affairs may be a source of despair, for Foucault and Arendt, 
however, it signifies both loss and hope. 
Arendt's point as a critic of liberalism and modernity is similar to Foucault: it is 
not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous (see Foucault, 1983b: 
231-232). This includes those modem political innovations for which she - and 
we - are necessarily grateful. Arendt's theoretical work as well as that of Foucault 
demonstrates how man as a political being must refuse both "the blackmail of 
Enlightenment" (Foucault, 1984: 42) and the appeal to a religiosity as well as 
"political double bind, which is ... individualization and totalization of modem 
power structuree' (Foucault, 1983a: 216). 
4. Reflections on Work and Life: From the Pariah's Point of View 
Along with theoretical tensions, the life and writings of Foucault and Arendt also 
present a paradox. As Habermas points out, "in Foucault the stoic attitude of the 
observer who keeps his precise distance, obsessed with objectivity, was combined 
with the opposite element of passionate self-consuming participation in the reality 
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of the historical momenf' (Habermas, 1986: 103). Foucault shares this tension 
with Arendt. That is, there is the tension in Foucault and Arendt, which resists 
easy categorization, between the scholar striving objectivity - whether in the form 
of genealogical objectivity or the Arendtian objectivity achieved by distance and 
imagination - on the one hand, and, the politically vital, morally sensitive 
intellectual, on the other. In fact, this is an issue which is so close to the center of 
their work and life that they were not often clear about it. In an interview 
published shortly before his death, Foucault speaks for himself. 
The role of an intellectual is not to tell others what they have to do. By what 
right would he do so? And remember all the prophecies, promises, injunctions, 
and programs that intellectuals have managed to formulate over the last two 
centuries and whose effects we can now see. The work of an intellectual is not 
to shape others' political will; it is, through the analyses that he carries out in 
his own fields, to question over and over again what is postulated as self- 
evident, to disturb people's mental habits, the way they do and think things, to 
dissipate what is familiar and accepted, to reexamine rules and institutions and 
on the basis of this re-problematization (in which he carries out his specific task 
as an intellectual) to participate in the formation of a political will (in which he 
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has his role as a citizen to play) (Foucault, 1988e: 265, my emphasis). 
This quotation points to the tension between Foucault's work and life, between his 
political commitments and theoretical detachment. This is the same with Arendt. I 
want to conclude by examining this issue in the point of the pariah they 
distinctively hold. As I will seek to show, for Foucault and Arendt, looking at 
things from "the pariah's point of view" was a lifetime vocation. It is an 
admirable vocation, but one which cannot provide a theoretical apparatus as a 
guiding thread nor a bridge between theory and practice. If we desire, then, to do 
justice to Foucault and Arendt's insights concerning the interrelations of what we 
are thinking and what we are doing, we must avoid the twin temptations of 
political commitment and theoretical detachment. For, in the end, what Foucault 
and Arendt teach us is the irreducible need to be both in and out of the game. 
Let's go back to Foucault's first major book, Madiiess and Civilizatioti, here. In 
this book, Foucault follows the images of woe-begotten yet holy lepers with 
equally compelling description of the Ship of Fools, Narrenschiff. During the 
Renaissance the mad were loaded onto the ship and sent off to sail down Europe's 
rivers in search of their sanity. On this subject, Foucault wrote: "He [the madman] 
is put in the interior of the exterior, and inversely ... He is a prisoner in the midst of 
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what is the freest, the openest of routes: bound fast at the infinite crossroads. He is 
the Passenger par excellence: that is, the prisoner of the passage' (Foucault, 1989; 
orig. 1961: 11). As we have already seen, in this description, the madman's 
passage is no other than the odyssey of Foucault's thought, from the sea to the 
ship of the sea, or rather precisely, from "the thought of the outside" (power) to 
"the inside of thought" (subjectivation) (see Deleuze, 1988). But, there is more. It 
is, to some extent, an analogy of his life as a pariah. 
I see Foucault as a pariah not only because of his sexuality but also because of his 
ethos, his philosophical life. According to Young-Bruehl, "a self-conscious 
pariah" is not only the theme of Arendt's book, Rahel Varnhagen, but also the 
theme of her life (Young-Bruehl in Hill, 1979: 3). Furthermore, "in Hannah 
Arendt's lexicon... real people were pariahs" (Young-Bruehl, 1982: xv). This is 
the same with Foucault. I think that the pariah perspective is not limited to an 
actual condition -a Jew or a homosexual and so on - but linked to the 
philosophical question, i. e., the ontology of human beings. In this sense, the 
personal ideal of pariahdom, which Foucault and Arendt framed in their youth, 
was transformed in their later years into the intellectual's raison d'Etre as well as 
political ideas. 
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Arendt borrowed the term pariah and parvenu from the French journalist Bernard 
Lazare (Arendt, 1978: 68-69). While the pariah is the one who is cast aside, 
marginalized, and treated with contempt by society because of his or her otherness, 
the parvenu denied his or her otherness so as to become accepted by the dominant 
society. Arendt's own understanding of the pariah's perspective is best expressed 
in her letter to Gershom Scholem: 
What confused you is that my arguments and my approach are different from 
what you are used to; in other words, the trouble is that I am independent. By 
this I mean, on the one hand, that I do not belong to any organization and 
always speak only for myself, and on the other hand, that I have great 
confidence in Lessing's selbsidenken [self-thinking] for which, I think, no 
ideology, no public opinion, and no "convictions" can ever be a substitute 
(Arendt, 1978: 250). 
The pariah's task, in Arendt's understanding, was to be alert to the unexpected, to 
look at how things and event appear without preconceptions about history's 
course or pattern, to avoid sacrificing the outsider's perspective for the parvenu's 
comforts. Arendt's solution to her own Jewish problem was not to repudiate her 
Jewishness nor blindly affirm it, but to adopt the stance of a conscious pariah, an 
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outsider among non-Jews, and a rebel among her own people. It was because of 
this marginal position that she was able to gain critical insights into both the 
Jewish and non-Jewish world. 
It is possible to see that Foucault had to give sexuality a central position in his 
work, since it was central in his life, or that his last books in some ways constitute 
the personal ethics he imposed upon himself by force of will. Nevertheless, one 
cannot pretend that Foucault's entire work is explained by his homosexuality, as 
certain academics do (see Miller, 1993; Lila, 2001), imagining, moreover, that this 
would be enough to discredit it. 
It is interesting to see how an intellectual project is born in an experience that 
should perhaps be described as primary. However, it is much more important to 
see how an intellectual adventure is created in the struggle of individual and social 
life, not to remain stuck in them, but to think them through, to go beyond them, to 
problematize them. In doing so, Foucault ironically turns the question back on 
those who level it. Do you really know who you are? Are you so sure of your 
reason, of your scientific concept, of your categories of your conception? 
Foucault tries to perform the philosophical task as a pariah by taking the double 
detour of literature and theory. On the one hand, there is his fascination with 
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writers who deal with "transgression", the "limit experience". By reading Bataille, 
Maurice Blanchot, and Klossowski, Foucault seeks to discover the possibility of a 
mad philosopher (see Foucault, 1977a, 'A Preface to Transgression'). On the other 
hand, there is his examination at a historical level of the scientific status of 
psychological disciplines, the medical gaze, and then the established human 
sciences as a whole. "Every time I have tried to do a piece of theoretical work7, he 
said in 1981, "it has been on the basis of elements of my own experience: always 
in connection with processes I saw unfolding around me ... each time was partly a 
fragment of autobiography" (Foucault, 2000: 458). 
Exile is one of the saddest fates. In premodern times, banishment was a 
particularly dreadful punishment. There has always been an association between 
the idea of exile and the terrors of being a leper or a madman, a social and moral 
untouchable. And yet, it is true that in the idea of exile, there is, in a self-tortured 
way, the irresistible temptation of not following the prescribed path. Originally, 
exile is an actual condition, but it is also a metaphorical condition. In other words, 
the condition of exile is produced not only by the social and political trimming but 
also by the censorship of conscience. As Foucault describes, the exile is put 
"across a half-real, half-imaginary geography", from "a visible fortress of order" 
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to the "castle of our conscience" (Foucault, 1989; orig. 1961: 11). 
In Presentations of Me Intellectual (1994), Edward Said explores the role of the 
intellectual. He sees intellectual as an exile, whose spirit is "in opposition, rather 
than in accommodatioW' (Said, 1994: xvii), whose challenge is to be found in 
"dissent against the status quo" (Said, 1994: xvii). His diagnosis of the intellectual 
in exile is derives from the social and political history of dislocation and 
migration, for example, the widespread territorial rearrangements of the post- 
World War Two period, but his observation is not limited to it. Said argues that 
even intellectuals who are lifelong members of a society can be divided into 
insiders and outsiders: those, on the one hand, who belong fully society as it is, 
those who can be called yea-sayers; and on the other hand, the nay-sayers, the 
individuals at odds with their society and therefore outsiders and exiles so far as 
privileges and power are concerned (Said, 1994: 52-53). Said derives some 
positive things from exile and marginality, that is, the pleasure of restless and 
unsettled life: 
An intellectual is fundamentally about knowledge and freedom. Yet these 
acquire meaning not as abstractions ... but as experiences actually lived through. 
An intellectual is like a shipwrecked person who learns how to live in a certain 
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sense with the land, not on it, not like Robinson Crusoe whose goal is to 
colonize his little island, but more like Marco Polo, whose sense of the 
marvelous never fails him, and who is always a traveler, a provisional guest, not 
a freeloader, conqueror, or raider (Said, 1994: 59-60). 
In this book, Said does not deal with Foucault and Arendt as examples, but his 
diagnosis of the intellectual in exile explains Foucault and Arendt very well. It is a 
matter of thinking of the intellectual vocation as maintaining a state of constant 
alertness, of a perpetual willingness not to let the one and only truth or accepted 
ideas dominate. It also involves a sense of the present, an almost athletic rational 
energy, and a complicated struggle to balance the problems of one's own selfbood 
against the public demands, an everlasting effort, constitutionally unfinished and 
necessarily imperfect. The exile sees things both in terms of what has been left 
behind and what is actual here and now, there is a double perspective that never 
sees things in isolation. Also, the exile intellectual does not respond to the logic of 
the conventional but to the audacity of daring, and to representing change, to 
moving on, not standing still. In a very Deleuzian passage, Foucault speaks for 
himself. "I dream of the intellectual who destroys evidence and generalities, the 
one who, in the inertias constraints of the present time, locates and marks the 
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weak- points, the openings, the lines of force, who is incessantly on the move, 
doesn't know exactly where he is heading nor what he will think tomorrow for he 
is too attentive to the presenf' (Foucault, 1988e: 124). 
What Foucault shares with Arendt is a peculiar critical sense, a sense of being 
unwilling to accept easy formulas, or ready-made clich6s, or orthodox party line, 
or fixed dogma. They both are against belief in a theoretical god or a political god 
of any sort. Of course, there is no real pariahdom, even for the exile who tries to 
remain suspended, since the state of inbetweenness can itself become a rigid 
ideological position. Furthermore, for the intellectual in exile, there is always a 
danger of being irresponsible and flippant under the disguise of marginality. 
Nevertheless, what strikes me as much more important is how to keep a space in 
the mind open for doubt and for the part of an alert, skeptical irony, also self-irony 
It is "the ethics of discomfort" that consists in revising certainties without 
renouncing convictions, in managing to change one's opinion and at the same 
time to remain faithful to oneself It is Foucault's urging that one is "never to 
consent to being completely comfortable with one's own presuppositions" 
(Foucault, 2000: 448), which brings to mind Arendt's letter to Gershom Scholem 
(Arendt, 1978: 250), and her confidence in selbadetiken [self-thinking] rather than 
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fixed opinion or unmovable thought. 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
In this work, I present an interpretation of Foucault and Arendt. Recognizing the 
problems of attaching labels to Foucault's work and that of Arendt, I focus on the 
tensions and complexity of their work. My reading develops under following 
contentions. 
First, Foucault and Arendt are fascinated by history and the relationship between 
personal experience and those events of which they are a part. Particularly, the 
experience of totalitarianism and Stalinism, which they see as a disease of modem 
power, haunts their critique of modernity as a whole. This is not to say their 
writings on history are only concerned with actual experiences, whether 
contemporary or historical. Because their writings on history are intertwined with 
41an exercise of oneself in the activity of thought", which constantly undoes its 
own construction. Furthermore, a tension between their profound commitment to 
political reality and the sense of detachment from the subject matter continually 
complicates their work. However, these tensions in theory as well as in practice, in 
the technique of life as well as in the political choices provide the elements for the 
uniqueness and coherence of their work. 
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In this sense, a new historiography performed by Foucault and Arendt is neither 
subjective nor objective. Rather it is an unusual combination of imagination, 
analysis, and commitment. Yet, we should not forget that they were very wary of 
the analytic link between a "philosophical conception7' and the "concrete political 
attitude", between "what one is thinking and saying" and "what one is doing". For 
them, this ideal is chimera and a dangerous one, because it grows out of and 
enforces an instrumental configuration of theory and practice. 
Bearing these questions in mind, we should read Foucault and Arendt not only 
through their ideas, but also through Foucault's "ethosP and Arendt's "moral 
taste'. We should perform the two readings, which are, on the one hand, a 
scientific analysis of their work, the ability to decipher Foucault's "ethos" and 
Arendt's "judgmenf', on the other. 
Second, there are three dimensions of Foucault's work: power, knowledge, and 
self. Also, there are three dimensions of Arendt's work: thinking, action, and 
judgment. These dimensions are irreducible, yet constantly imply one another. A 
philosophy, especially one so subtle and complex such as Foucault and Arendt, 
must always be understood at a distance. We should not allow ourselves to 
become too caught up in a certain phase of their thought. We should rather step 
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back. NVe should read the earlier work in relation to the later. Although there is the 
shift in Foucault and Arendt, from the focus on the political to the focus on the 
personal, when viewed in terms of a three-fold circular (i. e., non-totalizing) 
reciprocity, we see the underlying continuity in their thought. In this regard, it is 
one of the goal of this work to decenter the place of Discipline and Punish and 
Ae Human Condition. Only when read Discipline and Punish and Yhe Human 
Condition in the light of the historical development of their thought as a whole, 
we can understand Foucault and Arendt, then can indeed go beyond them. 
Third, questioning the adequacy of the mapping of modernism and 
postmodemism, I do not read Foucault and Arendt as postmodernists fout court, 
but rather as theorists who combine premodern, modem, and postmodern 
perspectives. There are tensions in Foucault's thought between totalizing/ 
detotalizing impulses, discursive/ extra-discursive theorization, macro/micro 
perspectives, and domination/ resistance relations as well as between ethical- 
political commitments and archaeological detachment. There are also tensions in 
Arendt's thought between creative rupture and exercise in retrieval, between 
agonism and consensus as well as between existential engagement and 
philosophical withdrawal. 
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More importantly, Foucault and Arendt embrace postmodern sensibility not as an 
absolute given but as an attitude that must be - at the risk of inviting Nietzschean 
scorn - constantly checked and examined. For them, critique is based on a serious 
and sustained interrogation of historical experience as much as it is on a 
deconstruction of metaphysical philosophy. This is why they cannot be wholly 
understood by a stark opposition between modernism and postmodernism. 
Fourth, focusing on the selectivity and idiosyncrasy of their interpretation of Kant, 
I place Foucault and Arendt within a tradition of critical thought running from 
Kant to Nietzsche. Indeed, what binds Foucault and Arendt together is the effort 
to link Kant and Nietzsche in order to overcome the analytics of truth without 
abandoning philosophical seriousness. Foucault's turn to Kant in his later work 
enables him to identify the thread that connects Kant with Nietzsche within a 
critical thought. The critical ontology of ourselves and of the present, which 
Foucault sees that Kant formulated by reflecting on the Enlightenment and 
revolution, is Foucault's Kantian version of Nietzsche's ontological support of the 
moment against the flux of time. Also, Arendt's turn to Kant's aesthetic judgment 
in her later work- enables her to identify the thread to connect Kant with Nietzsche, 
the thread running from Kant's objectivity, the objectivity arises from being able 
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to "think in the place of everybody else" to Nietzsche's perspectival objectivity, 
the objectivity born of using "more" and "different" eyes to judge and to interpret 
a thing. The representative thinking made possible by disinterested judgment 
through a free play of imagination is Arendt's Kantian version of Nietzsche's 
perspectival objectivity Their challenge to Kant and Nietzsche or rather their 
Nietzscheanism with a Kantian twist opens the possibility of genuine dialogue 
between postmodern theory and critical theory. 
As we have seen, Foucault and Arendt are profoundly subtle, sophisticated but not 
well-conceptualized thinkers whose thought is in tensions. However, in this work, 
the tensions of their work are not the target of criticism but the positive working 
concept. What Foucault and Arendt teach us is that critical thought must live in 
the field of tension. Far from vindicating one against the other, this work is also 
situated in the force field created by these interpretative tensions which run deep 
in this work. 
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